DEFINITION: A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of chemical weapons of mass destruction.
|ArgentinaArgentina||There is no evidence that Argentina has ever had a chemical weapons (CW) program. Argentina has been active in CW nonproliferation efforts. In 1992, Argentina became a member of the Australia Group and, in October 1995, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Even before participation in these bodies, Argentina engaged in regional nonproliferation efforts; for example, Argentina signed the Mendoza Accord in 1991, which prohibits both chemical and biological warfare agents.|
|ArmeniaArmenia||On 15 May 1992, Armenia signed the Tashkent Agreement between the Commonwealth of Independent States, according to which Russia was acknowledged as the successor of Soviet chemical weapons. In signing the agreement, Armenia agreed to by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, abide by the Soviet moratarium of 1987 on the production of chemical weapons, coordinate its policy with a view to achieving the speedy conclusion of a multilateral and verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and coordinate its policy with regard to controlling the export of 'dual-use' chemicals. Armenia is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a founding member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.|
|BelarusBelarus||In January 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared that all former Soviet chemical weapons had been transferred to Russia. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Belarus does not have a chemical warfare (CW) program, nor does it have any plans to establish such a program in the future. Belarus is a State Party of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which it ratified in 1996.|
|BrazilBrazil||There is no evidence that Brazil has ever embarked on a chemical warfare (CW) program; to the contrary, Brazil is an extremely active participant in CW nonproliferation efforts. Even before the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came into existence, Brazil engaged in regional nonproliferation efforts. For example, in September 1991, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile signed the Mendoza Declaration, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transferâ€”directly or indirectlyâ€”chemical or biological weapons. Brazil participated actively in the negotiations for the CWC and ratified it in March 1996, thereby becoming a charter member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). By the end of 2000, Brazil had hosted five OPCW inspections of its chemical industry sites, as well as the first simulation of a challenge inspection of private industry.|
|ChinaChina||China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in December 1996, declaring two former chemical weapons (CW) production facilities that may have produced mustard gas and Lewisite. Since 1997, China has hosted 14 on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Although China claims that it no longer possesses any CW stockpiles, the U.S. government believes that China has not revealed the full scope of its program. China has signed a bilateral agreement with Japan to destroy CW that Japan abandoned in Chinese territory during World War II.|
|EgyptEgypt||Egypt is one of the few countries known to have employed chemical weapons against its enemies in the 20th century. Despite this history of use and contemporary concerns regarding the possession and proliferation of chemical weapons there is relatively little open-source information concerning Egypt's chemical warfare (CW) programs. There is strong evidence that during their intervention in the Yemen Civil War (1963-1967) Egyptian forces employed bombs and artillery shells filled with phosgene and mustard against the Royalist troops and civilians in North Yemen. Egypt appears to have inherited stocks of phosgene and mustard agents left behind by British forces when their occupation of Egypt ended in 1954. Egypt definitely received defensive CW assistance from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and early 1970s and might have received support for an offensive CW program. Since the 1980s Egypt has received training in defensive CW from the United States. Egypt maintains a substantial defensive CW capability and produces personal protective equipment and decontamination equipment for domestic use and export. It is strongly suspected, though not firmly established, that since the early 1960s Egypt has expanded its CW capability to include domestic production of nerve agents and psychoactive chemicals. By the early 1970s Egypt was believed to possess stocks of mustard, tabun and sarin. Reports in the 1990s claimed that Egypt had begun the production of VX nerve agent. Egypt possesses a sufficiently advanced chemical and industrial infrastructure to allow it to pursue the production of chemical weapons and their associated delivery systems if it chose to do so. Suspected Egyptian CW facilities include the Abu-Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides and the Abu Za'abal Company for Specialty Chemicals; there may be others. Egypt has been involved in at least two instances of chemical weapons related proliferation. The first case was the direct provision of weaponized agents in bombs and artillery shells to Syria prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur war. In the 1980s Egypt was a conduit for the supply of precursor chemicals to Iraqâ€™s CW program. These chemicals were often obtained from European suppliers and then exported to Iraq. It is possible that Egyptian personnel provided assistance to Iraqi forces in the development of tactics and doctrines for the use of CW. Egypt maintains commercial links with Syria and may supply Syria with many of its chemical needs thus directly or indirectly supporting that countryâ€™s own chemical weapons program. Despite the widely held belief that it maintains an offensive CW program Egypt is still able to import the materials and equipment that it requires for the functioning of its chemical industries. Egypt is not subject to military or economic sanctions but is subject to some restrictions associated with the enforcement of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Egypt acceded to the Geneva Protocol on December 6, 1928, but remains outside the CWC. The Egyptian government publicly denies developing, acquiring, or producing CW but has indicated that it will not accede to the CWC until questions regarding Israelâ€™s nuclear weapons are addressed.|
|FranceFrance||France developed and used chemical weapons in WWI and maintained stockpiles of mustard gas and phosgene at the beginning of WWII. In a 1988 speech to the United Nations, French President Mitterrand claimed that France had no chemical weapons and would produce none in the future. Having no evidence to the contrary, it should be accepted that France no longer has a chemical warfare (CW) program nor does it have chemical weapons stockpiles. France ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on March 2, 1995.|
|IndiaIndia||After many years of denying the existence of a chemical weapon program, India disclosed in June 1997 that it possessed chemical weapons. Few details are publicly available concerning Indian chemical weapon stockpiles, although Chinese researchers suggest that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents, mostly mustard agent, located at five chemical weapon production and storage facilities. Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which India signed in 1993 and ratified in September 1996, India must destroy 45 percent of its stockpile by 2004 and the remaining stockpile by 2007.|
|IranIran||Iran suffered severe losses from the use of Iraqi chemical weapons over the period 1982 to 1988. As a consequence Iran has a great deal of experience of the effects of chemical warfare (CW). Iran has continued to maintain a significant defensive CW capability since the end of the Gulf War in 1988. The most important incentive for this effort was probably concern that Iraq continued to possess chemical weapons. Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and has been an active participant in the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Iran has publicly acknowledged the existence of a chemical weapons program developed during the latter stages of the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. On ratifying the CWC Iran opened its facilities to international inspection and claimed that all offensive CW activities had been terminated and the facilities destroyed. Nevertheless the United States has continued to claim that Iran maintains an active program of development and production of chemical weapons. This program reportedly includes the production of sarin, mustard, phosgene, and hydrocyanic acid. The U.S. government estimates that Iran can produce 1,000 metric tons of agent per year and may have a stockpile of at least several thousand metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent. Open-sources do not provide unambiguous support to these accusations. Iran strongly denies producing or possessing chemical weapons. To date the United States has not pursued options available to it under international law to convincingly demonstrate Iranian noncompliance with the CWC. Iran is committed to the development of its civilian and military industries and this has involved an ongoing process of modernisation and expansion in the chemical industry aimed at reducing dependence on foreign suppliers of materials and technology. Due to U.S. claims of ongoing chemical weapons production Iran encounters regular difficulties with chemical industry related imports that are restricted by members of the Australia group.|
|IraqIraq||Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons (CW) during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988. In 1988, Iraq mounted a massive chemical attack against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing approximately 5,000 civilians. Before Desert Storm, Iraq succeeded in producing the blister agent mustard, as well as the nerve agents tabun, sarin, cyclosarin and VX. After its 1991 defeat Iraq declared to UN inspectors that between 1982 and 1990 it produced 3,859 tons of CW agents and more than 125,000 filled and unfilled "special munitions." These munitions were mostly stored at the Muthana State Establishment, Iraq's major CW production, filling, and testing facility. Iraq's CW infrastructure suffered extensive damage during the 1991 Gulf War. After the war the United Nations was authorized to verify the destruction of all of Iraq's WMD and long-range delivery systems. By mid-1995, inspectors had largely completed verification and destruction of Baghdad's chemical stocks, munitions, and relevant production facilities and equipment. Following the suspension of UNSCOM inspections in 1998, the United States continued to believe that Iraq was secretly storing a significant quantity of chemical weapons, particularly nerve agent, and that Iraq had rebuilt much of its CW production infrastructure. According to the US State Department, Iraq had failed to account for 1.5 tons of VX, 1,000 tons of mustard gas, and 550 munitions containing mustard gas during the UNMOVIC inspections, violating UNSCR 1441. In November 2002, following a period of escalating pressure on Iraq, UNMOVIC inspection teams were allowed access to Iraq. Inspections continued until 18 March 2003 at which point all United Nations staff were withdrawn after the United States issued an ultimatum to Iraq. The UNMOVIC teams did not find any evidence that Iraq had resumed its WMD programs. On 19 March 2003 the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime. One of the justifications for this invasion was a belief that Iraq had clandestinely amassed large stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX, sarin and mustard gas, among other WMD that it had successfully concealed from the United Nations. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 the United States established the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). This group was tasked with locating the chemical weapons and other WMD reportedly hidden in Iraq. The United States at no point allowed UNMOVIC officials or inspectors to reenter Iraq to resume their duties and has not cooperated with UNMOVICS efforts to monitor Iraqi sites placed under UNMOVIC seal. On 30 September 2004 the ISG released its final report on Iraq's WMD programs. The ISG revealed that despite spending over one billion dollars it had not been able to find any WMD stockpiles or evidence that Iraq had restarted its CW program at any point subsequent to 1991. The ISG did find indications that Saddam intended to resume his WMD activities once UN sanctions were lifted but also noted that many Iraqi scientists and technicians were engaged in active deception of the Iraqi leadership regarding their ability to restart WMD programs. Iraq has not yet acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is anticipated that once Iraq regains full control over its domestic and foreign affairs it will acede to the CWC.|
|IsraelIsrael||While there are allegations that Israel has an advanced chemical weapons (CW) program, no confirmed evidence of production or stockpiling exists. Some reports have suggested an offensive CW program is located at the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Nes Ziona. In October 1992, an El Al airliner carrying a cargo of approximately 50 gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate (a widely used simulant for defensive research but also a possible precursor of sarin nerve agent) destined for the Institute crashed in Amsterdam. Israel stated that this material was being imported to test gas masks. Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).|
|JapanJapan||Japanese scientists began developing chemical weapons (CW) as early as 1917. The Japanese Army used CW after invading China in 1937, conducting an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 attacks. Japan reportedly produced five to seven million munitions containing agents such as phosgene, mustard, lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and diphenyl cyanarsine. Although Japanese forces used many of these munitions between 1937 and 1945, a considerable amount was abandoned when Japanese forces retreated. After World War II, Japan pledged to not produce CW and participated in the negotiations for the CWC, which Japan signed in 1993 and ratified in 1995. Japan's CWC obligations include the responsibility for the disposal of abandoned CW (ACW) in China. The deadline for completion of the clean-up is 2007, but the scale of the program has led many to estimate that Japan will need an extension. Japan's chemical industry is the world's second largest, with about 16 percent of global chemical production. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan has developed comprehensive and well-enforced export controls on chemical weapons precursors and dual-use items. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack, Japanese spending on CW defense has increased.|
|KazakhstanKazakhstan||Kazakhstan inherited one known chemical weapons production plant in the city of Pavlodar. This plant probably was designed to replace aging plants in Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk (Russia) for the production of the binary agent "novichok." The plant's construction was halted in 1987, after the Soviet Union became involved in CWC-related negotiations, so it never produced any chemical warfare agents. Kazakhstan joined the CWC in March 2000. However, Kazakhstan submitted a nil declaration, leaving out the Pavlodar facility.|
|KyrgyzstanKyrgyzstan||Kyrgyzstan signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in February and October 2003, respectively. Bishkek neither possesses nor pursues chemical weapons.|
|LatviaLatvia||Latvia is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention and joined the Australia Group in June 2004. There is no evidence that Riga possesses or seeks to develop chemical weapons.|
|LibyaLibya||There is a significant amount of open-source literature concerning Libya's acquisition and use of chemical weapons (CW); it is well documented that Libya employed Iranian-supplied mustard gas bombs against Chad, its southern neighbor, in 1987. In documentation provided to US and UK authorities in 2003, Libya revealed a "significant quantity" of mustard agent produced more than 10 years ago at a facility near Rabta, located in the Sahara Desert about 120km southwest of Tripoli, along with chemical munitions and equipment needed to establish a second CW production facility. In December 2003, Libya pledged to eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention "without delay."|
|LithuaniaLithuania||Lithuania is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention and joined the Australia Group in June 2004. There is no evidence that Vilnius possesses or seeks to develop chemical weapons.|
|PakistanPakistan||Pakistan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and ratified the treaty in 1997. Islamabad has apparently made no admission in its treaty-mandated declarations of having possessed chemical weapons. Further, there is no reliable information in publicly available literature asserting that Pakistan has ever possessed chemical weapons, although some analysts suspect that it supports an offensive program.|
|RussiaRussia||During the Cold War, and afterwards, the Soviet Union had the world's largest arsenal of chemical weapons, including artillery shells, bombs, and missiles that contained choking agents (phosgene), nerve agents (sarin, soman, and VX), and blister agents (mustard, lewisite, and mustard-lewisite mixture). There have been allegations that the Soviet Union developed a new class of nerve agent (Novichok), estimated to be 5-10 times more toxic than VX. Russia inherited the declared Soviet stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of CW munitions and agents stored in bulk. In November 1997, Russia ratified the CWC, but financial and other difficulties have impeded the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, so it is far behind the timetable specified in the treaty.|
|Serbia and MontenegroSerbia+||Yugoslavia is known to have produced a variety of chemical weapons. The majority of stockpiled weapons is believed to have been inherited by its successor, Serbia and Montenegro. Reports indicate that the former Yugoslavia's Army produced significant quantities of sarin (50 tons), sulfur mustard, phosgene, the incapacitant BZ (allegedly a stockpile of 300 tons), and tear gas. At least four chemical warfare production facilities have been identified in Serbia: Prva Iskra in Baric; Miloje Blagojevic in Lucani; and Milojie Zakic and Merima in Krusevac. While the Trajal plant in Krusevac is no longer associated with the production of CW agents, serious questions exist about accounting and previous production and storage of chemical materials there, as well the lack of accounting on the other three sites. Yugoslavia used its chemical warfare (CW) technologies to develop chemical munitions for Iraq prior to the first Gulf War in the "Jastrebac" (Little Hawk) program and chemical munitions for the Orkan MLRS system under the "KOL15" program. There have been allegations that chemical weapons were used in the area of the former Yugoslavia: both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats alleged that Bosnian government forces used chlorine during the conflict in Bosnia; Bosnian Serbs allegedly used BZ against Moslem refugees in July 1995; and the FRY Army may have used BZ against Kosovo Albanians in 1999. Mysterious deaths during the 1999 NATO bombings of suspected chemical facilities have also been attributed to chemical weapons production. The former Yugoslavia signed the Geneva Protocol in 1929. In April 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In September of 2003, all remaining equipment and materials associated with the production of CW agents was destroyed under the supervision of OPCW inspectors.|
|South AfricaSouth Africa||South Africaâ€™s chemical warfare program was one of the two principal components of its covert state-sponsored CBW program, codenamed Project Coast (later Project Jota). Personnel associated with Coast have characterized it as the most sophisticated program of its type outside of the former Soviet Union, but international CBW experts generally consider it to have been considerably less advanced from a scientific standpoint. Although ostensibly created entirely for defensive purposes, since government and Cuban military forces in Angola were reportedly equipped for and planning to useâ€”if not already usingâ€”CW agents against the South African Defence Force (SADF), from the outset the program also had offensive features and capabilities. The apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the target of a â€œtotal onslaughtâ€ by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas or regimes in neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to meet this all-encompassing â€œred-black dangerâ€ it was apparently willing to use almost any means at its disposal to defend itself. It was in this highly charged political and military context, which precipitated a â€œbunkerâ€ or â€œlaagerâ€ mentality, that Coast was secretly initiated in 1981 under the aegis of the SADF Special Forces. The chief facility for researching and producing CW agents was a military front company called Delta G Scientific, located between Johannesburg and Pretoria, and several other facilities were set up to develop protective clothing, manufacture exotic assassination devices, and â€œweaponizeâ€ irritants (Riot Control Agents such as CS and CR) and incapacitants by placing them in artillery shells, mortar bombs, and grenades. Project Officer Dr. Wouter Basson also set up an elaborate network of procurement and financial front companies overseas. During its existence Coast scientists tested and developed both small quantities of well-known CW agents (including mustard agent, sarin, tabun, BZ, and perhaps VX) and a host of lethal, hard-to-trace toxic chemicals. Several of these latter, above all the toxic organophosphates, were almost certainly employed to assassinate individual â€œenemies of the state.â€ Certain CW facilities also carried out research on the suitability of using illegal drugs such as methaqualone (â€œQuaaludesâ€), MDMA (â€œEcstasyâ€), LSD, marijuana extract (tetrahydrocannibol), and cocaine as incapacitating â€œcalmatives,â€ but some of these illegal drugs may have ended up being sold for a profit. The CBW program was officially dismantled in 1993, in the midst of a liberalizing transformation of the regime. There are indications, however, that certain personnel who were intimately involved in the program, including Basson, may have provided technical knowledge, equipment, or materials to â€œrogue regimesâ€ such as Libya, to foreign intelligence personnel, to unscrupulous black marketers trafficking in dangerous weapons, and perhaps alsoâ€”if certain journalists can be believedâ€”to elements of a shadowy international network of right-wing extremists. These claims have yet to be fully investigated, much less verified. The extent to which various foreign governments, military establishments, and intelligence agencies secretly monitored or covertly assisted in the development of the program likewise remains an open question.|
|South KoreaSouth Korea||After ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997, South Korea acknowledged possessing chemical weapons (CW) and one CW production facility. Although few details are publicly known, South Korea may store several hundreds of tons of CW munitions, including nerve agents. Pursuant to its CWC obligations, the South Korean military currently is devising methods to destroy CW munitions at a disposal site in Yongdong-kun, North Châ€™ungchâ€™ong Province.|
|SyriaSyria||Syria is suspected of having one of the most advanced chemical warfare (CW) capabilities in the Middle East and among developing countries worldwide. Syria allegedly received initial chemical warfare assistance and supplies, including weaponized chemical agents, from Egypt prior to the October War against Israel in 1973. Analysts claim that the country now has an indigenous capability to produce and weaponize nerve (e.g., sarin) and blister (e.g., mustard) agents. There are numerous highly inconsistent reports that Syria has successfully produced and weaponized VX nerve agent. There are some allegations that Syria received Russian assistance in developing this agent in the 1990s but these reports remain substantially unconfirmed in the open sources. Syria appears to remain dependent on the acquisition of imported dual-use technology, equipment and precursors. In the past Syria has acquired many of these items from various European countries and India. Despite the widespread belief that Syria has an active chemical weapons program it is still able to obtain access to many dual-use chemicals used by its oil and chemical industries. As export controls have tightened Syria has increasingly turned to imports from countries outside international export control regimes such as Egypt and North Korea for the provision of certain precursor chemicals. Syria is still able to meet many of its more general bulk chemical needs from its traditional European and Indian suppliers. Syria possesses Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles capable of being fitted with chemical warheads, and in 1999 it allegedly tested a Scud-B carrying a warhead designed to disperse VX. The quality of Syrian weaponization efforts is not clear from open-sources and it remains unclear how effective the use of Scud missiles would be against Israeli defenses. In addition to this long range capability Syria is believed to possess a significant tactical chemical weapons capability centered around artillery shells and rockets. Open sources assert that there are at least three Syrian facilities currently engaged in producing CW, located near Damascus, Hama, and Safira village (in the Aleppo area). Beginning in early 2003 officials in the united States and Israel began to suggest that Syria had received shipments of chemical weapons and other WMD from Iraq. These allegations increased in frequency as the absence of WMD in Iraq became more apparent. To date the available information suggests that these allegations are at best speculative and at worst malicious. Given the claims that Syria has the most advanced CW capability in the middle-east it is difficult to find a convincing rationale for Syria receiving illicit Iraqi WMD stocks. Since late 2002 Syria has been confronted by an aggressive United States using WMD possession as a justification for pre-emptive military action. Since April 2003 Syria has been effectively surrounded by the United States and its allies and has come under increasing political and military pressures. Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968, but so far has declined to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In 2004 Syrian officials met with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In the absence of information on the content of the discussions the significance of this development remains unclear.|
|TaiwanTaiwan||In 1989, the U.S. Congress was informed that Taiwan could have acquired an offensive chemical weapons (CW) capability. While acknowledging production of small quantities of CW agents for defense research purposes, Taiwanese authorities have consistently denied any offensive CW capabilities. Still, rumors persist that Taiwan has stockpiled sarin in two locations: Tsishan (Kaohsiung) and in Kuanhsi, Hsinchu County. Chemical defense research and development is conducted at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. Because of Taiwan's non-state status, it cannot join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) nor the Australia Group.|
|UkraineUkraine||In January 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared that all former Soviet chemical weapons had been moved to Russia. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Ukraine does not have a chemical warfare program, nor does it plan to establish one. Ukraine is a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which it ratified in 1998. Ukraine joined the Australia Group in April 2005.|
|United KingdomUnited Kingdom||The United Kingdom's World War II stockpile of chemical warfare (CW) agents included phosgene, mustard gas, and lewisite. However, the United Kingdom renounced its chemical weapons program in 1957 and subsequently destroyed its chemical stockpiles. The United Kingdom formally backed the U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative in 2004 and has participated in joint exercises to practice intercepting and boarding ships engaged in weapons proliferation, including chemical weapons. In addition, the United Kingdom continues to give monetary assistance to Moscow for the dismantlement of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile. Britain ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in May 1996.|
|United StatesUnited States||The U.S. chemical warfare (CW) program began with the establishment of the Chemical Warfare Service in June 1918. During World War I, the United States manufactured, stockpiled, and used chemical weapons. Chemical weapons development and production continued during and after World War II, but the production of unitary chemical munitions was terminated in 1969. During the Reagan administration, the production of binary chemical weapons was restarted, but was discontinued in 1990. Since then, the United States no longer has an active CW program. The United States ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1975, with the reservation that the treaty not apply to defoliants and riot control agents such as were used in Vietnam and Laos during the Vietnam War. Currently, the United States has what is believed to be the world's second largest stockpile of chemical weapons, including bombs, rockets, and artillery shells that are loaded with lewisite, mustard, sarin, soman, VX, or binary nerve agents. Under terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which the United States ratified in April 1997, the United States has committed to destroying all chemical stockpiles by April 2004. However in September 2003, the Pentagon announced that it would be unable to meet this deadline and would ask for an extension at the Fall 2003 CWC meeting. As of 28 December 2004, the Chemical Materials Agency of the U.S. Army announced that only 33.34% of the nation's stored chemical agent, including 70% of the remaining mustard agent stockpile, and 42% of the nation's chemical weapons munitions had been destroyed. Former chemical production facilities and recovered chemical warfare materials are also being destroyed under the U.S. Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program (NSCMP). The NSCMP also destroyed 80% of the nation's original chemical weapons production facilities in 2003, 16 months ahead of schedule, and will meet the final deadline of 100% destruction by April 2007.|
|UzbekistanUzbekistan||Uzbekistan inherited on Soviet-era CW facility, the Chemical Research Institute, located near the city of Nukus in western Uzbekistan. It had a one-cubic-meter reactor vessel with a one-ton production capacity per day. The facility was equipped with high-containment laboratories, and aerosol test chamber, and a wind tunnel used to model the dispersion of chemical agents. The facility also had an open-air test site. Operated by the Red Army, the test site was used to field-test various chemical agents. The binary agent Novichok might also have been tested on the site. Under a May 1999 implementing agreement signed by Uzbekistan and the United States, the CTR program provided $8.5 million for the dismantlement of the Chemical Research Institute. Dismantlement was complete in June 2002. Uzbekistan is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but not the Australia Group.|
"All countries compared for Military > WMD > Chemical", The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Aggregates compiled by NationMaster. Retrieved from http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/WMD/Chemical
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'All countries compared for Military > WMD > Chemical, The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Aggregates compiled by NationMaster.', <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/WMD/Chemical> [assessed 1989-2007]
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"All countries compared for Military > WMD > Chemical", The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Aggregates compiled by NationMaster. Avaliable at: nationmaster.com. Assessed 1989-2007.
"All countries compared for Military > WMD > Chemical, The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Aggregates compiled by NationMaster.," http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/WMD/Chemical (assessed 1989-2007)
"All countries compared for Military > WMD > Chemical", The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Aggregates compiled by NationMaster., http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/WMD/Chemical (last visited 1989-2007)
"All countries compared for Military > WMD > Chemical", The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Aggregates compiled by NationMaster., http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/WMD/Chemical (as of 1989-2007)
" Only what I can say that this is so disappointing " You are talking about Serbian weapons and as you have said allegations that chemical weapons were used in the area of the former Yugoslavia: both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats alleged that Bosnian government forces used chlorine during the conflict in Bosnia; Bosnian Serbs allegedly used BZ against Moslem refugees in July 1995; and the FRY Army may have used BZ against Kosovo Albanians in 1999.
I do not sea that you have said anything about United States and other countries from NATO that have bombing us(same that Serbs and Moslem) with weapons with DEPLETED URANIUM !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ???? Do you think that DEPLETED URANIUM is healthy and because of that u do not mention it ????Or it is like GENOCIDE.
Posted on 29 Jun 2010