Definition

Data retention is the storage of telephony and internet traffic and transaction data by governments and commercial organisations. In the case of government data retention the data that is stored is usually of telephone calls made and received, emails sent and received and web sites visited. Location data is also collected. The primary objective in government data retention is traffic analysis. By analysing the retained data governments can identify the locations of individuals, an individual's associates and the members of a group.

In the case of commercial data retention the data retained will usually be on transactions and web sites visited.

Data retention in the European Union

The United Kingdom, France, Ireland and Sweden are attempting to persuade the European Union to introduce a directive which would make data retention mandatory throughout the EU. It appears that representatives of the music and film-industry, the IFPI and the MPA, are active in promoting data retention, as well as many UK MEPs.

An attempt to introduce a far reaching data retention directive through the Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the Council of Ministers has failed, but the directive proposal has returned under the co-decision procedure, mening that the UK-precidency is trying to get the European Parliament to agree on something that the Council could not.

The responsible Committee i the European Parlaiment is Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), ant the Committe is votes on the [Data Retention Directive http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=5275032] 24 November, 2005.

The Directive suggests to retain for one year the following categories of data:

-data necessary to trace and identify the source of a communication;

-data necessary to trace and identify the destination of a communication;

-data necessary to identify the date, time and duration of a communication;

-data necessary to identify the type of communication;

-data necessary to identify the communication device;

-data necessary to identify the location of mobile communication equipment.

Rapporteur in LIBE is Alexander Nuno Alvaro. Shadow rapporteurs are Charlotte Cederschiöld (IMCO) and Angelika Niebler (ITRE). The whole procedure is very hasty as can be seen from the fact that there is less than one month between the appointment of the IMCO shadow and the date for the IMCO committee vote (21 November).

There are still only two countries in the EU with legal data retention actually in force. Italy retains data for four years and Ireland for three years. The UK's scheme is voluntary. Belgium has re-introduced the possibility of data retention on 13 June 2005 with a new telecommunication law, but the royal decree stipulating what kind of data should be stored, by which market parties and for what period of time was never issued.

Data retention in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom [UK] has a system of voluntary data retention which derives from the Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001. Telephone operators and Internet Service Providers retain some data [see below] under a voluntary arrangement with the UK Home Office. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) is a business or organization that offers users access to the Internet and related services. ... The modern concept of Small Office and Home Office or SoHo , or Small or Home Office deals with the category of business which can be from 1 to 10 workers. ...

Part 2 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001 [The Act] contains a number of sections which deal with the retention of communications data by fixed line and mobile telephone service providers and internet service providers [service providers]. Communications data includes data which identifies the users of services, data which identifies which services were used and when they were used, and data which identifies who the user contacted. It does not include the content of communications. For example, in the case of a call from a mobile telephone the data to be retained would include data identifying the owner of the phone, who was called, the duration of the call and the approximate locations of both parties. It would not include what was said during the call.

The Act requires the Secretary of State for the Home Office to issue a voluntary code of practice on data retention. This has been done. A code of practice has been issued and contains the requirements set out below. If the Secretary of State believes that the voluntary code of practice is not effective then he may make the code compulsory by issuing a statutory instrument which must be approved by both Houses of Parliament. This has not yet been done.

Other legislation affecting data retention includes the Data Protection Act 1998, the Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) Regulations 1999 and the EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002. These require service providers to destroy or anonymise data when it is not longer required for commercial purposes [e.g. billing]. The provisions of Part 2 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001 override these requirements. The Data Protection Act 1984 is a British Act of Parliament that provides a legal basis for the privacy and protection of data of UK citizens and businesses. ... The legislative acts of the European Union (EU) can have different forms: regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. ...

Any compulsory scheme of data retention would also be affected by Article 8 (the respect for the right of privacy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This would require the destruction or anonymisation of communications data, but article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights permits an interference with individual’s right to privacy if it is necessary in the interests of national security and the prevention and detection of crime. If the UK government was not to be challenged under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act it would need to demonstrate that any statutory requirement for data retention was proportionate. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as the European Convention on Human Rights, was adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe[1] in 1950 to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. ...

UK Home Office Voluntary Code of Practice on Data Retention

Subscriber Information - retention period 12 months Subscriber details relating to the person e.g. Name, date of birth, installation and billing address, payment methods, account/credit card details Contact information (information held about the subscriber but not verified by the CSP) e.g. Telephone number, email address Identity of services subscribed to (information determined by the communication service provider) Customer reference/account number, list of services subscribed to Telephony: telephone number(s), IMEI, IMSI(s) Email: email address(es), IP at registration Instant messaging: Internet Message Handle, IP at registration ISP - dial-in: Log-in, CLI at registration (if kept) ISP - always-on: Unique identifiers, MAC address (if kept), ADSL end points, IP tunnel address The International Mobile Equipment Identity (or IMEI) is a unique number associated with every GSM and UMTS mobile phone. ... IMSI IMSI is an acronym for International Mobile Subscriber Identity. ... CLI is an acronym (or, strictly speaking, an initialism) for Command line interface Call Level Interface Common language interface (Commonly believed, but not official for Common Language Infrastructure) Common Language Infrastructure CLear Interrupts Composite Leading Indicator Caller Line Identification (telephony) Celebrity Love Island Critical Language Institute This page concerning a... Jump to: navigation, search In computer networking a Media Access Control address (MAC address) is a unique identifier attached to most forms of networking equipment. ...

Telephony Data - retention period 12 months All numbers (or other identifiers e.g. name@bt) associated with call (e.g. physical/presentational/network Assigned CLI, DNI, IMSI, IMEI, exchange/divert numbers) Date and time of start of call Duration of call/date and time of end of call Type of call (if available) Location data at start and/or end of call, in form of lat/long reference. Cell site data from time cell ceases to be used. IMSI/MSISDN/IMEI mappings. For GPRS & 3G, date and time of connection, IMSI, IP address assigned. Mobile data exchanged with foreign operators; IMSI & MSISDN, sets of GSM triples, sets of 3G quintuples, global titles of equipment communicating with or about the subscriber. DNI is a TLA which has multiple meanings: The newly created United States Director of National Intelligence The Honduran National Department of Investigations This is a disambiguation page — a navigational aid which lists other pages that might otherwise share the same title. ...

In addition it has been reported that the UK police and security services have the following additional capabilities on mobile telephones, provided by telephone operators, but not covered by the voluntary code.

1. The capability to record to the content of selected conversations.
2. The capability to determine the location of a mobile telephone to within a few yards by using triangulation and multiple base stations.
3. The capability to remotely activate the microphones of some mobile telephones. The UK Financial Times of the 2nd August 2005 [page 4 of the UK edition] reported that the UK police can ask mobile phone operators to download special software to a mobile telephone without the user’s knowledge or permission. When this has been done the authorities can turn on the microphone of a mobile telephone and listen to any conversations in its vicinity. This capability only exists for mobile telephones which can accept downloaded software. The telephone must be turned on for the microphone to be activated, but the user does not have to be making a call.

SMS, EMS and MMS Data - retention period 6 months. Calling number,IMEI - Called number, IMEI - Date and time of sending - Delivery receipt - if available - Location data when messages sent and received, in form of lat/long reference. Jump to: navigation, search A received SMS being announced on a Nokia phone. ... Jump to: navigation, search EMS may stand for: Eastern Mountain Sports, an outdoor retailer Edinburgh Mathematical Society Electromagnetic Spectrum Electronic Manual Special, a special edition Saab 99 automobile Electronics Manufacturing Services Electronic Muscle Stimulation Electronic Music Studios (London) Ltd, manufacturers of synthesisers. ... MMS may stand for: Multimedia Messaging System (mobile phones) Methodology Management System (business process) Microsoft Metadirectory Services Microsoft Media Services (data streaming protocol) Multimedia Solutions (T-Systems Multimedia Solutions GmbH) This page concerning a three letter acronym is a disambiguation page — a navigational aid which lists other pages that might...

Email Data – retention period 6 months. Log-on (authentication user name, date and time of log-in/log-off, IP address logged-in from)- sent email (authentication user name, from/to/cc email addresses, date and time sent)- received email (authentication user name, from/to email addresses, date and time received)

ISP Data – retention period 6 months. Log-on (authentication user name, date and time of log-in/log-off, IP address assigned, Dial-up: CLI and number dialed, Always-on: ADSL end point/MAC address (If available)

Web Activity Logs – retention period 4 days. Proxy server logs (date/time, IP address used, URL’s visited, services. The data types here will be restricted solely to Communications Data and exclude content of communication. Web browsing information is retained to the extent that only the host machine or domain name (web site name) is disclosed. For example, within a communication, data identifying www.homeoffice.gov.uk would be traffic data, whereas data identifying www.homeoffice.gov.uk/kbsearch?qt=ripa+traffic=data would be content and not subject to retention.

Other Services - retention period relative to service provided. Instant Message Type Services (log-on/off time) if available.

Collateral Data - retention period relative to data to which it is related. Data needed to interpret other communications data, for example the mapping between cell mast identifiers and their location, and the translation of dialing (as supported by IN networks.

Postal data - retention period unknown. Information written on the outside of a postal item (such as a letter or parcel, online tracking of postal items, records of postal items, such as records of registered, recorded or special delivery postal items, records of parcel consignment, delivery and collection

Access to retained data [UK]

The bodies which are able to access retained data in the United Kingdom are listed in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA. These are -

• Police forces (as defined in section 81(1) of RIPA)
• National Criminal Intelligence Service
• National Crime Squad
• HM Customs and Excise
• Inland Revenue
• Security Service
• Secret Intelligence Service
• Government Communications Headquarters

Reasons for accessing retained data [UK]

The justifications for accessing retained data in the United Kingdom are set out in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA]. They are -

• in the interests of national security;
• for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder;
• in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom;
• in the interests of public safety;
• for the purpose of protecting public health;
• for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department;
• for the purpose, in an emergency, of preventing death or injury or any damage to a person's physical or mental health, or of mitigating any injury or damage to a person's physical or mental health;
• for any purpose (not falling into the above) which is specified for the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the Secretary of State.

Data retention in Italy

In July 2005 new legal requirements on data retention came into force in Italy.

Subscriber information Internet cafes and public telephone shops with at least three terminals must seek a license permit within 30 days from the Ministry of Home Affairs. They must also store traffic data for a period which may be determined later by administrative decree. WIFI hotspots and locations that do not store traffic data have to secure ID information from users before allowing them to log on. For example, users may be required to enter a number from an ID card or driving license. It is not clear how this information is validated. Mobile telephony must identify them selves before service activation, or before a SIM may be obtained. Resellers of mobile subscriptions or pre-paid cards must verify the identity of purchasers and retain a photocopy of identity cards.

Telephony data Data, including location data, on fixed line and mobile telephony must be retained for 29 months. There is no requirement to store the content of calls. Telephony operators must retain a record of all unsuccessful dial attempts. ISP data

Internet service providers must retain all data for at least six months. The law does not specify exactly what traffic data must be retained. There is no requirement to store the content of internet communications.

Legality The legislation of July 2005 enables data retention by outlawing all the relevant data protection provisions until 31 December 2007. Under the data protection provisions, service providers are obliged to anonymise or delete traffic data when they no longer need it to process the communication or to send bills (with a maximum of 6 months). The traffic data which will now be retained can be used for anti-terrorism purposes and for general penal enforcement of criminal offences.

Italy already required the retention of telephony traffic data for 48 months, but without location data. Italy has adopted the EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002 but with an exemption to the requirement to erase traffic data.

Arguments on data retention

It is often argued that data retention is necessary to combat terrorism. It is not necessarily claimed that data retention would prevent terrorist attacks; rather that it would assist the police to find the culprits and their accomplices after attacks had taken place. the authorities in Spain and the United Kingdom have claimed that retained telephony data made a significant contribution to police enquires into the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 7 July 2005 London bombings. The scene of one of the Madrid bombings. ... Jump to: navigation, search On Thursday 7 July 2005 a series of four bomb attacks struck Londons public transport system during the morning rush hour. ...

The opponents of data retention make the following arguments –

1. Schemes for data retention do not make adequate provisions for independent judicial oversight of the process.
2. That data retention is an invasion of privacy and a disproportionate response to the threat of terrorism.
3. That it will be easy for terrorists to avoid having their communications recorded. The Home Office Voluntary Code of Practice of Data Retention admits that there are some internet protocols which cannot be effectively monitored. It would be possible for terrorists to avoid monitoring by using peer to peer technologies, internet cafes, anonymous proxies or several other methods. The police forces of the EU are sceptical about the value of data retention. Heinz Kiefer, president of Eurocop [European Confederation of Police] issued a press statement saying "it remains easy for criminals to avoid detection through fairly simple means, for example mobile phone cards can be purchased from foreign providers and frequently switched. The result would be that a vast effort is made with little more effect on criminals and terrorists than to slightly irritate them. Activities like these are unlikely to boost citizens’ confidence in the EU’s ability to deliver solutions to their demand for protection against serious crime and terrorism.’
4. The hardware and software required to store all the retained data will be costly. The costs of retaining data could not only fall on Internet Service Providers and telephone companies, but also on all companies and other organisations which need to retain records of traffic passing through their switchboards and servers.
5. Data retention gives excessive power to the state to monitor the lives of individual citizens.
6. Data retention may be abused by the police to monitor the activities of any group which may come into conflict with the state; including ones which are engaged in legitimate protests. The UK police have used anti terrorism powers against groups opposed to the war in Iraq and protestors at an arms fair. The definition or terrorism in the UK Terrorism Act 2000 includes not only action, but the threat of action, involving serious violence against a person, or serious damage to property, for the purposes of advancing a "political, religious or ideological cause". There is concern that the definition is vaguely worded and could be applied supporters of animal liberation, anti-war demonstrators and others.
7. Data retention may be justified but the retention periods proposed in some cases are excessive. It has been argued that a period of five days for web activity logs and ninety days for all other data would be adequate for police purposes.

An Internet Service Provider (ISP) is a business or organization that offers users access to the Internet and related services. ...

Avoiding data retention (How any computer user can do it)

The current directive proposal (see above) would force ISPs to record the internet communications of its users. The basic assumption is that this information can be used to identify with whom a terrorist communicated throughout a specific timespan. Believing that such as mandate would be useful is ignoring that some very commited community of crypto professionals has been preparing for such legislation for decades. Below are some strategies available today to any user to avoid such traces and render such an expensive logging operation useless.

1. VPNs

Several organizations have setup VPNs so their employees can safely access the private data of the company. In this case the only data retained is the connection to the VPN server, that will contain all the data served to the EU citizen encrypted.

The connections, if the company is in the EU, will be recorded as a company access, mixed with all the other employees access. To single out any user, would mean that the company would have to be tapped and that the citizen would have to use it after it's been tapped. In practice that would mean that data retention would be of the same use that the presente tapping legislation, so it presents only a cost with no benefit.

If the company is outside the EU, not even tapping can be done. Google created a public use VPN with their Google Wifi project. While their client software isn't provided by Google anymore, it can still be downloaded in sites like Softpedia. In this situation, any EU citizen can simply download their software and use the Internet without worrying about data retention in the EU.

2. Anonymizer Proxies: Web

There are anonymizer proxies that provide anonymous web access, using standard ecommerce cryptography to communicate with the final user. As in the case above, the data retained is only the connection to the server.

A list of such proxies can be found in http://www.freeproxy.ru/en/free_proxy/cgi-proxy.htm

3. Webmail

Most hosting companies (Pair Networks, Inc. in the US, for instance), provide a secure interface to their webmail system. This means that any EU citizen that pays for their services can read and send email without any information about it being recorded, other than a secure (e-commerce like) connection to the hosting company.

4. Use P2P communications

Some P2P services, being it file transfer or voice over IP, use other computers to allow communication between computers behind firewalls. This means that trying to follow a call between two citizens might, mistakenly, identify a third citizen unaware of the communication.

5. Privacy enhancing tools

For security conscious citizens, using tools like Tor, mixmaster and the cryptography options integrated into any major mail client these days is always an option.

Tor is a project of the USA's Electronic Frontier Foundation to create a P2P network where normal protocols are made untraceable. Mixmaster is a remailer service that allows anonymous email sending.

See also

• Traffic analysis
• Mass surveillance
• UK Home Office consultation papers on data retention and on access to communications data.
• Privacy
• Data privacy
• John Gieve

Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce information from patterns in communication. ... Jump to: navigation, search Mass surveillance is the pervasive surveillance of an entire population, or a substantial fraction thereof. ... Jump to: navigation, search Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to stop information about themselves from becoming known to people other than those they choose to give the information to. ... Data privacy refers to the evolving relationship between technology and the legal right to, or public expectation of privacy in the collection and sharing of data. ... John Gieve, (born 20th February 1950) has been Permanent Secretary (officially titled the Permanent Under-Secretary of State) in the Home Office since 2001. ...

External links

• EPIC data retention page