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Averroes (1126–1198), a philosopher who discussed the omnipotence paradox. [1] The omnipotence paradox is a family of related paradoxes, having to do with the question of what an omnipotent being can do. These paradoxes pose the question whether it makes sense to attribute omnipotence to anything, usually a being of some sort, or whether such an attribution is meaningless. Image File history File links Omnipotence_paradox. ...
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Year 2007 (MMVII) is the current year, a common year starting on Monday of the Gregorian calendar and the AD/CE era in the 21st century. ...
is the 247th day of the year (248th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...
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Ibn Rushd, known as Averroes (1126 â December 10, 1198), was an Andalusian-Arab philosopher and physician, a master of philosophy and Islamic law, mathematics, and medicine. ...
Look up paradox in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ...
Omnipotence (literally, all power) is the power to do absolutely anything. ...
The argument states that if the being can perform such actions, then it can limit its own ability to perform actions and hence it cannot perform all actions, yet, on the other hand, if it cannot limit its own actions, then that is -- straight off -- something it cannot do.[2] This paradox is often formulated in terms of the God of the Abrahamic religions, though this is not a requirement. One version of the omnipotence paradox is the so-called paradox of the stone: "Could an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that even that being could not lift it?" If so, then it seems that the being could cease to be omnipotent; if not, it seems that the being was not omnipotent to begin with.[3] This article discusses the term God in the context of monotheism and henotheism. ...
Abrahamic religions symbols designating the three prevalent monotheistic religions â Judaism, Christianity, and Islam Abrahamic religion is a term commonly used to designate the three prevalent monotheistic religions â Judaism, Christianity, and Islam[1][2] â which claim Abraham (Hebrew: Avraham ×Ö·×ְרָ×Ö¸× ; Arabic: Ibrahim ابراÙÙÙ
) as a part of their sacred history. ...
A version of the paradox can also be seen in non-theological contexts. A similar problem occurs when accessing legislative or parliamentary sovereignty, which holds a specific legal institution to be omnipotent in legal power, and in particular such an institution's ability to regulate itself. [2] Parliamentary sovereignty, parliamentary supremacy, or legislative supremacy is a concept in constitutional law that applies to some parliamentary democracies. ...
Some philosophers, such as J. L Cowan, see this paradox as a reason to reject the possibility of any absolutely omnipotent entity.[4] Others, such as Thomas Aquinas, assert that the paradox arises from a misunderstanding of the concept of omnipotence.[5] The paradox can indeed be viewed as a straightforward logical impossibility, in that it frames an inability ("cannot lift it") as an attribute of total ability (omnipotence), rather than its absence or negation. Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P.(also Thomas of Aquin, or Aquino; c. ...
Still others, such as René Descartes, argue that God is absolutely omnipotent, despite the apparent problem.[6] In addition, some philosophers have considered the assumption that a being is either omnipotent or non-omnipotent to be a false dilemma, as it neglects the possibility of varying degrees of omnipotence.[7] Some modern approaches to the problem have involved semantic debates over whether language — and therefore philosophy — can meaningfully address the concept of omnipotence itself.[8]Some, however, argue that omnipotence grants the ability to bend logic, therefore rendering the paradox useless. Descartes redirects here. ...
The form of the fallacy of false dichotomy as an argument map with the conclusion at the top of the tree. ...
The introduction to this article provides insufficient context for those unfamiliar with the subject matter. ...
It is thought by some that to analyze the omnipotence paradox rigorously, a precise definition of omnipotence must be established, though others see this as shilly-shallying and just an attempt to avoid the paradox. At any rate, for those who think there is enlightenment at the end of this tunnel the common definition, "all powerful", is not specific enough to deal with the issues raised by the paradox. Several other versions of the paradox, incidentally, have been advanced besides the "heavy stone", and these relate to problems in modern physics. Overview | “ | Could an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that even that being could not lift it? | ” | | A common modern version of the omnipotence paradox is expressed in the question: "Can an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that it cannot lift it?" This question generates a dilemma. The being can either create a stone which it cannot lift, or it cannot create a stone which it cannot lift. If the being can create a stone that it cannot lift, then it seems that it can cease to be omnipotent. If the being cannot create a stone which it cannot lift, then it seems it is already not omnipotent. The problem is similar to another classic paradox, the irresistible force paradox: What happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object? One response to this paradox is that if a force is irresistible, then by definition there is no truly immovable object; conversely, if an immovable object were to exist, then no force could be defined as being truly irresistible. But this way out is not possible in the omnipotence case, because the purpose is to ask if the being's omnipotence makes its own omnipotence impossible. This is a trivia section. ...
J.L. Cowan attempts to resolve the paradox in "The Paradox of Omnipotence Revisited." He proposes the following: (1) Either God can create a stone which He cannot lift, or He cannot create a stone which He cannot lift. (2) If God can create a stone which He cannot lift, then He is not omnipotent (since He cannot lift the stone in question). (3) If God cannot create a stone which He cannot lift, then He is not omnipotent (since He cannot create the stone in question). (4) Therefore God is not omnipotent. Omnipotence implies that God can lift anything, therefore it is illogical to say God can make a stone which He cannot lift. It is however logical to say if God can lift anything, then he is not capable of making a stone He cannot lift. Because He cannot make a stone He cannot lift, omnipotence is negated. In order to analyze the omnipotence paradox in a rigorous way, one of several definitions of omnipotence must be established as in use. For example, Peter Geach describes four different kinds of omnipotence and distinguishes all of them from the notion of being "almighty".[9] Peter Thomas Geach (born 1919) is one of the foremost contemporary British philosophers. ...
C.S. Lewis in his book "The Problem of Pain" holds that the nature of the paradox is internal to the statement. To quote: "This is no limit to His power. If you choose to say God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it', you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combination of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them to other words `God can'" (p. 18). In the end, "not because His power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God". (p.18)[10] The Problem of Pain is a 1940 book by C. S. Lewis, in which he seeks to provide a Christian response to intellectual questions about suffering. ...
Free-Will is a Japanese independent record label founded in 1986. ...
One should note the question relies on its clever linguistic construction. One who claims God's omnipotence could simply claim "There is no stone too big for God to lift" and "There is limit to how large a stone God can create." The question itself disguises a question of ability with a question of inability. An omnipotence paradox would also arise from the question "Can God not do something"? One would say if God cannot not do something, then God is not omnipotent. But the very definition of "omnipotent" is precisely that: that God "cannot cannot" do something. As such the Omnipotence problem could be argued to be a linguistic trick on one's definition of omnipotence. Another explanation is that, because this logic being used is a construct of man, we cannot apply it to a god/God of omnipotence. Our concept of time and space is limited, while an all-knowing being comprehends things that are, literally, incomprehensible. A similar example is how can God have existed for all time? Such a question is incomprehensible for us, yet an all-knowing being would know.
Types of omnipotence -
Peter Geach describes and rejects four levels of omnipotence. He also defines and defends a lesser notion of the "almightiness" of God. Omnipotence (literally, all power) is power with no limits or inexhaustible, in other words, unlimited power. ...
Peter Thomas Geach (born 1919) is one of the foremost contemporary British philosophers. ...
- Y is absolutely omnipotent means that Y "can do everything absolutely. Everything that can be expressed in a string of words even if it can be shown to be self-contradictory," Y "is not bound in action, as we are in thought by the laws of logic."[9] This position is advanced by Descartes. It has the theological advantage of making God prior to the laws of logic, but the theological disadvantage of making God's promises suspect. On this account, the omnipotence paradox is a genuine paradox, but genuine paradoxes might nonetheless be so.
- Y is omnipotent means "Y can do X" is true if and only if X is a logically consistent description of a state of affairs. This position was once advocated by Thomas Aquinas.[11] This definition of omnipotence solves some of the paradoxes associated with omnipotence, but some modern formulations of the paradox still work against this definition. Let X = "to make something that its maker cannot lift". As Mavrodes points out there is nothing logically contradictory about this; a man could, for example, make a boat which he could not lift.[12] It would be strange if humans could accomplish this feat, but an omnipotent being could not. Additionally, this definition has problems when X is morally or physically untenable for a being like God.
- Y is omnipotent means "Y can do X" is true if and only if "Y does X" is logically consistent. Here the idea is to exclude actions which would be inconsistent for Y to do but might be consistent for others. Again sometimes it looks as if Aquinas takes this position.[13] Here Mavrodes' worry about X= "to make something its maker cannot lift" will no longer be a problem because "God does X" is not logically consistent. However, this account may still have problems with moral issues like X = "tells a lie" or temporal issues like X = "brings it about that Rome was never founded."[9]
- Y is omnipotent means whenever "Y will bring about X" is logically possible, then "Y can bring about X" is true. This sense, also does not allow the paradox of omnipotence to arise, and unlike definition #3 avoids any temporal worries about whether or not an omnipotent being could change the past. However, Geach criticizes even this sense of omnipotence as misunderstanding the nature of God's promises.[9]
- Y is almighty means that Y is not just more powerful than any creature; no creature can compete with Y in power, even unsuccessfully.[9] In this account nothing like the omnipotence paradox arises, but perhaps that is because God is not taken to be in any sense omnipotent. On the other hand, Anselm of Canterbury seems to think that almightiness is one of the things that makes God count as omnipotent.[14]
The question, though, is whether these are really all just distinctions without a difference, at least a difference with respect to whether it really makes sense to say that a being is omnipotent, or all-powerful. It may sound good, particularly because it has been said so often, over so many centuries, but could there actually be a power of this sort? Broadly speaking, a contradiction is an incompatibility between two or more statements, ideas, or actions. ...
Descartes redirects here. ...
â â â¡ logical symbols representing iff. ...
Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P.(also Thomas of Aquin, or Aquino; c. ...
Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033 or 1034 â April 21, 1109) was an Italian medieval philosopher and theologian, who held the office of Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109. ...
The notion of omnipotence can also be applied to an entity in different ways. An essentially omnipotent being is an entity that is necessarily omnipotent. In contrast, an accidentally omnipotent being is an entity that can be omnipotent for a temporary period of time, and then becomes non-omnipotent. The omnipotence paradox can be applied differently to each type of being.[15]
Philosophical responses Asking God to create a stone which he cannot lift not only implicates an ability, but also a weakness. For example, if you ask a person to create a boat that he cannot lift, it implies that there could be a boat that he cannot lift (weakness), but he, in fact, can create it (ability). Asking God to create a stone that he cannot lift not only asks him to be able to do something (create the stone), but also not to be able to do something (not be able to lift the stone), a weakness. In fact, asking God to do so has no practical purpose. Nothing can be accomplished if God simply cannot lift the stone. God could easily create a stone and then not lift it. It is similar to asking a perfect pither with a perfect defence behind him to not be able to record an out. The argument then becomes that God cannot be all-powerful because he does not have a weakness, an absurd argument. The question itself is worded in such a way that it is disguised as an ability, when in fact it is the combination of an ability and a weakness. If God can do Anything, then God can remove his own omnipotence. If God can remove his own omnipotence, then God can create an enormous stone, remove his own omnipotence, then not be able to lift the stone. This preserves the belief that God is omnipotent because this means that god can create a stone so large that God can't even lift it. However there is a problem with this theory which is that if god were to remove his omnipotence he would not be able to restore it as he would not be omnipotent anymore. Therefore in this theory he would not be omnipotent after not being able to lift the stone. One can attempt to resolve the paradox by asserting a kind of omnipotence that does not demand that a being must be able to do all things at all times. According to this line of reasoning, the being can create a stone which it cannot lift at the moment of creation. Being omnipotent, however, the being can always alter the stone later so that it can lift it. Therefore the being is still, perhaps, in some sense omnipotent. This is roughly the view espoused by Matthew Harrison Brady, a character in Inherit the Wind loosely based upon William Jennings Bryan. In the climactic scene of the 1960s movie version, Brady argues, "Natural law was born in the mind of the Creator. He can change it — cancel it — use it as He pleases!" But this solution merely pushes the problem back a step; one may ask whether an omnipotent being can create a stone so immutable that the being itself cannot later alter it. But a similar response can be offered to respond to this and any further steps. Inherit the Wind is a play by Jerome Lawrence and Robert Edwin Lee, which opened on Broadway in January 1955, a 1960 Hollywood film based on the play, and three television remakes. ...
For other persons of the same name, see William Bryan. ...
In a 1955 article published in the philosophy journal Mind, J. L. Mackie attempted to resolve the paradox by distinguishing between first-order omnipotence (unlimited power to act) and second-order omnipotence (unlimited power to determine what powers to act things shall have).[16] An omnipotent being with both first and second-order omnipotence at a particular time might restrict its own power to act and, henceforth, cease to be omnipotent in either sense. There has been considerable philosophical dispute since Mackie, as to the best way to formulate the paradox of omnipotence in formal logic.[17] For other people named John Mackie, see John Mackie. ...
Another common response to the omnipotence paradox is to try to define omnipotence to mean something weaker than absolute omnipotence, such as definition 3 or 4 above. The paradox can be resolved by simply stipulating that omnipotence does not require the being to have abilities which are logically impossible, but only to be able to do anything which conforms to the laws of logic. A good example of a modern defender of this line of reasoning is George Mavrodes.[12] Essentially Mavrodes argues that it is no limitation on a being's omnipotence to say that it cannot make a round square. Such a "task" is inherently nonsense. But not so, making a stone bigger than you can lift. If a being is accidentally omnipotent, then it can resolve the paradox by creating a stone which it cannot lift and thereby becoming non-omnipotent. Unlike essentially omnipotent entities, it is possible for an accidentally omnipotent being to be non-omnipotent. This raises the question, however, of whether or not the being was ever truly omnipotent, or just capable of great power.[15] On the other hand, the ability to voluntarily give up great power is often thought of as central to the notion of the Christian Incarnation.[18] If a being is essentially omnipotent, then it can also resolve the paradox (as long as we take omnipotence not to require absolute omnipotence). The omnipotent being is essentially omnipotent, and therefore it is impossible for it to be non-omnipotent. Further, the omnipotent being cannot do what is logically impossible. The creation of a stone which the omnipotent being cannot lift would be an impossibility, and therefore the omnipotent being is not required to do such a thing. The omnipotent being cannot create such a stone, but nevertheless retains its omnipotence. This solution works even with definition 2, as long as we also know the being is essentially omnipotent rather than accidentally so. This was essentially the position taken by Augustine of Hippo in his The City of God: Augustinus redirects here. ...
The City of God, opening text, created c. ...
| “ | For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent.[19] | ” | Thus Augustine argued that God could not do anything or create any situation that would in effect make God not God. Some philosophers maintain that the paradox can be resolved if the definition of omnipotence includes Descartes' view that an omnipotent being can do the logically impossible. In this scenario, the omnipotent being could create a stone which it cannot lift, but could also then lift the stone anyway. Presumably, such a being could also make the sum 2 + 2 = 5 become mathematically possible or create a square triangle. This attempt to resolve the paradox is problematic in that the definition itself forgoes logical consistency. The paradox may be solved, but at the expense of making the logic a paraconsistent logic. This might not seem like a problem if one is already committed to dialetheism or some other form of logical transcendence. The phrase two plus two make five (or 2 + 2 = 5) is sometimes used as a succinct and vivid representation of an illogical statement, especially one made and maintained to suit an ideological agenda. ...
In mathematical logic, a formal system is consistent if it does not contain a contradiction, or, more precisely, for no proposition Ï are both Ï and Â¬Ï provable. ...
A paraconsistent logic is a logical system that attempts to deal nontrivially with contradictions. ...
Dialetheism is a paraconsistent logic typified by its tolerance of at least some contradictions. ...
In philosophy, transcendental/transcendence, has three different but related primary meanings, all of them derived from the words literal meaning (from Latin), of climbing or going beyond: one that originated in Ancient philosophy, one in Medieval philosophy and one in modern philosophy. ...
Others have argued that (alluding to C.S. Lewis' argument; see scholastic definition of omnipotence), that when talking about omnipotence, referencing "a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it" is nonsense just as much as referencing "a square circle." So asking "Can God create a rock so heavy that even he cannot lift it?" is just as much nonsense as asking "Can God draw a square circle?" Therefore the question (and therefore the perceived paradox) is meaningless. Omnipotence (literally, all power) is power with no limits or inexhaustible, in other words, unlimited power. ...
Language and omnipotence The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is often interpreted as arguing that language is not up to the task of describing the kind of power an omnipotent being would have. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he stays generally within the realm of logical positivism, until claim 6.4, but at 6.41 and following the succeeding propositions argue that ethics and several other issues are "transcendental" subjects which we cannot examine with language, propositions which no doubt came as a shock to judges, lawyers, members of the clergy, guidance counselors, mothers and fathers the world over. Wittgenstein also mentions the will, life after death, and God; arguing that "When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words".[20] Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (IPA: ) (April 26, 1889 in Vienna, Austria â April 29, 1951 in Cambridge, England) was an Austrian philosopher who contributed several ground-breaking ideas to philosophy, primarily in the foundations of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. ...
Book cover of the Dover edition of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ogden translation) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only book-length work published by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his lifetime. ...
Logical positivism grew from the discussions of Moritz Schlicks Vienna Circle and Hans Reichenbachs Berlin Circle in the 1920s and 1930s. ...
For other uses, see Ethics (disambiguation). ...
Wittgenstein's work makes the omnipotence paradox a problem in semantics, the study of how symbols are given meaning. (The retort "That's only semantics" is a way of saying that a statement only concerns the definitions of words, instead of anything important in the physical world.) According to the Tractatus, then, even attempting to formulate the omnipotence paradox is futile, since language cannot refer to the entities the paradox considers. The final proposition of the Tractatus gives Wittgenstein's dictum for these circumstances: "What we cannot speak of, we must pass over in silence."[21] Wittgenstein's approach to these problems is influential among other 20th century religious thinkers such as D. Z. Phillips.[22] The introduction to this article provides insufficient context for those unfamiliar with the subject matter. ...
Dewi Phillips late in life. ...
But in his later years, Wittgenstein wrote works which are often interpreted as conflicting with his positions in the Tractatus,[23] and indeed the later Wittgenstein is mainly seen as the leading critic of the early Wittgenstein.
Other versions of the paradox In the 6th century, Pseudo-Dionysius claims that a version of the omnipotence paradox constituted the dispute between St. Paul and Elmyas the Magician mentioned in Acts 13:8, but it is phrased in terms of a debate as to whether or not God can "deny himself" ala 2 Tim 2:13.[24] In the 11th century, St. Anselm argues that there are many things that God cannot do, but that nonetheless he counts as Omnipotent.[25] Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is the name scholars have given to an anonymous theologian and philosopher of the 5th century, who wrote a collection of books (Corpus Areopagiticum) falsely ascribed to the Dionysius mentioned in Acts 17:34. ...
Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033 or 1034 â April 21, 1109) was an Italian medieval philosopher and theologian, who held the office of Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109. ...
A triangle on the Euclidean plane with sides, angles and vertices labeled; the sum α + β + γ must equal 180 degrees. Thomas Aquinas advanced a version of the omnipotence paradox by asking whether God could create a triangle with internal angles that did not add up to 180 degrees. As Aquinas put it in Summa contra Gentiles: Image File history File links Triangle. ...
Image File history File links Triangle. ...
A triangle. ...
Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P.(also Thomas of Aquin, or Aquino; c. ...
The Summa contra Gentiles (hereafter referred to as SCG) was written by St. ...
| “ | Since the principles of certain sciences, such as logic, geometry and arithmetic are taken only from the formal principles of things, on which the essence of the thing depends, it follows that God could not make things contrary to these principles. For example, that a genus was not predicable of the species, or that lines drawn from the centre to the circumference were not equal, or that a triangle did not have three angles equal to two right angles.[26] | ” | This can be done on a sphere, and not on a flat surface. Note that the later discovery of non-Euclidean geometry does not resolve this question; for one might as well ask, "If given the axioms of Riemannian geometry, can an omnipotent being create a triangle whose angles do not add up to more than 180 degrees?" In either case, the real question is whether or not an omnipotent being would have the ability to evade the consequences which follow logically from a system of axioms that the being created. Behavior of lines with a common perpendicular in each of the three types of geometry The term non-Euclidean geometry describes hyperbolic, elliptic and absolute geometry, which are contrasted with Euclidean geometry. ...
Elliptic geometry (sometimes known as Riemannian geometry) is a non-Euclidean geometry, in which, given a line L and a point p outside L, there exists no line parallel to L passing through p. ...
In a sense, the classic statement of the omnipotence paradox — a rock so heavy that its omnipotent creator cannot lift it — is grounded in Aristotelian science. After all, if you consider the stone's position relative to the sun around which the planet orbits, one could hold that the stone is constantly being lifted -- strained though that interpretation would be in the present context. Modern physics indicates that the choice of phrasing about lifting stones should relate to acceleration; however, this does not in itself of course invalidate the fundamental concept of the generalized omnipotence paradox. However, one could easily modify the classic statement as follows: "An omnipotent being creates a universe which follows the laws of Aristotelian physics. Within this universe, can the omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that the being cannot lift it?" Aristotelianism is a tradition of philosophy that takes its defining inspiration from the work of Aristotle. ...
For other uses, see Universe (disambiguation). ...
Ethan Allen's Reason addresses the topics of original sin, theodicy and several others in classic Enlightenment fashion.[27] In Chapter 3, section IV, he notes that "omnipotence itself" could not exempt animal life from mortality, since change and death are defining attributes of such life. He argues, "the one cannot be without the other, any more than there could be a compact number of mountains without valleys, or that I could exist and not exist at the same time, or that God should effect any other contradiction in nature." Labeled by his friends a Deist, Allen accepted the notion of a divine being, though throughout Reason he argues that even a divine being must be circumscribed by logic. âOriginal Sinâ redirects here. ...
This article does not cite any references or sources. ...
The Enlightenment (French: ; German: ; Italian: ; Portuguese: ) was an eighteenth century movement in European and American philosophy â some classifications also include 17th century philosophy (usually called the Age of Reason). ...
For other uses, see Ceremonial Deism. ...
In an episode of The Simpsons entitled Weekend at Burnsie's, Homer questions his neighbor Flanders with this variation. "Could Jesus microwave a burrito so hot that he himself could not eat it?" Simpsons redirects here. ...
âWeekend at Burnsieâsâ is the sixteenth episode of The Simpsonsâ thirteenth season. ...
See also Logical positivism grew from the discussions of Moritz Schlicks Vienna Circle and Hans Reichenbachs Berlin Circle in the 1920s and 1930s. ...
In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of a god. ...
The introduction to this article provides insufficient context for those unfamiliar with the subject matter. ...
Parliamentary sovereignty, parliamentary supremacy, or legislative supremacy is a concept in constitutional law that applies to some parliamentary democracies. ...
Notes - ^ Averroës, Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) trans. Simon Van Der Bergh, Luzac & Company 1969, sections 529–536
- ^ a b Suber, P. (1990) The Paradox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Law, Logic, Omnipotence, and Change. Peter Lang Publishing.
- ^ Savage, C. Wade. "The Paradox of the Stone" Philosophical Review, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan., 1967), pp. 74–79 doi:10.2307/2182966
- ^ Cowan, J. L. "The Paradox of Omnipotence" first published 1962, in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 144–52
- ^ Aquinas Summa Theologica Book 1 Question 25
- ^ Descartes, Rene, 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy. Cottingham, J., trans., 1996. Cambridge University Press. Latin original. Alternative English title: Metaphysical Meditations. Includes six Objections and Replies. A second edition published the following year, includes an additional ‘’Objection and Reply’’ and a Letter to Dinet
- ^ Haeckel, Ernst. The Riddle of the Universe. Harper and Brothers, 1900.
- ^ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (6.41 and following)
- ^ a b c d e Geach, P. T. "Omnipotence" 1973 in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 63–75
- ^ The Problem of Pain, Clive Staples Lewis, 1944 MacMillan
- ^ Aquinas, Thomas Summa Theologica Book 1 Question 25 article 3
- ^ a b Mavrodes, George. "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence" first published 1963 now in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 131–4
- ^ Aquinas Summa Theologica Book 1 Question 25 article 4 response #3
- ^ Anselm of Canterbury Proslogion Chap VII in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 35–36
- ^ a b Hoffman, Joshua, Rosenkrantz, Gary. "Omnipotence" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
- ^ Mackie, J. L., "Evil and Omnipotence." Mind LXIV, No, 254 (April 1955).
- ^ The Power of God: Readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978. Keene and Mayo disagree p. 145, Savage provides 3 formalizations p. 138–41, Cowan has a different strategy p. 147, and Walton uses a whole separate strategy p. 153–63
- ^ Gore, Charles, "A Kenotic Theory of Incarnation" first published 1891, in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 165–8
- ^ City of God, Book 5, Chapter 10
- ^ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. proposition 6.5
- ^ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. proposition 7
- ^ D. Z. Phillips "Philosophy, Theology and the Reality of God" in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. William Rowe and William Wainwright eds. 3rd ed. 1998 Oxford University Press
- ^ Hacker, P.M.S. Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. 1996 Blackwell
- ^ Pseudo-Dionysius, "Divine Names" 893B in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. trans Colm Luibheid Paulist Press. 1987. ISBN 0-8091-2838-1
- ^ Anselm of Canterbury Proslogion Chap. VII, in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 35–6
- ^ "Cum principia quarundam scientiarum, ut logicae, geometriae et arithmeticae, sumantur ex solis principiis formalibus rerum, ex quibus essentia rei dependet, sequitur quod contraria horum principiorum Deus facere non possit: sicut quod genus non sit praedicabile de specie; vel quod lineae ductae a centro ad circumferentiam non sint aequales; aut quod triangulus rectilineus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis". Aquinas, T. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Section 25. trans. Edward Buckner
- ^ Allen, Ethan. Reason: The Only Oracle of Man. J.P. Mendum, Cornill; 1854. Originally published 1784. (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
Averroes Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (1126 - December 10, 1198) was an Andalusian-Arab philosopher and physician, a master of philosophy and Islamic law, mathematics and medicine. ...
Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225 - March 7, 1274) was a Catholic philosopher and theologian in the scholastic tradition, who gave birth to the Thomistic school of philosophy, which was long the primary philosophical approach of the Roman Catholic Church. ...
Summa theologiae, Pars secunda, prima pars. ...
The title page of the Meditations Meditations on First Philosophy (subtitled In which the existence of God and the real distinction of mind and body, are demonstrated) is a philosophical treatise written by René Descartes first published in Latin in 1641 . ...
Ernst Haeckel. ...
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (IPA: ) (April 26, 1889 in Vienna, Austria â April 29, 1951 in Cambridge, England) was an Austrian philosopher who contributed several ground-breaking ideas to philosophy, primarily in the foundations of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. ...
Book cover of the Dover edition of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ogden translation) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only book-length work published by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his lifetime. ...
Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P.(also Thomas of Aquin, or Aquino; c. ...
Summa theologiae, Pars secunda, prima pars. ...
Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225 - March 7, 1274) was a Catholic philosopher and theologian in the scholastic tradition, who gave birth to the Thomistic school of philosophy, which was long the primary philosophical approach of the Roman Catholic Church. ...
Summa theologiae, Pars secunda, prima pars. ...
Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033 or 1034 â April 21, 1109) was an Italian medieval philosopher and theologian, who held the office of Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109. ...
is the 109th day of the year (110th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...
Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ...
For other people named John Mackie, see John Mackie. ...
Dewi Phillips late in life. ...
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, also known as pseudo-Denys, refers to the anonymous theologian and philosopher of the 5th century whose Corpus Areopagiticum was falsely ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite of Acts 17:34. ...
For other uses, see Ethan Allen (disambiguation). ...
is the 109th day of the year (110th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...
Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ...
References - Allen, Ethan. Reason: The Only Oracle of Man. J.P. Mendum, Cornill; 1854. Originally published 1784. (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
- Augustine. City of God and Christian Doctrine. The Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1890. (Accessed on 26 September 2006)
- Burke, James. The Day the Universe Changed. Little, Brown; 1995 (paperback edition). ISBN 0-316-11704-8.
- Gleick, James. Genius. Pantheon, 1992. ISBN 0-679-40836-3.
- Haeckel, Ernst. The Riddle of the Universe. Harper and Brothers, 1900.
- Hoffman, Joshua, Rosenkrantz, Gary. "Omnipotence" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
- Mackie, J. L., "Evil and Omnipotence." Mind LXIV, No, 254 (April 1955).
- Wierenga, Edward. "Omnipotence" The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes. Cornell University Press, 1989. (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Available online via Project Gutenberg. Accessed 19 April 2006.
For other uses, see Ethan Allen (disambiguation). ...
is the 109th day of the year (110th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...
Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ...
is the 269th day of the year (270th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...
Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ...
James Burke James Burke (born November 22, 1936) is a British science historian, author and television producer best known for his documentary television series called Connections, focusing on the history of science and technology leavened with a sense of humour. ...
The Day the Universe Changed is a name of a British documentary television series produced by and starring science historian James Burke, originally broadcast in 1985. ...
James Gleick (August 1, 1954â ) is an author, journalist, and biographer, whose books explore the cultural ramifications of science and technology. ...
Ernst Haeckel. ...
is the 109th day of the year (110th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...
Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ...
For other people named John Mackie, see John Mackie. ...
is the 109th day of the year (110th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...
Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ...
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (IPA: ) (April 26, 1889 in Vienna, Austria â April 29, 1951 in Cambridge, England) was an Austrian philosopher who contributed several ground-breaking ideas to philosophy, primarily in the foundations of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. ...
Book cover of the Dover edition of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ogden translation) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only book-length work published by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his lifetime. ...
Project Gutenberg, abbreviated as PG, is a volunteer effort to digitize, archive and distribute cultural works. ...
is the 109th day of the year (110th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...
Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ...
Arguments for and against the existence of God have been proposed by philosophers, theologians, and others. ...
The cosmological argument is a metaphysical argument for the existence of God, or a first mover of the cosmos. ...
An ontological argument for the existence of God is one that attempts the method of a priori proof, which utilizes intuition and reason alone. ...
A teleological argument, or argument from design, is an argument for the existence of God or a creator based on perceived evidence of order, purpose, design and/or direction in nature. ...
To meet Wikipedias quality standards, this article or section may require cleanup. ...
The Christological argument for the existence of God is a relatively modern argument. ...
To meet Wikipedias quality standards, this article or section may require cleanup. ...
The Argument from Consciousness is an argument for the existence of God against naturalism. ...
The Argument from love is an argument for the existence of God, as against materialism. ...
The Argument from Beauty is an argument for the existence of God, as against materialism // Its logical structure is essentially as follows: There are compelling reasons for considering beauty to exist in a way which transcends its material manifestations. ...
The argument from degrees or the degrees of perfection argument is an argument for the existence of God first proposed by Thomas Aquinas as one of the five ways to prove God in his Summa Theologica. ...
The Argument from Desire is an argument for the existence of God. ...
The Argument from religious experience is an argument for the existence of God, as against materialism. ...
The Argument from Miracles is an argument for the existence of God relying on eyewitness testimony of impossible (or extremely improbable events) to establish the active intervention of a supernatural supreme being (or supernatural agents acting on behalf of that being). ...
Pascals Wager (or Pascals Gambit) is the application by the French philosopher Blaise Pascal of decision theory to the belief in God. ...
âNDEâ redirects here. ...
In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of a god. ...
The problem of Hell is a variant of the problem of evil, applying specifically to religions which hold both that: An omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), and omnibenevolent (all-loving) God exists. ...
The argument from nonbelief, also known as the argument from divine hiddenness, is a recently-developed argument against the existence of God. ...
The Argument from Inconsistent Revelations, also known as the Avoiding the Wrong Hell Problem, is an argument against the existence of God. ...
The argument from poor design or dysteleological argument is an argument against the existence of God, specifically against the existence of a creator God (in the sense of a God that directly created all species of life). ...
The Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God (also called TANG) was first explicitly formulated by Michael Martin in a 1996 article in New Zealand Rationalist & Humanist [1]. It was first intended as a reply to the Transcendental argument for the existence of God, which argues that logic, science...
Theological noncognitivism is the argument that religious language, and specifically words like God (capitalized), are not cognitively meaningful. ...
The argument from free will is an argument against the Existence of God which contends that omniscience and free will are incompatible, and that any conception of God which incorporates both properties is therefore inherently contradictory. ...
An editor has expressed a concern that the subject of the article does not satisfy the notability guideline or one of the following guidelines for inclusion on Wikipedia: Biographies, Books, Companies, Fiction, Music, Neologisms, Numbers, Web content, or several proposals for new guidelines. ...
The Ultimate Boeing 747 argument has been known to go straight over peoples heads The Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit is an argument for the improbability of the existence of God introduced by Richard Dawkins in chapter 4 Why there almost certainly is no God of his book The God...
For the House television show episode called Occams Razor, see Occams Razor (House episode) Occams razor (sometimes spelled Ockhams razor) is a principle attributed to the 14th-century English logician and Franciscan friar William of Ockham. ...
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