In philosophy of mind, dualism is a set of beliefs which begins with the claim that the mental and the physical have a fundamentally different nature. It is contrasted with varying kinds of monism, including materialism and phenomenalism. Dualism is one answer to the mind-body problem. Pluralism holds that there are even more kinds of events or things in the world. Philosophy of mind is the philosophical study of the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, and consciousness. ... The mind is the term most commonly used to describe the higher functions of the human brain, particularly those of which humans are subjectively conscious, such as personality, thought, reason, memory, intelligence and emotion. ... Antonym of psychical. ... ... Materialism is the philosophical view that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions. ... In the philosophy of perception, phenomenalism is the view that physical objects, properties, events (whatever is physical) are reducible to mental objects, properties, events. ... The mind-body problem is the problem of determining the relationship between the human body and the human mind. ... Pluralism in the area of philosophy of the mind, distinguishes a position where one believes there to be ultimately many kinds of substances in the world, as opposed to monism and dualism. ...

Note that other fields have their own meanings for "dualism". See dualism. The term dualism can refer to a variety of doctrines, mainly in theology and philosophy, each involving the purported existence of two opposites of some kind. ...

Types of ontological dualism

Ontological dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and matter. Substance dualism asserts that the mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of substances, while property dualism suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter (as in emergentism). Yet a weaker type of ontological dualism is predicate dualism which claims the irreducibility of mental predicates to physical predicates. Substance dualism is a type of ontological dualism defended by Descartes in which it is claimed that there are two fundamental kinds of substance: mental and material. ... Property dualism is a philosophy of mind, and a subbranch of emergent materialism. ... In philosophy, emergentism is the belief in emergence, particularly as it involves consciousness and the philosophy of mind, and as it contrasts with reductionism. ...

Cartesian dualism is a kind of substance dualism, a great difficulty with which is the explanation of the interaction between mind and matter, if mind is to be immaterial. Cartesian dualism was Descartess principle of the separation of mind and matter and mind and body. ... Substance dualism is a type of ontological dualism defended by Descartes in which it is claimed that there are two fundamental kinds of substance: mental and material. ...

Types of interaction dualism

Regardless of whether ontological dualism is correct, one may wish to inquire how the mental interacts with the material.

Interaction dualism can be distinguished based on if and how mind and matter are thought to causally interact. In dualistic interactionism (also Cartesian dualism, as it was Descartes' position), arguably the most popular and widespread version, mind events can cause physical events and vice versa. Thus when Johnny touches a hot stove and burns his skin (physical events), he experiences pain (a mental event). Conversely, when Jessica decides her dog needs exercise (a mental event), she takes it for a walk (a physical event). This is arguably most people's common sense view of the relationship between mind and matter. The philosophical concept of causality or causation refers to the set of all particular causal or cause-and-effect relations. ... Cartesian dualism was Descartess principle of the separation of mind and matter and mind and body. ... Wikisource has original works written by or about: René Descartes Works by René Descartes at Project Gutenberg A summary of his book A Discourse On Method French French Audio Book (mp3) : excerpt about animals/machines from Discourse On the Method Discourse On the Method – at Project Gutenberg Selections from the... The mind is the term most commonly used to describe the higher functions of the human brain, particularly those of which humans are subjectively conscious, such as personality, thought, reason, memory, intelligence and emotion. ... The term common sense (or as an adjective, commonsense) describes beliefs or propositions that seem, to most people, to be prudent and of sound judgment, without dependence upon esoteric knowledge. ...

Epiphenomenalism allows causality to flow only in one direction, claiming that physical events have mental effects, but not vice versa. So although the mental cannot be reduced to the physical, mental events are side-effects, or by-products, of physical processes. Usually, the mind is seen as being a by-product of the brain and its neurons. The contrary position, that physical events are somehow by-products of mental events, is relatively unpopular and does not have a standard name. Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... Comparative brain sizes In the anatomy of animals, the brain, or encephalon (Greek for in the head), is the higher, supervisory center of the nervous system. ... Neurons (also spelled neurones or called nerve cells) are the primary cells of the nervous system. ...

According to a rather different theory called parallelism, mental events and physical events are perfectly coordinated by God; so that when a mental event such as Sally's decision to walk across the room occurs, simultaneously Sally's body heads across the room, in the absence of any cause-effect relation between mind and body. Mental and physical events are just perfectly coordinated by God, either in advance (as per Gottfried Leibniz's idea of pre-established harmony) or at the time (as in the Occasionalism of Nicolas Malebranche). God is the Supreme Being believed to exist in monotheistic religions as the creator and ruler of the Universe. ... This article needs copyediting (checking for proper English spelling, grammar, usage, tone, style, and voice). ... Gottfried Leibnizs theory of pre-established harmony is a philosophical theory about causation under which every substance only affects itself, but all the substances (both bodies and minds) in the world nevertheless seem to causally interact with each other because they have been programmed by God in advance to... Occasionalism is a philosophical theory about causation which says that neither matter nor mind can be a true cause of events. ... Nicolas Malebranche (August 6, 1638 – October 13, 1715) was a French philosopher of the Cartesian school. ...

Arguments for dualism

Arguments for dualism come in four main varieties: intuitive, religious, ontological, and subjective arguments.

Intuitive and Religious Arguments

One argument for dualism, especially dualistic interactionism, is that it is a very common sense view. Some developmental psychologists claim to have shown that dualism is commonsensical for very young children as well. This is obviously not "proof", but it suggests we should at least demand a reason for abandoning dualism. The term common sense (or as an adjective, commonsense) describes beliefs or propositions that seem, to most people, to be prudent and of sound judgment, without dependence upon esoteric knowledge. ...

A second argument is that the mind is (or resides in) the immortal soul. Traditional Christianity actually believed in the binding of the soul and body in one's redemption. Only in more recent branches of Christanity did the idea that your body will die and then your soul will go to heaven or hell arise. If you believe in this idea then you believe in dualism. Another idea in contrast to dualism is phenomenalism, which holds that everything is, ultimately, mental. But in any event you absolutely cannot hold that the soul is reducible to anything physical. If events in your soul were reducible to events in your brain, then when your brain stopped functioning, your soul would cease to exist. This is not necessarily the case, as some views of the universe admit the possibility that the laws of physics are not static. See the book The Physics of Immortality (ISBN 0385467990). The soul, according to many religious and philosophical traditions, is the ethereal substance — spirit (Hebrew:rooah or nefesh) — particular to a unique living being. ... Beliefs Though enormous diversity exists in the beliefs of those who self-identify as Christian, it is possible to venture general statements which describe the beliefs of a large majority . ...

Note that although this religious account may motivate or reinforce a religious person's belief in dualism, it may well seem altogether unconvincing to dualism's skeptics. To use this argument to convert, say, a card-carrying materialist to dualism, it seems necessary first to establish that people do, in fact, have immortal souls. And yet the card-carrying materialist is one of the last kinds of people who is going to admit to this.

The Problem of Mental Causation

A third argument for dualism, a negative argument against other philosophies of mind is perhaps to be considered an ontological argument for it; it goes like this: if dualism is false, we should be able to reduce mind to matter, or vice versa, or to reduce both to a neutral third substance. Notably Buddhist philosophy argues this point, but says everything reduces to "emptyness" or Shunyata rather than a "substance". The third argument can be re-stated as the problem of mental causation. Since dualism argues against the philosophy of epiphenomenalism by stating that it has a better answer for the problem of mental causation, the dualist argues that it is right about the need for a dualist account of the mind. Further, the dualist often argues that all other philosophies of the mind reduce to either dualism or epiphenomenalism. Buddhist philosophy is the branch of Eastern philosophy based on the teachings of Gautama Buddha (c. ... Śūnyatā, शून्यता (Sanskrit, Pali: suññatā), or Emptiness, is a term for an aspect of the Buddhist metaphysical critique as well as Buddhist epistemology and phenomenology. ... This is the mind-body problem of how it is that the mind can cause actions to bring about effects in the world. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... This is the mind-body problem of how it is that the mind can cause actions to bring about effects in the world. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ...

According to epiphenomenalism, all mental events are caused by a physical event and have no physical consequences as perhaps an intuitive view of mental causation would seem to suggest. So, a mental event of deciding to pick up a rock (call it "M") is caused by the firing of specific neurons in the brain (call it "P"), however when the arm and hand move to pick up a rock (call it "E") this is only caused by P. The physical causes are in principle reducible to fundamental physics, and therefore mental causes are eliminated using this reductionist explanation. If P causes M and E, there is no overdetermination in the explanation for E. Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... Reductionism in philosophy describes a number of related, contentious theories that hold, very roughly, that the nature of complex things can always be reduced to (explained by) simpler or more fundamental things. ...

Overdetermination and Dualism

Overdetermination arguments make the case that M/P causes E. Dualistic interactionism is an overdeterminist thesis. Interactionists believe that the mental (M) interacts with the physical (P), and through an overdetermination process where M and P interact, E is obtained (e.g., we pick up the rock). Overdeterminists who are not dualists can offer Donald Davidson's Anamolous Monism solution. The late Davidson advocated that mental events (M) are identical with physical events, however rejected the existence of psychophysical laws that tie a mental property to a physical property as a lawful structure. For example, if there are no psychophysical laws, then M is distinct from P in that there are no psychophysical laws that allow one to substitute a reference to a M property with a reference to a P property. The identity between P and M is maintained with token physicalism that states that there is a physical particular for every mental particular. The identity can also be maintained by saying that there is a counterfactual statement that if a physical event had not occurred, then there are non-strict laws that are in force that would prevent a mental events from occurring. The dualist criticism of this approach is that even though there are no psychophysical laws, causation is determined by a causal connection from the cause to the effect. Even in cases where there are no strict laws (e.g., I always buy a donut in the morning), there must be a causal connection from the physical event to the mental event to avoid dualism. If such a causal connection exists, even in principle, then epiphenomenalism seems unavoidable for the physicalist. There are two Donald Davidsons: Donald Davidson (poet) Donald Davidson (philosopher) This is a disambiguation page — a navigational aid which lists other pages that might otherwise share the same title. ... // Computer programming In object-oriented programming, object identity is a mechanism for distinguishing different objects from each other. ... // Computer programming In object-oriented programming, object identity is a mechanism for distinguishing different objects from each other. ... A counterfactual conditional (sometimes called a subjunctive conditional) is a logical conditional statement whose antecedent is (ordinarily) taken to be contrary to fact by those who utter it. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ...

The epiphenomenalist faces a few problems with regard to the problem of mental causation, and the dualist argues that these problems lead to absurdity--hence making dualism a preferable explanation to the philosophy of the mind. Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... This is the mind-body problem of how it is that the mind can cause actions to bring about effects in the world. ...

Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Mental Causation

There are three main problems facing the epiphenomenalist with regard to the problem of mental causation. This is the mind-body problem of how it is that the mind can cause actions to bring about effects in the world. ...

Epiphenomenalism and Zeno's Arrow Paradox

Epiphenomenalism has an entheymeme in regard to its argument for physical properties causing mental properties. The missing assumption in that argument is a material property can cause another material property. However, there are reasons to suspect this assumption as valid. Zeno's paradoxes for the Proposed solutions to the arrow paradox have not come without controversy. The argument suggests that platonism is needed to solve the material cause problem, and therefore the epiphenomenalism subtly assumes dualism in contradiction to their strict reductionist view. Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... Zenos paradoxes are a set of paradoxes devised by Zeno of Elea to support Parmenides doctrine that all is one and that contrary to the evidence of our senses, the belief in plurality and change is mistaken, and in particular that motion is nothing but an illusion. ... Platonic idealism is the theory that the substantive reality around us is only a reflection of a higher truth. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ...

Synchronic and Diachronic Arguments against Epiphenomenalism

The two other main arguments against epiphenomenalism solving the problem of mental causation are based on synchronic and diachronic arguments for mental causes. Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... This is the mind-body problem of how it is that the mind can cause actions to bring about effects in the world. ...

Synchronic argument

The synchronic argument assumes that epiphenomenalism is true to show an absurdity, hence the first assumption is that any causal interaction with the world via mental constructs is based on a false sense of mental causation. However, the second assumption of this argument is that some kind of causal interaction with the world is needed to construct mental constructs of the world. A third assumption is that our mental constructs provide a very good approximate representation of the world (commonsense realism), and commonsense realism requires for us to test all the known possibilities our conceptions might require in order for a mental construct to be verified as an approximately accurate representation. Therefore, epiphenomenalism is false according to this synchronic argument. That is, the epiphenomenalist forbids us from using a mental construct to attribute actual causal interaction with the world, however we have very good approximate mental representations of the world. We need causal interaction of our mental constructs to the world to bring about commonsense realism. This dualist argument says that two of these three assumptions are not compatible: we can't have a false sense of mental causation (assumption 1), and also have mental constructs that provide a very good approximate representation of the world (assumption 3). The argument says that since epiphenomenalism (assumption 1) is more speculative than our having mental constructs providing a very good approximation of the world, by Occam's razor we ought to reject epiphenomenalism. Since the dualistic interactionist argues that dualism is the only reasonable alternative to epiphenomenalism, the dualistic interactionist argues that we should accept dualism. Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... Occams Razor (also spelled Ockhams Razor), is a principle attributed to the 14th-century English logician and Franciscan friar, William of Ockham. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ...

Diachronic argument

The diachronic argument is similar to the synchronic argument, however it asks how natural selection can select mental attributes that help the organisms survive and reproduce since these functions have no causal role according to epiphenomenalism. The mental properties are eliminated according to epiphenomenalism since physical attributes are the actual causal agent for all mental effects, and mental effects have no causal impact. Therefore, the dualistic interactionist asks how could the natural selection process select for a property that doesn't actually exist? The dualistic interactionist argues that it is the behavior that is selected by natural selection since that behavior brings results that help the organisms to survive and reproduce. So, the dualist asks, if it is solely a physically caused behavior that is selected, then why select for mental functions that have no causal role in this process? Like the synchronic argument, this argument assumes epiphenomenalism is true to prove an absurdity is a result. In this case, the absurdity is that mental constructs are being naturally selected without having any causal role in aiding the survival and reproduction of the organism. Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ... Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. ...

Subjective argument in support of Dualism

A final argument, to be explored in depth, is that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different and perhaps irreconcilable properties.

Mental events are not publicly observable. When a boy touches a hot stove, a typical reactions is that he whips back his hand and says "Ouch!" but another party cannot feel or observe the pain outside the physical reaction.

Mental events are often said not to be spatially located. One could say pain is in the nerve endings in the fingerips of a person who has just touched a hot stove, yet the nerves in the fingertips do not cause the muscles to react (whipping the arm back). Another example is an emotion like happiness. When one is happy, there is no clear location where the emotion is felt. It could be in the brain or all over the body, but since one cannot feel happiness, it cannot be pinpointed to a particular place. Skeptics of dualism could claim that this is a result of an emotion being too minute to feel (the same way one cannot feel a weak sound wave or a soft gust of wind) if it was, perhaps, merely a small electric charge in the brain.

Maybe the simplest concept is the fact that mental events do not have mass or velocity. One cannot measure the properties a mental event such as an emotion, except the perceived intensity. Some argue against this point, however, claiming that time also does not have physical properties, but is only a perceived measurement.

Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical events obviously do not. That is, for example, what a burned finger feels like, what sky blue looks like, what nice music sounds like, and so on. This fourth point merits further expansion. Recently, philosophers have been calling the subjective aspects of mental events qualia, and they also call them raw feels. There is something that it's like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on; there are qualia involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical. One can describe the feeling the top of a hand at the moment--a "raw feel" experienced--is nothing more than a physical event. This article is about the philosophical concept. ...

An article by Thomas Nagel that came out in the late 1970s, called "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", argues the point that experiences cannot be transferred. He states that biologists know how bats perceieve their surroundings and how they perceive objects, yet they cannot experience what it would be like to actually be a bat. A biologist can understand how a bat's senses work, but it is impossible to actually feel what the bat experiences using the sonar. Nigel asks readers to think about what it would be like to be a bat, flying around using sonar to detect obstacles and finding its way. Bats obviously have experiences the same way a human does when it sees its surroundings; while a person can know how something or someone experiences things, at the same time they cannot share the experience. Thomas Nagel (born July 4, 1937) is Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University. ... The 1970s in its most obvious sense refers to the decade between 1970 and 1979. ...

On the same note as Thomas Nagel's article, a psychologist can examine a patient and determine what he or she is thinking and going through every day; the psychologist can know almost precisely how the person sees the world, yet the psychologist can never fully experience what the patient has gone through.

Mental events:

• Are not publicly observable
• They do not seem spatially localized
• It is difficult to identify their physical properties (such as mass and velocity) precisely
• There seems to be an irreducibly subjective aspect to them

Arguments against dualism

Varieties of dualism in which mind can causally affect matter have come under strenuous attack from different quarters, especially starting in the 20th century. How can something totally immaterial, people ask, affect something totally material? That's the basic problem. We can analyze the problem here in three parts. (19th century - 20th century - 21st century - more centuries) Decades: 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s As a means of recording the passage of time, the 20th century was that century which lasted from 1901–2000 in the sense of the Gregorian calendar (1900–1999 in the...

First, it is not clear where the interaction would take place. Burning my fingers causes pain, right? Well, apparently there is some chain of events, leading from the burning of skin, to the stimulation of nerve endings, to something happening in the nerves of my body that lead to my brain, to something happening in a particular part of my brain; and then, I feel pain. But the pain is not supposed to be spatially located. So what I want to know is, where does the interaction take place? If you say, "It takes place in the brain," then I will say, "But I thought pains weren't located anywhere." And you, as a dualist, might stick to your guns and say, "That's right, pains aren't located anywhere; but the brain event that immediately leads to the pain is located in the brain." But then we have a very strange causal relation on our hands. The cause is located in a particular place but the effect is not located anywhere. Well, you might say, that might be puzzling but it's not a devastating criticism.

(Problems with the above paragraph: 1) some dualisms maintain that the mind resides in a particular place, say, in the pineal(?) gland. In this case the arguments about the mental being "nowhere" look less strange. 2) it seems a little blurred -- is the problem locating the mind or the mental events or both? 3) it should at least be emphasized that things don't necessarily have to be in the same place to interact, as we see with the "attraction at a distance" in gravity.)

So look at a second problem about the interaction. Namely, how does the interaction take place? Maybe you think, "Well, that's a matter for science -- scientists will eventually discover the connection between mental and physical events." But philosophers have something to say about the matter, because the very idea of a mechanism, which explains the connection between the mental and the physical, would be very strange, at best. Why do I say it would be strange? Compare it to a mechanism that we do understand. Take a very simple causal relation, such as when the cue ball strikes the eight ball and causes it to go into the pocket. Here we can say that the cue ball has a certain amount of momentum as its mass moves across the pool table with some velocity, and then that momentum is transferred to the eight ball, which then heads toward the pocket. Now compare that to the situation in the brain, where we want to say a decision causes some neurons to fire and thus cause my body to move across the room. The decision, "I will cross the room now," is a mental event; and as such it does not have physical properties such as force. If it has no force, then how on earth could it cause any neuron to fire? Is it magic? Honestly, how could something without any physical properties have any physical effects at all?

Here you might reply, as some philosophers have indeed replied, as follows. You might say: "Well sure, there is a mystery about how the interaction between mental and physical events can occur; but the fact that there is a mystery doesn't mean that there is no interaction. Because plainly there is an interaction and plainly the interaction is between two totally different sorts of events." Now I expect that some of you may want to say this. But the problem with it is that it does not seem to answer the full power of the objection.

So let me explain the objection more precisely. Let's take as our example my decision to walk across the room. We say: my decision, a mental event, immediately causes a group of neurons in my brain to fire, a physical event, which ultimately results in my walking across the room. The problem is that if we have something totally nonphysical causing a bunch of neurons to fire, then there is no physical event which causes the firing. That means that some physical energy seems to have appeared out of thin air. Even if we say that my decision has some sort of mental energy, and that the decision causes the firing, we still haven't explained where the physical energy, for the firing, came from. It just seems to have popped into existence from nowhere.

A fundamental principle of physics is involved, the conservation of energy. According to this principle, "In all physical processes, the total amount of energy in the universe remains constant." Or in a form you may have heard before: in any change anything undergoes, energy is neither created nor destroyed. This is a basic principle you probably learned about in high school physics. So the point is that nerve firings, which are allegedly caused by a totally nonphysical decision, would appear to violate the Principle of the Conservation of Energy.

Now, dualistic interactionists have tried to answer these objections, and other such objections, but most philosophers these days are not impressed by their answers. It has come to the point where, in fact, there aren't very many interactionists around, and there haven't been many for decades. When I say this, I don't mean to imply that dualistic interactionism is false. All I mean to imply is that many philosophers today think it is false, and perhaps also that, if you want to hold onto interactionism yourself, you should try to come up with some effective replies to these objections.

(Another very interesting route to take for the aspiring substance dualist might be to question the causal closure of the physical domain. Briefly: there seem to be events on the quantum level which lack a physical cause; if they lack a physical cause, then either they have a nonphysical cause or they are uncaused; in either of these cases, the physical domain is not causally closed. But it remains true that there are very serious objections to substance dualism which must be met.)

Biological naturalism

John R. Searle, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, has pioneered an approach to mind-body issues that is dualistic in some respects, monist in others. He calls it "biological naturalism." John Searle is a philosopher at UC Berkeley. ... University of California, Berkeley The University of California, Berkeley (also known as Cal, UCB, UC Berkeley, The University of California, California, or simply Berkeley) is a public coeducational university situated east of the San Francisco Bay in Berkeley, California, overlooking the Golden Gate. ...

Searle's views sound like dualistic interactionism. He believes that consciousness "is a real part of the real world and it cannot be eliminated in favor of, or reduced to, something else" whether that something-else is a neurological state of the brain or a software program. He contends, for example, that the software known as Deep Blue knows nothing about chess. He also believes that consciousness is both a cause of events in the body and a response to events in the body. Kasparov vs. ... A chess table is a table with a chessboard painted or engraved on it. ...

On the other hand, Searle doesn't treat consciousness as a ghost in the machine. He treats it, rather, as an emergent property of the brain as a whole. (See holism). The causal interaction of mind and brain can be described in naturalistic terms, thus: events at the micro-level (perhaps at that of individual neurons) cause consciousness. Changes at the macro-level (the whole brain) constitute consciousness. Micro-changes cause and then are impacted by holistic changes, in much the same way that individual football players cause a team (as a whole) to win games, then the individuals gain confidence from the knowledge that they are part of a winning team. For other uses, please see Ghost in the Machine (disambiguation) Ghost in the Machine is the fourth album by The Police, released in 1981 (see 1981 in music). ... Emergence is the process of deriving some new and coherent structures, patterns and properties in a complex system. ... Holism (from holos, a Greek word meaning whole) is the idea that the properties of a system cannot be determined or explained by the sum of its components alone. ...

See also

• Dualism
• Monism
• Pluralism
• Reductionism

• Johannes Jacobus Poortman

The term dualism can refer to a variety of doctrines, mainly in theology and philosophy, each involving the purported existence of two opposites of some kind. ... ... For pluralism in regard to extraterrestrial conjecture see Cosmic pluralism Pluralism, the affirmation of diversity, is arguably one of the most important features of modern societies and social groups, and may be a key factor of progress in science, society and economic development. ... Reductionism in philosophy describes a number of related, contentious theories that hold, very roughly, that the nature of complex things can always be reduced to (be explained by) simpler or more fundamental things. ... Johannes Jacobus Poortman (Rotterdam April 26, 1896 - The Hague December 21, 1970), studied philosophy and psychology at Groningen University under Professor Gerardus Heymans. ...

External links

• Dictionary of philosophy of mind entry
• Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy