In these painful times for Indonesia, between the difficulties of President Wahid disputed by the great political parties indonésiens (SIDE, Golkar, Pdi-p), and the various conflicts in progress in the archipelago, it is a subject which deserves to be tackled: the process of reform within the army indonésienne. The army indonésienne (the TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia) holds a significant place in this country archipelagic, as well in the field political as social and economic, this resulting from the principle of dwi-fungsi . Principle specific to Indonesia, it makes that the Army is not confined solely with one role of defense and safety; the TNI holds a role social-policy (SosPol). The founder of the Army indonésienne, the Sudirman General, defended in 1945 the idea that the soldiers were not to in no case to be perceived like "inert tools" for the government, and that they were a component of the company with a particular duty. The principle of double function ( dwi fungsi ) was built little by little, following a series of seminars organized by the Army. In 1982, the principle of dwi fungsi was institutionalized.

In the years 1990, the occupying number of officers of the "civil" stations turned around five thousand, but it however tended to be reduced. Half of the posts of head of district (Bupati) and a third of the posts of governor of area or province was held by officers of the armed forces. But the members of the TNI can also be appointed, civils servant of civil governmental departments, ambassadors abroad, etc. Within the framework of this dwifungsi , the built TNI of the roads, bridges, public buildings, provides a medical aid to the most moved back areas, and takes part in the rural life.

In addition, the TNI is implied in the economic life; let us quote for example the majority interest of Kostrad (Command of the Strategic Forces) in the capital of the airline company Mandala, or the financial control which Kopassus exerts (Special Forces of the Army) on several companies of Ferry (in the archipelago indonésien, this maritime transport is crucial). Many units of the three armies (Ground, Air and Sea) hold, by the means of "Foundations", a great number of companies, and exert an influence in the economic life of the country. In the years 1970-1990, the old practice of partnership indicated by the expression Ali-Baba [ which instituted with the head of these companies a sino-indonésien (Baba) ankle of it with a higher military officer indonésien (Ali) ] is not completely any more of setting; nevertheless, the TNI remains an economic actor impossible to circumvent.

Following the election in November 1999 of Abdurahman Wahid, known as Gus Dur, and with the policy of engaged reform, it is within the army, and particularly in the Army (Tni-AD), that this reform takes all its crucial dimension; the implications of the reform of the TNI are very engaging for the future of Indonesia.

The present outline of study is circumscribed with the Army because it is precisely there that all will be played, and because one knows the dominating role of this one compared to the Air Force (Tni-with) and the navy (Tni-Al), this in spite of the rehandlings and nominations which followed the election of "Gus Dur", and which saw the less dominating role of the Tni-AD compared to the other armies. The consequences of this reform, if it succeeded, will be radical , as well for the soldiers as for the political life indonésienne as a whole.

Concerning the question of the strong presence of the army in the economic life , the process of reform inevitably will meet the question of the financing of the army. Currently, the budget for the armies accounts for only 25% of the expenditure of the TNI; from where need for finding resources financial. This is why the armies go towards the economic ground, directing companies, brewing billion and billion the Rupees, trying smallest, sullying morality with this institution however at the origin of the independence of Indonesia. If disengagement there is, the possibilities of resources extrabudgétaires up to now offered by the means of the Foundations are to be re-examined completely .

Questions arise then inevitably:

- how the army will give up for the benefits drawn from the Foundations? According to which processes? How to transfer the economic power and with which? Will the companies remain national? Will one go worms of privatizations? - this disengagement of the soldiers of the economic world will it be enough to settle the question of corruption?

As for will the solutions to compensate for this reform in the economic field, which be? To reduce the expenditure, and how? To increase the allocated budget, but then with which resources?

Concerning to the territorial military structure , the reform deeply will modify the implication of the army in the politico-economic world indonésien. It is necessary to underline the fundamental character of this territorial military structure, produced official doctrines of the TNI ( Sishankamrata ), which practically confers on the army a capacity of government . The territorial military structure, which employs nearly 140 000 soldiers, allows the Tni-AD to be present regional level (there are 11 Kodam) at the level of the village (33 000 Babinsa), while passing by the under-area (Korem), the commands of districts (266 Kodim) and under-districts (3 309 Koramil). This grid obviously allows the Army to withdraw great benefit as well political as economic. Present at all the levels of the civil administrative structure, the soldiers form a "military countervailing power literally", when the soldiers themselves do not hold (of right) administrative responsibilities "civil". Practically, the TNI more plays a role in the interior safety of the archipelago that in the mission of defense (external); put aside the conflict with Malaysia in the Sixties, and the recent problems encountered with the independence of Timor Loro SAE, Indonesia does not have regional enemies.

In addition, if another grid is added, that of the information , one can say that the Army ultimately holds the country between its hands. Admittedly, the new reorganization of the "services" will withdraw the seizure of the soldiers on this world of the intelligence. The Agency of Coordination of the Information of State (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara - Bakin ) - where the TNI holds the most significant stations properly when well even it acts of a civil agency and under the direct responsibility of the President - as well as the Strategic Information Agency (Badan Intelijen Strategis - Bais), soldier that one, will be restructured at the beginning of the second half of 2001; a central organization will be creates (Badan Intelijen Nasional - BIN -, Agence National Information), which will be under the cut of civil and the head of the State. The BIN will have the role of collecting, of treating and of diffusing the information, but also of the coordination of the various organizations of information. It will be responsible before the President for the Republic and the Parliament. The current head of Bakin, Arie Kumaat, revealed there is little that the BIN would be seen equipped with the right to proceed to "operational activities" which were reserved until at the time in Bais. Lastly, to be completely independent of "external influences", the BIN will be seen equipped with a consequent budget. As for Bais, it should probably pass under the cut of the Ministry for Defense (station now held by civil: Mohammad Mr. Mafud, a close relation of President Wahid), and would be seen relegating to the specifically military tasks, the military information.

It is not rare to intend to say in Indonesia, only when handling there is, during confrontations interethnic or inter monk, Bais and its men of the shade are not far. Let us note here that the head of Staff of the Tni-AD is a former head of Bais. Thus let us note, to summarize, that between the existence of the territorial military structure on the one hand and the importance of the services of information on the other hand, the TNI manages from there to hold, in addition to one structure of being able , of the means of being able .

What we can observe today, it is that as well on the economic aspect as on the structural aspect, the process of reform remains open without until to have touched there the key points which would make it possible to affirm that the reform within the army is really committed. One noted, it is a fact, the reduction of the number of seats (from 75 to 38) reserved to the soldiers at the Parliament indonésien (MPR), but also the "civilianisation" of the ministerial cabinets, and still the separation of the Police force indonésienne (Polri) of the TNI; but practically, the process of reform did not touch nor not called into question essence.

This reform in the Army is, say it, a true revolution ; it reveals fears but also hopes.

Fears first of all which could be:

- a takeover by force of the preserving soldiers not wanting "to release" gains bread to them, - an increase in the actions carried out by the separatist and Moslem movements radical, - problems in the achievement the mission of defense reserved to the TNI if the latter loses any local presence.

Hopes then: those which would lead finally the soldiers to return in their barracks and to confine itself strictly with the businesses of defense. But of the hopes which require on the one hand:

- large financial means, but taking into account the current economic situation of Indonesia, that seems unrealizable - the development of professionalism (by the moral formation and technique increased of the soldiers) - the development of the living conditions of the soldier indonésien (more regular and substantial pays, attenuated disparities, etc.)

The question of the solutions remains posed: how to solve the difficulties which will arise in this process? - by the reaffirmation of the local authorities? Would the increased autonomy (legal, financial) granted to the provinces at January 1, 2001 be a solution of substitution?