The Fabian strategy is a military strategy where pitched battles are avoided in favor of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition. While avoiding decisive battles, the side employing this strategy harasses its enemy to cause attrition and loss of morale. Employment of this strategy implies that the weaker side believes time is on its side, but it may also be adopted when no feasible alternative strategy can be devised. Military strategem in the Battle of Waterloo. ... A pitched battle is a battle were both sides choose to fight at a chosen location and time and where either side has the option to disengage either before the battle starts, or shortly after the first armed exchanges. ... This article is about the military strategy. ... Generally, a battle is an instance of combat in warfare between two or more parties wherein each group will seek to defeat the others. ...

Origin

This strategy derives its name from Quintus Fabius Maximus, the dictator of the Roman Republic given the thankless task of defeating the great general of Carthage, Hannibal, in southern Italy during the Second Punic War (218-202 BC). At the start of the war, Hannibal boldly crossed into Italy by traversing the Alps during winter-time and invaded Italy. Due to Hannibal's skill as a general, he repeatedly inflicted devastating losses on the Romans despite his numerical inferiority — quickly winning two smashing victories over the Romans at the Battle of Trebbia and the Battle of Lake Trasimene. After these disasters the Romans appointed Fabius Maximus as dictator. Well-aware of the military superiority of the Carthaginians and the ingenuity of Hannibal, Fabius initiated a war of attrition which was designed to exploit Hannibal's strategic vulnerabilities. Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (c. ... Dictator was a political office of the Roman Republic. ... This article is becoming very long. ... Bold text Carthage Ruins of Roman-era Carthage For other uses, see Carthage (disambiguation). ... Hannibal is one of the most common prenames in Punic and we know several military commanders (strategos) with this prename during the Punic Wars, while their family names or nicknames are often not recorded. ... Combatants Roman Republic Carthage Commanders Publius Cornelius Scipio†, Tiberius Sempronius Longus Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, Gaius Flaminius†, Fabius Maximus, Claudius Marcellus†, Lucius Aemilius Paullus†, Gaius Terentius Varro, Marcus Livius Salinator, Gaius Claudius Nero, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus†, Masinissa, Minucius+, Geminus+, Regulus+ Hannibal Barca, Hasdrubal Barca†, Mago Barca†, Hasdrubal Gisco†, Maharbal... The West face of the Petit Dru above the Chamonix valley near the Mer de Glace. ... Battle of the Trebia Conflict Second Punic War Date 18 December 218 BC Place Trebbia river, Italy Result Carthaginian victory The Battle of the Trebia (or Trebbia) was a battle of the Second Punic War fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and the Romans in 218 BC. Hannibals... Combatants Carthage Roman Republic Commanders Hannibal Gaius Flaminius † Strength 30,000 soldiers 30,000-40,000 soldiers Casualties 1,500 soliders about 15,000 The Battle of Lake Trasimene (June 24, 217 BC, April on the Julian calendar) was a Roman defeat in the Second Punic War between the Carthaginians... Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (c. ...

Hannibal suffered from one particular weakness: as a commander of an invading foreign army on Italian soil, his only hope of destroying Rome was by enlisting the support of her allies. As long as the Italians remained loyal to Rome, then there was no hope that Hannibal would win; but should the Romans keep on losing battles to him, their allies’ faith in them would weaken. Therefore, Fabius knew that the only other way to defeat Hannibal was never to engage with him in pitched battles, so as to deprive him of any victories he may gain. He determined that Hannibal's extended supply lines, and the cost of maintaining the Carthaginian army in the field, meant that Rome had time on its side. Rather than fight, Fabius shadowed Hannibal's army and avoided battle. While seeking to avoid battle, Fabius instead sent out small detachments against Hannibal’s foraging parties, and always maneuvered the Roman army in hilly terrain, so as to nullify Hannibal’s decisive superiority in cavalry. Residents of small northern villages were encouraged to post lookouts, so that they could gather their livestock and possessions and take refuge into fortified towns. He used interior lines to ensure that at no time could Hannibal march on Rome without abandoning his Mediterranean ports, while at the same time inflicting constant, small, debilitating defeats on the North Africans. This, Fabius knew, would wear down the invaders’ endurance and discourage Rome’s allies from going over to the enemy, without having to challenge the Carthaginians to battle. Military Supply Chain Management is a cross-functional approach to procuring, producing and delivering products and services. ... Kircholm, a 1925 painting by Wojciech Kossak. ... Fortifications (Latin fortis, strong, and facere, to make) are military constructions designed for defensive warfare. ... Interior lines is a strategy of warfare that is based on the concept that lines of movement within an area are shorter than those on the outside. ... Composite satellite image of the Mediterranean Sea. ...  Northern Africa (UN subregion)  geographic, including above North Africa or Northern Africa is the northernmost region of the African continent. ...

The strategy, though a military success, was a political failure. His inactive policies, while tolerable among wiser minds in the Roman Senate, were deemed unpopular, because the Romans had been long accustomed to facing their enemies in the field. The strategy was in part ruined because of a lack of unity in the command of the Roman army. The magister equitum, Minucius, was a political enemy of Fabius, who is famously quoted exclaiming, “Are we come here to see our allies butchered, and their property burned, as a spectacle to be enjoyed? And if we are not moved with shame on account of any others, are we not on account of these citizens... a Carthaginian foreigner, who was advanced even this far from the remotest limits of the world, through our dilatoriness and inactivity?". In fact, the more the Roman people recovered from the shock of Hannibal’s initial victories, the more they began to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy, which had given them the chance to recover. Fabius’s strategy was especially frustrating to the mass of the people, who were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. Moreover, it was widely believed that if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, the terrified allies, believing that Rome was incapable of protecting them, might defect and pledge their allegiance to the Carthaginians. Since Fabius won no large-scale victories, the Roman senate removed him from command. Their chosen replacement led the Roman army into the debacle at the Battle of Cannae. The Romans, after experiencing this catastrophic defeat and losing countless other battles, had at this point learned their lesson. They utilized the strategies Fabius had taught them, and which, they finally realized, were the only feasible means of driving Hannibal from Italy. The Roman Senate (Latin: Senatus) was the main governing council of both the Roman Republic, which started in 510 BC, and the Roman Empire, which ended in the 6th century AD. The word Senatus is derived from the Latin word senex, meaning old man or elder. ... The Master of the Horse was (and in some cases, is) a historical position of varying importance in several European nations. ... For the eleventh century battle in the Byzantine conquest of the Mezzogiorno, see Battle of Cannae (1018). ...

This strategy of attrition earned Fabius the epithet "Cunctator" (the Delayer). An epithet (Greek - επιθετον and Latin - epitheton; literally meaning imposed) is a descriptive word or phrase. ...

Later usage

Though it proved a political disaster for Fabius, eventually the Fabian strategy proved itself. The most noted use of Fabian strategy in American history was by George Washington, sometimes called the "American Fabius" for his use of the strategy, but, in fact, its application was originally championed and pressed on Washington by his trusted strategic advisor General Nathanael Greene and the other generals in the Councils of War. While Washington had initially pushed for traditional direct engagements and victories, he was convinced of the merits of using his army to harass the British rather than engage them both by the urging of his generals in his councils of war, as well as after the pitched-battle disasters of 1776, and especially the Battle of Long Island. However, as with the original Fabius, Fabian strategy is often more popular in retrospect than at the time. To the troops, it can seem like a cowardly and demoralizing policy of continual retreat. Fabian strategy is sometimes combined with scorched earth tactics that demand sacrifice from civilian populations. Fabian leaders may be perceived as giving up territory without a fight, and since Fabian strategies promise extended war rather than quick victories, they can wear down the will of one's own side as well as the enemy. During the Revolution, John Adams' dissatisfaction with Washington's conduct of the war led him to declare, "I am sick of Fabian systems in all quarters!" Later in history Fabian tactics would be employed all over the world. Used against Napoleon’s Grande Armée and Hitler’s blitzkrieg the Fabian tactics proved to be a excellent strategy in the defense of Russia. George Washington (February 22, 1732–December 14, 1799)[1] led Americas Continental Army to victory over Britain in the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), and was later elected the first President of the United States. ... Charles Willson Peale painted a portrait of General Greene from life in 1783, which was then copied several times by C.W. Peale and his son, Rembrandt Peale. ... Combatants United States Kingdom of Great Britain Commanders George Washington, Israel Putnam William Howe, Charles Cornwallis, Henry Clinton Strength 11,000-13,000 (about 10,000 of which were militia ) 22,000 (including 9,000 Hessians) Casualties 1,719 total (312 dead, 1,407 wounded, captured or missing) 377 total... A scorched earth policy is a military tactic which involves destroying anything that might be useful to the enemy while advancing through or withdrawing from an area. ... John Adams (October 31, 1735 – July 4, 1826) was a politician and Founding Father of the United States of America who served both as that nations first Vice President (1789–1797), and as its second President (1797–1801). ... For other uses, see Napoleon (disambiguation). ... Adolf Hitler Adolf Hitler (April 20, 1889 – April 30, 1945, standard German pronunciation in the IPA) was the Führer (leader) of the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi Party) and of Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945. ... One of the defining characteristics of what is commonly known as Blitzkrieg is close co-operation between infantry and tanks. ...

See also

• Attrition warfare
• Fabian Society
• Scorched earth