David Malet Armstrong, often D. M. Armstrong, (1926 - ) is an Australianphilosopher of mind, and scientific metaphysician. He is well-known for being a functionalist, an actualist and a materialist. 1926 was a common year starting on Friday (link will take you to calendar). ... A philosopher is a person devoted to studying and producing results in philosophy. ... Philosophy of mind is the philosophical study of the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, and consciousness. ... Metaphysics (Greek words meta = after/beyond and physics = nature) is a branch of philosophy concerned with the study of first principles and being (ontology). ... Functionalism is the dominant theory of mental states in modern philosophy. ... This article is about the philosophy actualism. ... Materialism is the philosophical view that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are comprised of material. The view is perhaps best understood in its opposition to the doctrines of immaterial substance applied to the mind historically, and most famously by...
Materialism is the philosophical view that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are comprised of material. The view is perhaps best understood in its opposition to the doctrines of immaterial substance applied to the mind historically, and most famously by... 1968 was a leap year starting on Monday (the link is to a full 1968 calendar). ... Universal has several meanings: For the concept of a universal in metaphysics, see Universal (metaphysics). ... 1978 was a common year starting on Sunday (the link is to a full 1978 calendar). ... 1983 is a common year starting on Saturday of the Gregorian calendar. ... Possibility comprises that which one can achieve, or alternatively ones potential. ... 1989 is a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ... 1997 is a common year starting on Wednesday of the Gregorian calendar. ...
Armstrong requires his factualism to be compatible with both naturalism, the ontological view that ”the world, the totality of entities, is nothing more than the spacetime system”, whose features are most reliably understood by means of natural science (ibid., p.
Armstrong will not buy the conceptual relativist’s (or pluralist’s) thesis that the possibility of viewing the world from several different perspectives makes either the world itself (or the plurality of worlds) or the truth about the way the world is ontologically dependent on the perspectives from which it is viewed.
Armstrong does not make the distinction between things in themselves and appearances, believing (mistakenly) that the world we empirically cognize and (fallibly) try to represent is the world as it is in itself.
Feeds |
Contact