A Marquess is a nobleman of hereditary rank in Europe and Japan. In British peerage it ranks below a Duke and above an Earl. A woman with the rank of marquess, or the wife of a marquess, is a marchioness.
The word derives from the Middle Frenchmarquis (feminine, marquise), ultimately from a Germanic word for 'border'. This spelling marquis is still also used, though marquess is now preferred, at least for British marquesses (French marquis are still generally known by the French spelling of the word). In German-speaking countries, the equivalent title was margrave.
Peerage of England
The first marquess in England was Robert de Vere, 9th Earl of Oxford, who was created Marquess of Dublin by Richard II on the 1 December1385. On the 13 October1386 the patent of this marquessate was recalled, Robert de Vere was raised to Duke of Oxford. John Beaufort, 1st Earl of Somerset, the second legitimate son of John of Gaunt, was raised to the second marquessate as Marquess of Dorset on in September 1397. In 1399, he was disgraced and the king revoked his marquessate. The Commons petitioned Richard for his restoration but he himself objected stating "the name of marquess is a strange name in this realm". From that period the title appears to have been dormant till the reign of Henry VI, when it was revived in 1442.
The Chronological Peerage of England, hereditarytitles.com as of March 2, 2003; [1] (http://www.hereditarytitles.com/Page70.htm); omits Normanby, misspells Hartington as Martington, places Marquess of Lorn and Kintyre in peerage of England (Scotland is more probable).
BUCKINGHAM AND NORMANBY, JOHN SHEFFIELD, 1ST DUKE OF (1648-1721), 1911 Encyclopędia Britannica; [2] (http://49.1911encyclopedia.org/B/BU/BUCKINGHAM_AND_NORMANBY_JOHN_SHEFFIELD_1ST_DUKE_OF.htm); mentions Marquess of Normanby in peerage of England.
Marchese alleges that the federal court's jurisdiction was based not only on the ADA and 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 but also on diversity of citizenship.
Marchese has failed to specifically allege that the hospital discriminated against her on the basis of a disability protected by the ADA.
Marchese's federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the ADA, we VACATE the district court's dismissal of her state law claims, and we REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.