Japan had an active biological weapons (BW) program prior to 1945. The focal point was the now infamous Unit 731 based at a laboratory complex in northeastern China during the Japanese occupation. Unit 731 experimented on Chinese civilians and Allied prisoners of war with various biological agents, including plague, cholera, and hemorrhagic fever. After World War II, the Japanese government abandoned its BW program. Japan signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it in 1982. Japan has actively supported negotiation of a protocol to strengthen current BWC provisions. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack and failed attempt to disperse anthrax, Japan has increased its focus on bio-terrorism defenses. Although Japan has a growing biotechnology industry, it is still small in comparison to its chemical industry. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan's biotech industry is subject to a comprehensive set of export controls.
The U.S. offensive biological warfare (BW) program was launched in 1943 and terminated in 1969, by executive order. During this period, the U.S. weaponized a variety of pathogens and toxins for use against humans and plants. The anti-human agents it developed for weapons purposes were Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), the Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B. The anti-plant agents were the fungi that cause wheat rust and rice blast. In addition, U.S. military scientists conducted research on pathogens that cause smallpox, glanders, and plague, as well as several toxins, such as botulinum toxin, saxitoxin, and ricin. The entire U.S. BW stockpile was destroyed in 1969 and 1970; since that time, it has not had an offensive BW program. The U.S. ratified the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) in March 1975 and had an important role in the process of developing confidence-building measures (CBMs) during several BWC review conferences. However, in 2001, the Bush administration rejected an effort by other signatories to conclude a protocol that would provide verification measures. Since then, the remaining parties to the BWC have conducted semiannual meetings to discuss, among other things, national measures for the implementation of biosecurity regulations and penal legislation, leading up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. In addition, the United States has conducted an active biodefense program for many years in accordance with BWC provisions that permit the use of agents of types and in quantities appropriate for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. These activities are reported each year to Congress and in an annual information exchange on biodefense activities under the BWC. A 4 September 2001 New York Times article identified previously undisclosed U.S. government biodefense projects involving a model of a germ bomb, a factory to make biological agents, and the development of more potent anthrax. The United States denied allegations that this research was anything other than defensive in nature and asserted that it did not violate any BWC provisions or CBMs. On 28 April 2004, President Bush outlined the administration's perspective on biological weapons by issuing National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-33) called "Biodefense for the 21st Century", an initiative to strengthen the country's biodefense capabilities through programs in threat awareness, prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and response and recovery. The Bush administration also faces criticism that financial resources have been redirected from non-biodefense research in order to fund additional biodefense research.
Japanese scientists began developing chemical weapons (CW) as early as 1917. The Japanese Army used CW after invading China in 1937, conducting an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 attacks. Japan reportedly produced five to seven million munitions containing agents such as phosgene, mustard, lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and diphenyl cyanarsine. Although Japanese forces used many of these munitions between 1937 and 1945, a considerable amount was abandoned when Japanese forces retreated. After World War II, Japan pledged to not produce CW and participated in the negotiations for the CWC, which Japan signed in 1993 and ratified in 1995. Japan's CWC obligations include the responsibility for the disposal of abandoned CW (ACW) in China. The deadline for completion of the clean-up is 2007, but the scale of the program has led many to estimate that Japan will need an extension. Japan's chemical industry is the world's second largest, with about 16 percent of global chemical production. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan has developed comprehensive and well-enforced export controls on chemical weapons precursors and dual-use items. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack, Japanese spending on CW defense has increased.
The U.S. chemical warfare (CW) program began with the establishment of the Chemical Warfare Service in June 1918. During World War I, the United States manufactured, stockpiled, and used chemical weapons. Chemical weapons development and production continued during and after World War II, but the production of unitary chemical munitions was terminated in 1969. During the Reagan administration, the production of binary chemical weapons was restarted, but was discontinued in 1990. Since then, the United States no longer has an active CW program. The United States ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1975, with the reservation that the treaty not apply to defoliants and riot control agents such as were used in Vietnam and Laos during the Vietnam War. Currently, the United States has what is believed to be the world's second largest stockpile of chemical weapons, including bombs, rockets, and artillery shells that are loaded with lewisite, mustard, sarin, soman, VX, or binary nerve agents. Under terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which the United States ratified in April 1997, the United States has committed to destroying all chemical stockpiles by April 2004. However in September 2003, the Pentagon announced that it would be unable to meet this deadline and would ask for an extension at the Fall 2003 CWC meeting. As of 28 December 2004, the Chemical Materials Agency of the U.S. Army announced that only 33.34% of the nation's stored chemical agent, including 70% of the remaining mustard agent stockpile, and 42% of the nation's chemical weapons munitions had been destroyed. Former chemical production facilities and recovered chemical warfare materials are also being destroyed under the U.S. Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program (NSCMP). The NSCMP also destroyed 80% of the nation's original chemical weapons production facilities in 2003, 16 months ahead of schedule, and will meet the final deadline of 100% destruction by April 2007.
Japan does not have a ballistic missile development program, but its space program includes a number of technologies that could potentially be adapted to long-range missiles. The solid-fueled M-5 rocket system, first launched in 1995, includes technologies that could be adapted to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities roughly similar to those of the U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile. Japan's two-stage H-2 rocket is capable of placing a two-ton payload into orbit, but the H-2 is not optimal for ballistic missile applications due to its reliance on cryogenic liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuel. Japan lacks sophisticated command and control systems, as well as some guidance and warhead technology that would be necessary to develop operational missiles. Japan has partnered with the United States to research ballistic missile defenses (BMD), but has yet to make a final decision on future development and deployment. Many in Japan argue that a missile defense system would compliment the U.S. nuclear deterrent and defend against possible belligerents such as North Korea. Others argue that the system's costs outweigh the benefits, especially since the system's effectiveness is unproven. Missile defense also raises potential legal issues regarding Japanese legislation barring the military use of space. Japan is an active member of the MTCR and was involved in drafting the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC).
The United States has the capability to produce highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-fueled missiles of all ranges. It currently deploys 500 Minuteman and 10 MX/Peacekeeper nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at three bases in Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming. The number of warheads on Minuteman missiles was scheduled to be reduced from three to one by 2007 under the defunct START II agreement, but this plan may be revised to assign between 700 to 800 warheads to the 500 Minutemen missiles. Deactivation of the MX/Peacekeeper force began in October 2002 and will conclude in 2005, at the cost of $600 million. In 2004, the Defense Department retired 17 additional MX/Peacekeeper missiles as part of this plan, and the final 10 MX missiles will be withdrawn from alert status by October 1, 2005. These remaining missiles will not be destroyed as prescribed under START II, but will be retained as stipulated in the 2001 NPR for potential use as space launch vehicles, target vehicles, or for redeployment. The Minuteman missile force is also undergoing a $6.0 billion modernization program to improve the weapon's accuracy, reliability, and to extend its service life beyond 2020. A new, longer-range ICBM, to be ready in 2018, is being considered by the Pentagon. As of early 2005, the U.S. Navy had 14 operational Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), having reduced its level by one in 2004 to meet NPR specifications. The four oldest subs in the original class of 18 have been converted to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. The 14 operational SSBNs carry a total of 336 Trident-1 and Trident-II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), each carrying between six and eight warheads, for an estimated total of 2,016. All SSBNs will be modified to carry the Trident II missiles, and the navy has extended the service life of the Trident-II from 30 to 49 years. The Pentagon is planning to introduce a new SSBN in 2029 when the oldest of the current subs will be retired. Previous predictions indicated that the U.S. Navy would station the 14 SSBNs evenly among the Atlantic and Pacific fleets; however, recent planning shifts have called for an SSBN fleet of 9 to be stationed in the Pacific with only 5 submarines in the Atlantic. Also, in 2004, the Navy initiated the Enhanced Effectiveness (E2) Reentry Body Program that would allow missiles to be targeted within 10-meter accuracy, expanding the list of potential targets to be attacked by W76 warheads. Finally, the Navy plans to resume SLBM flight tests in 2005 and plans to develop a submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (SLIRBM) that would carry nuclear and conventional payloads. The U.S. bomber force consists of 94 B-52 bombers stationed at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana and Minot AFB in North Dakota, and 21 B-2 bombers stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. The B-52 can deliver air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), advanced cruise missiles (ACM), or gravity bombs. The B-2 carries only gravity bombs. It is estimated that 450 ALCMs are deployed as well as around 400 operational ACMs, which have a longer range, greater accuracy, and more difficult to intercept than an ALCM. The B-2s are scheduled to undergo upgrades allowing them to make mission and target changes in route. The U.S. Air Force intends to expedite the process of finding a replacement for its current bomber force, considering long- and mid-range options, unmanned aircraft, and new bombers. The United States is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whose goal is to control the transfer of nuclear-capable missiles and unmanned delivery systems capable of carrying all types of WMD.
Japan's "Atomic Energy Basic Law" allows only peaceful nuclear activities, and its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" pledge that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. Despite Japan's long-standing stance against nuclear weapons, there was an internal debate in the early 1970s about whether Japan should sign the NPT, in part due to concerns about assuring access to nuclear technology to meet national energy needs, and the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Some conservatives were also concerned that closing off the nuclear option might negatively impact future national security needs. Japan has played an active role in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and has proposed a process for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan ratified the CTBT in 1997 and has been a strong supporter of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). However, Japan's security relationship with the United States has tempered Tokyo's emphasis on disarmament. For example, Japan remains quiet about the possible presence of nuclear warheads on U.S. ships and military bases in Japan. Japan increasingly relies on nuclear power for its electricity needs, and has a highly developed civilian nuclear sector. Japan has a controversial program for recycling spent nuclear fuel that has produced large quantities of plutonium in the form of metal-oxide nuclear fuel. At the end of 2001, Japan had more than 30 metric tons of spent fuel stored at reprocessing plants in Britain and France, along with a domestic stockpile of 5 to 6 tons. These nuclear fuel stockpiles will ultimately return to Japan for use in domestic nuclear facilities. The original plan called for consumption of the stored fuel by 2010, but due to technical and safety issues, this timetable has been delayed and return of the stored fuel to Japan is proceeding slowly. Some argue this material could provide Japan with a latent nuclear weapons capability. In addition, the new facility under constructing in Rokkasho (Aomori Prefecture) will increase Japanese domestic reprocessing capacity and potentially produce an additional 5 tons of metal-oxide nuclear fuel per year. Although anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public has far outweighed support for keeping a nuclear option open, several neighboring countries have expressed concerns about possible Japanese nuclear ambitions. Partly in response to these fears, the Japanese government completed an internal study in 1995 that reaffirmed previous conclusions that developing nuclear weapons would damage both Japanâ€™s national security and regional security. However recent tension developing in the region, particularly in the Korean peninsula, has led to increased discussions in Japan about the once taboo subject of nuclear weapons development. Despite recent speculation that Japan may reconsider its nuclear options, the deep aversion to nuclear weapons among the Japanese public will likely make any move in this direction difficult.
As one of the five recognized nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States maintains a sizeable arsenal of nuclear weapons, including approximately 10,350 intact warheads, 5300 of which are considered active or operational. Approximately 4,530 strategic warheads are operational, 1,150 of which are deployed on land-based missile systems (Minuteman and Peacekeeper ICBMs), 1,050 on bombers (B-52 and B-2), and 2,016 on submarines (Ohio-class subs). 780 are tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), and consist of an estimated 200 Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles (TLAM/N), and 580 B61 bombs. The remaining warheads are stockpiled. The only remaining U.S. weapons in forward deployment, aside from those on SSBNs, are approximately 480 of the 580 operational B61 bombs, located at eight bases in six European NATO countries. According to the May 2002 Treaty of Moscow (the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT) between the United States and the Russian Federation, both countries are required to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012. In June 2004, the US Department of Energy announced that "almost half" of these warheads would be retired for dismantlement by 2012. This statement suggests that the total stockpile of 10,350 warheards would be reduced to about 6,000 by this date. Over 5,000 warheads have been removed from deployment by the United States and placed in a "responsive reserve force" (active but not deployed or in overhaul). These "spares," or warheads on inactive status, have not been dismantled, in keeping with past practice under previous U.S. arms control agreements. The Bush administration has rejected U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but calls for a continued moratorium on nuclear testing. The NPR calls for a reduction in the amount of time needed (now 18 months as mandated by Congress, but this could be reduced to as little as 12 months) to test a nuclear weapon, suggesting that the United States might decide to resume nuclear testing, although Bush administration officials deny that this is currently planned and explain the shortening of test-site readiness time as a logical extension of the U.S. decision to maintain a testing option. The NPR also calls for discussion on possible development of new, low-yield, bunker-busting TNW. A law barring research and development that could lead to the production by the United States of a new low-yield "bunker buster" nuclear weapon (warheads with a yield of 5 kilotons or less) was passed by Congress in 1994. In its FY2004 budget request, however, the Department of Defense requested a repeal of the 1994 law, suggesting that the U.S. government intends to proceed with development of new nuclear weapons. The repeal was approved by the Senate on 20 May 2003. The Bush administration has requested an additional $8.5 million in its 2006 budget in order to continue research of nuclear "bunker busters" under the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) Project. Congress rejected RNEP funding and resources for the Advanced Concepts Initiative, one that would develop mini-nukes or exotic designs, completely for FY2005. Weapons laboratories under the Department of Energy began research on the RNEP Project in 2003, and the study is expected to be complete in 2006. The United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, making it the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons during a conflict. It ratified the NPT in March 1970.
Japan's 1947 constitution, which renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes, sets important limits on Japanese security policy. Japan does not have any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, although it has the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. The Japanese government is highly active in the international nonproliferation and disarmament arena, and party to all relevant multilateral treaties and regimes. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack, Japan has been especially active in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997. Before 1945, Japan developed and employed both chemical and biological weapons. Japan is now a state party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Japan is also a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Zangger Committee. Japan has an active nuclear energy program, one of the world's leading chemical industries, a growing biotechnology sector, and an active commercial space program.
The United States possesses a substantial nuclear weapons arsenal and associated delivery systems. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review suggests that the United States may seek to develop, and possibly test, new types of nuclear weapons in the future. The United States destroyed its biological weapons by 1970 and is in the process of destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons. Some critics allege that elements of U.S. government biodefense research are in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).