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Encyclopedia > Black Hawk Incident (April 1994)
Black Hawk Incident (April 1994)

A United States F-15 fighter fires an air-to-air missile.
Date April 14, 1994
Location Iraq
Result Two U.S. military helicopters destroyed,
29 military and civilian personnel killed

The Black Hawk Incident, sometimes referred to as the Black Hawk Shootdown Incident, was a "friendly fire" incident over northern Iraq that happened on April 14, 1994 during Operation Provide Comfort in which two United States Air Force F-15s fired on a pair of United States Army MH-60 Blackhawks, destroying both helicopters and killing 29 military service members and civilians from the U.S. and other countries. Image File history File links Download high resolution version (2048x1334, 825 KB) Description: A USAF McDonnell Douglas F-15C Eagle firing a AIM-7 Sparrow medium-range air to air missile. ... The Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglas) F-15 Eagle is an all-weather tactical fighter designed to gain and maintain air superiority in aerial combat. ... April 14 is the 104th day of the year (105 in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar, with 261 days remaining. ... 1994 (MCMXCIV) was a common year starting on Saturday of the Gregorian calendar, and was designated as the International Year of the Family and the International Year of the Sport and the Olympic Ideal by United Nations. ... Friendly fire (fratricide or non-hostile fire) is a term originally adopted by the United States military in reference to an attack on friendly forces by other friendly forces,[1] which may be deliberate (e. ... April 14 is the 104th day of the year (105 in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar, with 261 days remaining. ... 1994 (MCMXCIV) was a common year starting on Saturday of the Gregorian calendar, and was designated as the International Year of the Family and the International Year of the Sport and the Olympic Ideal by United Nations. ... Operation Provide Comfort was a military operation by the United States, starting on 24 July 1991, to defend Kurds fleeing their homes in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. ... The United States Air Force (USAF) is the aerial-warfare branch of the United States armed forces and one of the seven uniformed services. ... The McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle is an all-weather, extremely maneuverable, tactical fighter designed to permit the U.S. Air Force to gain and maintain air superiority in aerial combat. ... The United States Army is one of the armed forces of the United States and has primary responsibility for land-based military operations. ... The Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk is a twin-turbine engine, single rotor, semi-monocoque fuselage, rotary wing helicopter. ...

Contents

Background

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Incident

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Investigation

Series Of Errors

The 1994 Blackhawk shootdown was not the fault of a single error but several perventble errors that were known about but never addressed by either the United States Army or the Airforce staffs. The United States Army is one of the armed forces of the United States and has primary responsibility for land-based military operations. ...

A view of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter with "wing"-mounted fuel tanks similar to the ones mounted on the two helicopters involved in the shootdown incident.
A view of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter with "wing"-mounted fuel tanks similar to the ones mounted on the two helicopters involved in the shootdown incident.

The Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk is a twin-turbine engine, single rotor, semi-monocoque fuselage, rotary wing helicopter. ...

AWACS error

The first was inside the AWACS controlling northern Iraq. one of the tracking screens aboard the AWACS was not functioning and thus its operator was moved to a backup station on the other side of the control center. While this was not in and of itself a problem, it created difficulties because of the standard and informal procedures aboard the AWACS. In theory at least, AWACS operators "pass" aircraft from their screen onto a colleague's by oral and electronic communication. However, in Iraq, the standard operating method had been for the operator covering Southern Turkey to simply nudge the operator covering Northern Iraq when he wanted to pass a plane or helicopter along. This system worked because these two operators were always seated next to one another. However, on the day in question, due to the failed screen, these operators were on opposite sides of the control center. They were still linked by headset and computer, and were even within shouting distance, but their normal routine was not possible. US Air Force E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft is prepared for flight in November 1997 Cockpit of RAF E-3 Sentry undergoing upgrades Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is a radar-based electronic system designed to carry out airborne surveillance, and C3 (command, control and communications) functions for both...


Even more important than the informal norm (as opposed to written regulation) of "nudging" rather than talking was the norm of not passing helicopters off at all. Given that most helicopters in the No-Fly Zone were only jumping about 100 yards over the border, most AWACS operators just preferred to keep them on the Southern Turkey screen and avoid the hassle of changing operators. On this day, however, the Blackhawks were going unusually far into the zone, and this generally passable informal norm may have proven deadly. A final AWACS factor was that this particular AWACS crew had never flown together before, and had disturbingly low morale and low opinions of their superiors. Generally, American AWACS crews in this theater were constantly deployed, and given the fact that this particular crew was not a real team and had a poor command climate, it is understandable why they posed a risk to the pilots they monitored.


Inter-service rivaliry

The Army's helicopters were poorly integrated into the USAF-dominated system. The helicopter flights were not given to Air Force aviators on their daily flow sheets. Therefore, given that Blackhawks look something like Iraq's Russian-made helicopters, it is not surprising that these particular F-15 pilots were suspicious. More importantly, the interservice rivalry between the Army and USAF was such that no army aviator was given specific instructions concerning IFF codes. When an Air Force aircraft moves from Turkey into the no-fly zone, it switches to a specific IFF frequency that all other planes in the theater recognize. Because the two services did not coordinate much, if at all, the Blackhawk pilots were unaware of this operating routine, and failed to "squawk" the appropriate code once they crossed the Iraqi border.


the results of the F-15 fly-by identification were almost predetermined. Given that the Army aircraft looked somewhat like enemy choppers, were not on the flight plans they had been given, and were not squawking the correct IFF, the expectations of the USAF pilots totally conditioned what they saw. The shooting down of the two helicopters was therefore the result of a number of interacting factors; factors which resulted from the development of informal routines in the context of interservice rivalry, poor command structures, and a lack of communication.


Aftermath of the investigation

As a result, Brig. Gen. Jeffrey S. Pilkington, who commanded the Provide Comfort Combined Task Force received an official letter of admonishment for "his failure to fulfill his responsibilities as a commander" and was reassigned.


Brig. Gen. Curtis H. Emery II was serving as commander of the Combined Air Force Component at the time. He also received an official letter of admonishment for "failure to maintain adequate control and aircraft integration within the tactical area of responsibility."


Additionally, one officer received an Article 15 and five others received letters of reprimand. The letters were all placed in unfavorable information files, to remain there for two years.


The two F-15 pilots--Lt. Col. Randy W. May and Capt. Eric Wickson--were taken off flying status for at least three years. Additionally, AWACS officers Capt. Jim Wang, Capt. Joseph M. Halcli and 1st Lt. Ricky L. Wilson were disqualified from controlling aircraft for three years.[1] As of May, 2005 Jim Wang was still serving in the U.S. Air Force but remained at the rank of Captain, having been denied promotion.[2]

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Black Hawk Incident (April 1994)

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References

Notes

  1. ^ Arana-Barradas, "Black hawk incident 'tragic series of errors'", [1]
  2. ^ Chu Lin, Friendly Fire Doesn't Shoot Down Wang

Books

  • Piper, Joan L. (2001). Chain of Events: The Government Cover-up of the Black Hawk Incident and the Friendly-fire Death of Lt. Laura Piper. Brassey's. ISBN 1574883445. 
  • Snook, Scott A. (2000). Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq. Princeton University Press. 

Web

  • Lieutenant General Stephen B. Croker. Air Force Link (1996). Retrieved on 2007-02-16.- U.S. Air Force commander who made decision to prosecute Jim Wang.
  • Lieutenant General John R. Dallager. Air Force Link (2003). Retrieved on 2007-02-16.- U.S. Air Force general who exonerated the two F-15 pilots involved in the incident and then refused a 1996 U.S. Senate subpoena to testify concerning the U.S. Air Force investigation into the incident.
  • Brigadier General Curtis H. Emery. Air Force Link (1997). Retrieved on 2007-02-16.- U.S. Air Force commander of aircraft operations for Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the incident.
  • Brigadier General Jeffrey S. Pilkington. Air Force Link (1996). Retrieved on 2007-02-16.- Commander of Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the incident.
  • Brigadier General Douglas J. "Doug" Richardson. Air Force Link (2000). Retrieved on 2007-02-16.- U.S. Air Force commander of the 38th Operations Group at Incirlik Air Base at the time of the incident.
  • Lieutenant General Eugene D. Santarelli. Air Force Link (1998). Retrieved on 2007-02-16.- U.S. Air Force commander who made decision not to prosecute the two F-15 pilots.
  • Arana-Barradas, Louis A. (1996). Black hawk incident "tragic series of errors". Retrieved on 2007-02-16.
  • Associated Press (1994). No Charges Likely Against F-15 Pilot. THE LEDGER-STAR. Retrieved on 2007-02-16.
  • Chu Lin, Sam (2005). Friendly Fire Doesn’t Shoot Down Wang. AsianWeek.com. Retrieved on 2007-02-16.
  • Cornelius A. Bass, Specialist 5th, United States Army. Arlington National Cemetary Website (2000 – 2006). Retrieved on 2007-03-01.
  • Eagle Flight Detachment Memorial Monument Friends (1994-2007). Retrieved on 2007-02-16.
  • General Accounting Office (U.S.) (1998). Operation Provide Comfort: Review of U.S. Air Force Investigation of Black Hawk Fratricide Incident. Retrieved on 2007-03-01.
  • Ladkin, Peter B. (2003). Two Causal Analyses of the Black Hawk Shootdown during Operation Provide Comfort (PDF). Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology Series; Vol. 97. Retrieved on 2007-03-01.
  • Novak, Robert (2000). Article 3: Past Fiasco dims General's new Third Star. SOLDIERS FOR THE TRUTH. Retrieved on 2007-03-01.
  • Operation Provide Comfort: Review of U.S. Air Force Investigation of Black Hawk Fratricide Incident. C. Co, 6-159th Aviation Regt., U.S. Army, Dolan Barracks, Schwaebisch Hall, Germany (1994 & 1998). Retrieved on 2007-03-01.
  • Jerald Lee Thompson: Colonel, United States Army. Arlington National Cemetary Website (2000 – 2006). Retrieved on 2007-03-01.
  • Sklute, Nolan (1995). DoD NewsBriefing: Major General Nolan Sklute, AF/ SJA. DefenseLink. Retrieved on 2007-03-01.
  • U.S. Naval Academy (2004). Responsibility and Accountability, Case Study #1, Blackhawk Fratricide Incident, 14 April 1994. Retrieved on 2007-03-01.
  • Washington, Mark Thomas (1995). So, Who's to Blame?. Time. Retrieved on 2007-03-01.


 
 

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