The Battle of Ager Falernus is part of the Second Punic War. In the classic sense of battles, this was only a skirmish like that on Ticinus. The army of Hannibal, after winning the Battle of Lake Trasimene, had marched south towards Campania. By mistake or by design, the Carthaginian army had moved into Ager Falernus, a very fertile river valley in northern Campania, bordered by the river Volturnus in the east and south, Mount Massicus in the north, and Mount Callicula in the east. Quintus Fabius Maximus, who had been elected dictor after the disaster of Lake Trasemene, had been dogging Hannibal, sticking to "Fabin Tactics" with 2 consular armies. Fabius occupied all the crossings and mountain passes out of the valley, trapping the Carthaginians in plains. Hannibal, after stripping the valley clean of grain, cattle and supplies, duped part of the Roman garrisons guarding one on the mountain passes in a brilliant display of tactics and night fighting, provoked them to leave the pass and escaped the trap through the now empty pass. Fabius, encamped near the pass, refused to attack the Carthaginian army despite the protests of his staff officers and his Master of Horse, Marcus Minucius Rufus. Combatants Image:SPQR-Stone. ... Ruins of Roman-era Carthage The term Carthage (Greek: , Arabic: قرطاج also قرطاجة, Latin: Carthago) refers both to an ancient city in North Africa located in modern day Tunis and to the civilization that developed within the citys sphere of influence. ... See also Roman Republic (18th century) and Roman Republic (19th century). ... Hannibal Barca (247 BC – c. ... Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (c. ... Combatants Image:SPQR-Stone. ... Sagunt (Spanish Sagunto; Latin Saguntum) is an ancient city in Hispania, in the modern fertile district of Camp de Morvedre in the province of Valencia in eastern Spain. ... The Battle of Lilybaeum was a battle during the Second Punic War between the Roman Republic and Carthage. ... Combatants Carthage Roman Republic Commanders Hannibal Publius Cornelius Scipio the elder Strength 6,000 cavalry unknown Casualties small small The Battle of Ticinus was a battle of the Second Punic War fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and the Romans under Publius Cornelius Scipio in November 218 BC. It... Combatants Carthage Roman Republic Commanders Hannibal Tiberius Sempronius Longus Strength 31,000 45,000 Casualties Unknown, but low 20,000 The Battle of the Trebia (or Trebbia) was the first major battle of the Second Punic War, fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and the Roman Republic in 218... 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The Second Battle of Capua was fought in 211 BC when the Romans besieged Capua. ... The Second Battle of Herdonia of the Second Punic War, was fought in 210 BC between Hannibals army and the Roman forces of Fulvius Centumalus. ... The Battle of Numistro was fought in 210 BC between Hannibals army and a Roman army led by Marcus Claudius Marcellus. ... The Battle of Asculum was fought in 209 BC between Hannibals Carthaginian army, and a Roman force. ... Combatants Carthage Roman Republic Commanders Hannibal Marcus Livius Strength 10,000 unknown Casualties hardly any nearly all the army Hanibals assult on Tarentum Hannibal leaves for Southern Italy:The Romans had long been awaiting the chance to strike at Capua the revolted capital of the Campania region in Southern Italy... 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Combatants Carthage Roman Republic East Numidia Commanders Hannibal Scipio Africanus Masinissa Strength almost 58,000 infantry 6,000 cavalry 80 war elephants 34,000 Roman infantry 3,000 Roman cavalry 6,000 Numidian cavalry Casualties 20,000 killed 11,000 wounded 15,000 captured 1,500 killed 4,000 wounded... The Punic Wars were a series of three wars fought between Rome and the Phoenician city of Carthage. ... Combatants Roman Republic Carthage Commanders Marcus Atilius Regulus Gaius Lutatius Catulus Hamilcar Barca Hanno the Great Hasdrubal Xanthippus The First Punic War (264 to 241 BC) was the first of three major wars fought between Carthage and the Roman Republic. ... The Mercenary War was a uprising of mercenaries in the employ of Carthage in the 3rd century BC. The revolt was a consequence of delays in payment following the defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War. ... Combatants Image:SPQR-Stone. ... Combatants Roman Republic Carthage Commanders Scipio Aemilianus Hasdrubal the Boetarch Strength 40,000 90,000 Casualties 17,000 62,000 The Third Punic War (149 to 146 BC) was the third and last of the Punic Wars fought between the former Phoenician colony of Carthage, and the Roman Republic. ... Combatants Image:SPQR-Stone. ... Combatants Carthage Roman Republic Commanders Hannibal Gaius Flaminius † Strength 30,000 soldiers 30,000-40,000 soldiers Casualties 1,500 soldiers 15,000 killed or drowned 15,000 captured The Battle of Lake Trasimeno (June 24, 217 BC, April on the Julian calendar) was a Roman defeat in the Second... Campania is a region of Southern Italy, bordering on Lazio to the north-west, Molise to the north, Puglia to the north-east, Basilicata to the east, and the Tyrrhenian Sea to the west. ... Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (c. ...

Strategic Situation

The defeat of the Roman army in the Battle of Lake Trasimene had removed the Roman consular army blocking Hannibal from marching on Rome. The other consular army, under Germinus Gnaeus Servilus, was on the other side of the Appenine mountains, near Arriminium. This force had lost most of its reconnaissance capabilities as its cavalry of 4,000 was destroyed in an ambush by Maharbal immediately after the battle of Lake Trasimene. Combatants Carthage Roman Republic Commanders Hannibal Gaius Flaminius † Strength 30,000 soldiers 30,000-40,000 soldiers Casualties 1,500 soldiers 15,000 killed or drowned 15,000 captured The Battle of Lake Trasimeno (June 24, 217 BC, April on the Julian calendar) was a Roman defeat in the Second...

It is a matter of speculation why Hannibal did not march on Rome or what might have happened had he done so immediately after Trasimene(Strategy, B.H. Liddle Hart, Meridian Printing March 1991, ISBN 0-452-01017-3). The Carthaginian army marched into Umbria, through Perugia, although Livy states a failed siege of Spoletum, a Latin colony (Livy 22.9.1-3), Polybius does not mention it, and it is likely some Carthaginian raiders troubled the Latin colony ( J.F.Lazanby, Hannibal's War, p66). Hannibal, ravaging the countryside, marched trough Picenum towards the Adriatic coast, reaching Herita 10 days after leaving Lake Trasimene. Here Hannibal rested the army, who were suffering from scurvy, refitted the Libyan/African troops with captured Roman equipments and retrained them, and using of the low grade wine as an ointment, brought back health of the cavalry horses.

Roman Strategy

The Roman senate and the people, realizing the gravity of the situation, decided to elect a dictator to direct the war effort. As one of the consuls was dead and the other one away in with his army, the dictator was delectated instead of being nominated. Quintus Fabius Maximus, member of the patrician Fabii and consul in 233 and 228 BC, was elected dictator. Normally a dictator chose his deputy, the Master of Horse, but Fabius recieved as his Master of horse, Marcus Minucius Rufus, a plebian, in an unusual gesture.

Fabius set about restoring the morale of the Roman people and the defences of the city. The walls were repaired, Minucius was directed to raise 2 Roman and 2 allied legions and attached cavalry units. The unwalled towns in Latinum were ordered to be deserted, and the inhabitants moved into walled towns. Certain bridges were torn down to deny the Carthaginians easy passage.

Once it was clear Hannibal was not marching towards Rome, Fabius ordered the army of Servilius to Latinum, and he himself moved out of Rome to take over that army, then joined it with the army Minucius had raised and marched along via Appia into Apulia. Fabius had taken meticulous care in observing all the religious procedures attached to the state affairs and all the civil procedures to boost morale of the city, having blamed the Trasimene disaster on lack of proper religious observations.

Prelude

Hannibal in the meanwhile had marched in a leisurely manner south from Hartia. His army, rested, restored to health, retrained and reequipped, cut a path of destruction as they collected grain, cattle, provisions and supplies during the march. Hannibal followed the costal plain, then turned west. Near the town of Arpi, the Roman army under Fabius came into contact with the Carthaginian army and made camp at Aecae, six miles away from the Carthaginian camp. Hannibal drew up his army and offered battle, but Fabius remained in his camp and refused to fight.

The following months saw Fabius employ what would be known as "Fabian Strategy", and earn him the title "The Delayer" despite whatever provocation Hannibal thought up, as the Roman army always refused battle, maneuvered to keep to the high ground to deny the Carthaginian cavalry any advantages, always moved to keep between Rome and their enemies. Roman foragers were covered by flying columns of light infantry and cavalry at all times. Carthaginian foragers caught at a disadvantage and any stragglers were cut down whenever possible. With this strategy, Fabius left the initiative to Hannibal and failed to prevent him from looting and destroying Roman property, but his army gained combat experience and remained intact.

Hannibal marched west into Samnium, and then moved to Beneventum, ravaging the countryside at will. Fabius cautiously followed, keeping to the high ground. From Beneventum, which shut its' gates against Hannibal, the Carthaginians moved north to capture a town called either "Venosia" (Polybius 3.90.8) or Telesia (Livy 22.13.1). From this place Hannibal struck south west and going through Allifae, Callifae, across the Volturnus River to Cales and then down on the plain near Casilinum. (G.P Baker, Hannibal p.114). Hannibal let loose his soldiers on the rich land, and all through the summer collected a rich booty of cattle, grain, supplies and prisoners.

Fabius had been called away to Rome to perform religious duties. The Roman landed rich were also feeling the pinch with Hannibal destroying their property, so defending his strategy was another reason for this visit. Although there were eight possible routes out of Ager Falernus, but being positioned north of the Volturnus River, with all the bridges in Roman hands, there were only three that Hannibal could take to leave the river plain (Bagnall, Nigel, The Punic Wars, p186).

Ager Falernus lay on the south of Latinum, and to the north of Capua. Fabius reinforced Casilinum, which guarded one such bridge, and Cales on the south of Ager Falernus. Minucius took up position to the north of the plain to watch both via Latina and via Appia, and Taenum was also garrisoned. The main Roman army camped near Mount Massicus, north of the plain to the west of Minucius, ready to support his position. A detachment of 4000 would be sent to watch the passes of Mount Callicula to the east of the plain near Allifae, one of the possible passes through which Hannibal chose to enter the plain. The exact location is still unknown and remains debatable. Thus, the Roman dispositions hemmed the Carthaginians in the plain. It seemed that Hannibal would have to attack a Roman position directly to break out; the only question was whether he would choose such a dangerous maneuver before or after his supplies failed. A fictional chemical substance is a chemical element, isotope, compound or mineral that exists only in works of fiction (usually fantasy or science fiction). ... Capua is a city in the province of Caserta, (Campania, Italy) situated 25 km (16 mi) north of Napoli, on the northeastern edge of the Campanian plain. ... Casilinum (modern Capua), an ancient city of Campania, Italy, 3 m. ...

The Battle

Hannibal, after his plundering mission was completed, decided to leave the plain. The Romans, guided by Fabius, still refused to attack him despite whatever provocation he came up with. Hannibal, on the other hand, did not wish to suffer severe casualties by a head on assault on the Romans settled in fortified camps of on the high ground.

Hannibal moved his army to the east of the plain, near the pass beside Mount Callicula through which he had originally entered the plain. Fabius, anticipating the move, blocked the pass with 4000 troops, and encamped on a nearby hill with the main army. Minucius then joined the army with his contingent. (J.F. Lazanby, Hannibal's War, p70-71, and Map 8).

Hannibal made careful preparations to break out of the trap. The day before the battle, he had his men eat a hearty supper and go to bed early leaving the campfires burning. 2000 oxen from the captured herds were selected, as were camp followers to drive the cattle and 2000 spearmen to guard the whole gang, cattle and all. On the horns of the oxen dry woods and faggots were tied. An officer called Hasdrubal, in charge of army supplies in his role as Quarter master general, and the same who would lead the heavy cavalry at Cannae, oversaw the whole operation. Below the Camp of Fabius to the east, and on the north west of the pass, at the feet of mount Callicula, was a saddle. The spearmen were to capture and hold the saddle. There is a story recorded by Appain (Roman History 7.3.14) that Hannibal executed 5,000 prisoners so that they would not cause trouble before the march, an incident not mentioned by Polybius or Livy.

At the appointed time, after the third part of the night had ended, the Carthaginian Army aroused itself and made ready to march as silently as possible. The picked force with the oxen marched to the saddle, and when they approached the slopes, the wood and faggot tied to the horns were lit by the camp followers (Lazanby, J.F, Hannibal’s War, p70.). The oxen began to flee up the slopes. The lights and sounds of the spectacle attracted the attention of the Romans in the camp of Fabius, and also the detachment guarding the pass. The reaction of the forces were quiet different.

Fabius refused to budge despite the pleas of his officers, and the urgings of Minucius. The Roman army stood at arms but did not move out. Fabius did not want to fight a night battle, fearing a Punic trick to draw the Romans into a battle over broken, uneven ground, where Roman infantry will lose their edge as their lines will be broken, and communication would be hampered. The Roman force at the pass deserted their posts at the head of the pass to attack what they thought was main Carthaginian army trying to outflank their position and escape across the saddle.

As soon as the Romans left their position, Hannibal's main army left camp, the African infantry leading, Cavalry and the cattle after them, Celts and Spaniards in the rear. The army moved through the pass unmolested, as Fabius did not challenge them.

The Roman force attacking the saddle was bewildered when they confronted the lights on the saddle. The cattle ran amok, breaking their lines, the Carthaginian spearmen ambushed them, and worse of all, as dawn broke to make matters clear, a group of Spanish infantry appeared, and being experts in mountain warfare, killed over 1,000 Romans, and managed to rescue the Carthaginian camp followers, their spearmen guard and some of the offending cattle as well.

Aftermath

The political clout of Fabius began to wane after this incident, as displeasure with his tactics grew in Rome. Hannibal, escaping from the trap he had gotten himself into, marched east towards Apulia, ravaging the Roman estates at will. Fabius would cautiously follow him keeping to the Fabian strategy. He would order towns burned, crops destroyed in the path of Hannibal. The scorched earth policy was designed to hamper the movement of the Carthaginian army, which, unlike the Roman one, had not secure supply chain. Hannibal would march east through Samnium into Apulia, and select the town of Geronium as his winter base. The Carthaginian would again dupe part of the Army of Fabius in Battle of Geronium.

Importance

The battle itself was smaller than The Battle of Ticinus. Although Fabius was not duped by Hannibal’s moves, his blocking force was at the pass was. Leonard Cottrell, in his book “Hannibal: Enemy of Rome”, wrote that the trick was designed to be recognized by Fabius as a trick. Hannibal had studied the mind of his opponent, and devised a plan to make him do exactly what Hannibal needed him to do. Fabius though Hannibal was trying to get him to fight a night action over broken, uneven ground, where Roman infantry will lose their greatest advantage, discipline and teamwork, as their formations will become disorganized. Since Hannibal was choosing the battle ground and the hour; he might have sprung other surprises to gain further advantages on the Romans. Fabius predictably did what Hannibal had anticipated: nothing.

The Romans guarding the pass, with no Fabius to keep them in check, though they were doing their job when they rushed out: preventing a Carthaginian escape. Again, they acted as Hannibal had anticipated.

It seems both commanders here were following the one of the observations of Tzen Tzu, “A battle avoided cannot be lost’’. Fabius, who had avoided fighting a pitched battle with Hannibal because he now held the upper hand, faced Hannibal, who now had to avoid a pitched battle, because he would have to assault fortified Roman positions directly. As B.H. Liddell Hart had observed in his books Strategy and Great Captains Unveiled, successful generals normally understood the concept of economy of force and the value of indirect approach, and also the implications of another Tzen Tzu observation, “Know your enemy and know yourself, and victory will be yours”. Hannibal demonstrated all these factors in planning, implementing and orchestrating this small but significant episode. In another year, he would give a very devastating demonstration of his abilities at a place in Apulia called Cannae.

References

• Bagnall, Nigel (1990). The Punic Wars. ISBN 0-312-34214-4. 
• Cottrell, Leonard (1992). Hannibal: Enemy of Rome. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-80498-0. 
• Lazanby, John Francis (1978). Hannibal's War. Aris & Phillips. ISBN 0-85668-080-X.