The Emancipation reform of 1861 in Russia performed by tsar Alexander II of Russia amounted to liquidation of serf dependence of Russian peasants. Tsar (Bulgarian цар, Russian царь, listen ▶(?); often spelled Czar or Tzar and sometimes Csar or Zar in English), was the title used for the autocratic rulers of the Bulgarian Empire in 913-1396/1422 and 1908-1946, in Serbia in the middle of the 14th century, and in Russia from 1547 to... Alexander II (1818-1881) Alexander (Aleksandr) II (Russian: Александр II Николаевич) (April 17, 1818–March 13, 1881) was the Emperor (tsar) of Russia from March 2, 1855 until his assassination. ... This article needs to be cleaned up to conform to a higher standard of quality. ...

The legal basis of the reform was the tsar's Emancipation Manifesto of March 3 (February 19, O.S.), 1861, accompanied by the set of legislative acts under the general name Regulations Concerning Peasants Leaving Serf Dependence (Положения о крестьянах выходящих из крепостной зависимости, Polozheniya o krestyanakh vykhodyashchikh iz krepostnoi zavisimosti). March 3 is the 62nd day of the year in the Gregorian Calendar (63rd in leap years). ... In Britain and countries of the British Empire, Old Style or O.S. after a date means that the date is in the Julian calendar, in use in those countries until 1752; New Style or N.S. means that the date is in the Gregorian calendar, adopted on 14 September... 1861 is a common year starting on Tuesday. ...

The Manifesto granted the full rights of free citizens to serfs and prescribed that peasants would be able to buy the land from the landlords.

See also: Alexander II of Russia: Emancipation of the serfs. Alexander II (1818-1881) Alexander (Aleksandr) II (Russian: Александр II Николаевич) (April 17, 1818–March 13, 1881) was the Emperor (tsar) of Russia from March 2, 1855 until his assassination. ...

Pre-reform Russia

Imperial Russia was a land of peasants; peasants made up at least 80% of the population. There were two main categories of peasants, those living on state lands and those living on the land of private landowners. Only the latter were serfs. As well as having obligations to the state, they also were obliged to the landowner, who had great power over their lives. By the mid-nineteenth century, less than half of Russian peasants were serfs. Categories: 1911 Britannica | Historical stubs | Feudalism ...

The rural population lived in households (dvory, singular dvor), gathered as villages (derevni, lit. 'wood', larger villages were called selo), run by a mir ('commune', or obshchina) - isolated, conservative, largely self-sufficient and self-governing units scattered across the land every 10 km or so. There were around 20 million dvory in Imperial Russia, four in ten numbering from six to ten people. The Russian word mir (мир), besides its direct meanings of peace and world, had some other meanings related to social organization in Imperial Russia. ... The Russian word mir (мир), besides its direct meanings of peace and world, had some other meanings related to social organization in Imperial Russia. ...

Intensely insular the mir assembly, the skhod (sel'skii skhod), appointed an elder (starosta) and a 'clerk' (pisar) to deal with any external issues. Land and resources were shared within the mir. The fields were divided among the families as nadel - a complex of strip plots, distributed according to the quality of the soil. The strips were periodicallly redistributed (peredely) within the derevni to produce level economic conditions - albeit at the expense of actual efficiency. Despite this the land was not owned by the mir, the land and its inhabitants were the legal property of the 100,000 or so land-owners (dvoryanstvo). The peasants were duty bound to regular payments in labour and goods, usually working the land half-and-half for themselves and the land-owner.

Emancipation Manifesto

The Russian government recognised that their country was the only remaining feudal state in Europe. The pitiful display by Russian forces in the Crimean War left the government acutely aware of their 'backwardness'. Eager to grow and develop industrial, hence military and political, strength, there were a number of economic reforms. As part of this the end of serfdom was considered. Optimistically it was hoped that after the abolition the mir would dissolve into individual peasant land owners and the beginnings of a market economy. The Crimean War lasted from 28 March 1854 until 1856 and was fought between Russia and an alliance of the United Kingdom, France, the Ottoman Empire (to some extent), and Piedmont-Sardinia. ...

Alexander, unlike his father, was willing to deal with this problem. Moving on from a petition from the Lithuanian provinces, a committee "for ameliorating the condition of the peasants" was founded and the principles of the abolition considered. Alexander II (1818-1881) Alexander (Aleksandr) II (Russian: Александр II Николаевич) (April 17, 1818–March 13, 1881) was the Emperor (tsar) of Russia from March 2, 1855 until his assassination. ...

The main point at issue was whether the serfs should remain dependent on the landlords, or whether they should be transformed into a class of independent communal proprietors.

The land-owners initially pushed for granting the peasants freedom but not any land. The tsar and his advisers, mindful of 1848, were opposed to creating a proletariat and the instability this could bring. But giving the peasants freedom and land seemed to leave the existing land-owners without the large and cheap labour-force they needed to maintain their estates. The proletariat (from Latin proles, offspring) is a term used to identify a lower social class; a member of such a class is proletarian. ...

To 'balance' this, the legislation contained three measures to reduce the potential economic self-sufficiency of the peasants. Firstly a transition period of nine years was introduced, during which the peasant was obligated as before to the old land-owner. Additionally large parts of common land were passed to the major land-owners as otrezki, making many forests, roads and rivers only accessible for a fee. The third measure was that the serfs must pay the land-owner for their allocation of land in a series of redemption payments. The total sum would be advanced by the government to the land-owner and then the peasants would repay the money, plus interest, to the government over a number of years.

Implementation

Although well planned the legislation, the reform did not work smoothly.

The land-owners and nobility were paid in government bonds and their debts were removed from the money before it was handed over. The bonds soon fell in value, combined with the generally poor management skills of the land-owners under the new conditions there were severe money problems and extensive land sales. The nobility held 850,000 square kilometres in 1861, by 1905 this was down to 580,000 square kilometres.

Many peasants also felt economic difficulties. The hard money demands of redemption payments and taxes pulled many into unfavourable situations, forcing them to work for the old land-owners, or more successful peasants, or even leave the land to find work elsewhere.

The legislation retained the village commune as an official administrative force. The strain on the mir of new economic disparities was intense. More wealthy peasants could lend money at high interest rates, use their neighbours as paid labour and expand their land holdings. Successful peasants were called miroedy (mir-eaters) or kulaks. The Russian word mir (мир), besides its direct meanings of peace and world, had some other meanings related to social organization in Imperial Russia. ... Kulaks (Russian: , kulak, fist, literally meaning tight-fisted; Ukrainian: , kurkul) is a derogative term extensively used in Soviet political language, originally referring to relatively wealthy peasants in the Russian Empire who owned larger farms and used hired labour, as a result of the Stolypin reform introduced since 1906. ...

Worse were population pressures, an excess of 15 per 1,000 was the highest natural rate in Europe. Strong growth created more families who could, under the law, demand a share of the mir's land. This created ever smaller and less economic plots, from an average holding of 25,000 square metres in 1861 an average plot was reduced to 14,300 square metres by 1900. The deeply conservative nature of the mir also inhibited new agricultural methods or capital investment.

Outcome

The legislation neither freed the peasants from excessive external obligation or greatly reordered their social and economic constraints. The uneven application of the legislation did leave many peasants

sants in Poland and northern Russia both free and landless (batraks), while in other areas peasants became the majority land owners in their province.

Serf Emancipation and the Impact of Westernizer/Slavophile Tendencies

Originating from the year the Russian Serfs were emancipated, 1861, their impact and relation on the development of revolutionary consciousness in Imperial Russia, was dependent upon two lingering factors–where a newly freed Serf lived, whether a rural or urban setting, and also Russia’s economic condition, it could be either expanding or declining. Essentially, internal events in Russia—such as mass starvation and economic collapse—during the time period of emancipation to early Soviet period, gave the Serfs justified reasons to facilitate change, and therefore to become more involved in domestic issues. External events, such as the successive Russian battlefield failures during World War I, reinforced Serf Slavophile tendencies and isolationist desires. These tendencies and desires became the quintessential motivation, or fuel, that spread and intensified revolutionary consciousness across Russia, once an appropriate revolutionary leader or movement had been created or identified.

The late nineteenth century, primarily from 1861 until around 1890, was a time where Russia experienced economic growth, industrialization, the formation of a capitalist economy, and the massive internal migration of Serfs from farms to cities who still retained their ingrained Slavophile tendencies. The subsequent emancipation, released a previously untapped labor force which factories needed, and industrialization required. The newly employed urban Serfs, who resided in crowded and dirty urban settings, would now enjoy increased access to consumer goods and to each other. The distribution and accessibility of consumer goods, determined by distribution of wealth and social status, would create a new market, but envy and a desire for a more satisfactory state and quality of existence would become ever more important in the minds of urban Serfs. Previously spread thinly among the Russian countryside as rural Serfs, the subsequent congregation of large amounts people in a confined to setting, such as a city, could promote the permeation and attractiveness of ideals and beliefs, that run counter to the political, social, and economic agenda of the Russian state, and thus the Tsar himself. Therefore, urban Serfs would be more susceptible to abuse and manipulation at the hands of industrialists and the government in cities of Russia, rather than their previous abuse at the hands of the landowning gentry. Eventually, the congregation of people in urban settings, ingrained Slavophile tendencies, economic growth and collapse, and urban Serf desires for sustainable changes would equate to demands social, political, and economic changes and rights gradually, and then at a more rapid pace through revolution.

Rural Serfs, who remained on farms after emancipation, would have wanted to be left alone, meaning Slavophile tendencies were present, because of a few important realities. Due to the vastness of the Russian countryside, the presence of government and enforcement of laws would have been negligible. The lack of population pressure would have not created the conditions of squalor and population congregation which existed in the burgeoning Russian cities; therefore, the overall quality of life for rural Serfs could be higher, and liberal ideas, which existed in the urban setting, would not be as prevalent and influential. Due to these conditions and the conservative nature of rural Serfs, any potential revolutionary movement, and revolutionary consciousness, would have to be sustained and bolstered by a series, and combination, of climatic internal and external factors, and only then would the countryside mobilize for change—including demands for lower taxes, land reform, land ownership redistribution, etc.

As for the origins of the 1917 revolutions, economic decline and collapse combined with a heavy handed autocratic government to create a scenario that furthered the social, economic, political, and military woes and ills that plagued existence in Imperial Russia. For example, the Russo – Japanese War of 1904-1905 exacerbated the Russian economic condition, which was not only dire, but teetering on the brink of collapse when the war began and ended. Successive appeals made by, primarily, urban Russians to the Tsar for economic relief, social change, and a conclusion of the war went unheeded. Unheeded requests for change and urban Slavophile tendencies fueled the creation of new revolutionary movements, gave new life to already existing revolutionary movements, and essentially reinforced Slavophile concepts that equated—if Russia turns inward and applies Russified solutions to wholly Russian problems, it would be able to realize more progressive and quicker social, economic, and political conversions. The result of all this was the 1905 Russian revolution. Unfortunately, the demonstrators who desired change experienced unnecessary brutality at the hands of the Russian military. The direct result of all this meant that Russian revolutionary consciousness was perpetuated, at least in the urban setting, because the populous developed a rather bitter taste regarding the governments traditional utilization of brutal encounters combined with other heavy handed tactics.

Political concessions made by Tsar Nicholas II as a result of the 1905 Russian revolution, open Pandora’s Box. These political concessions, especially the creation of the Duma, signifies the beginning of revolution from above, however, it was interrupted by World War I and lackluster enthusiasm, on behalf of Tsar, regarding continuing social, economic, and political changes. Prior to and as World War I raged, economic collapse ensued and the Russian middle class was destroyed. The subsequent destruction of the Russian middle class, from 1904 through 1917, resulted in the splintering of the Russian political spectrum in urban centers towards the far left and far right, respectively. While in rural Russia, the peasants retreated to their isolationist Slavophile tendencies, and generally wanted to just be left alone and were willing accept any political interest, or revolutionary movement, that would retain the status quo or even improve their already bleak existence. Motivated individuals, such as Lenin, spurred on by foreign ideas—Marxism and Socialism—that had undergone Russification were, essentially, Slavophiles who retained only the basic elements normally associated with Westernizers. Thus, the revolution led by the Vanguard began in earnest and replaced revolution from above, amidst a chaotic Russia wracked by war weariness and national exhaustion. As the Russian Civil War began, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and Allied intervention, the communists and Lenin seemed to reinitialize the revolution from above in the areas which they controlled or occupied. I believe this revolutionary policy reversal is primarily due to a complacent peasantry, steeped in Tsarist era Slavophile tendencies, and also due to the particularly large number of competing political, military, and revolutionary interests involved in the civil war and overall struggle for power, prestige, and authority. In a sense, the revolution from above was finally and successfully completed, irrespective of costs to Russian society and the nation, by the communists. They successfully consolidated power and tended to the needs of the complacent Russian peasantry, and also resolved lingering concerns and problems that existed and nagged at city dwellers.

In conclusion, poop concepts and ideas associated with Westernizers had lost its effectiveness and mass appeal; however, Slavophile tendencies remained alive and well, only undergoing transformations depending upon an individuals, or revolutionary organizations, social status or economic condition. As the Russian economy grew and developed through the late nineteenth century—the social, economic, and political spectrums were neglected by successive Tsarist regimes, irrespective of Westernizer or Slavophile labels, and the consistent hostility and brutality levied against the Russian masses up through World War I, finally caught up with the Tsar. Therefore, Serf revolutionary consciousness was slow to develop, but once it did the full effects and demands became very apparent to whatever hodgepodge group that held the Russian reins of power. The resulting stockpiling of national grievances was magnified by external and internal factors, and could only achieve resolution through revolution, whether it was from above or via grassroots agitation. Yet, strong elements of Slavophile tendencies were still carried over through the whole Soviet period as relics from an important and distinct era in history.

Related article

• Stolypin reform

Stolypin agrarian reforms are the agrarian reforms to Imperial Russias agricultural sector instituted during the tenure of Petr Stolypin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister). ...

External links

• Emancipation Manifesto, in English
• Emancipation Manifesto, in Russian