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The Phoenix Program (Vietnamese: Kế Hoạch Phụng Hoàng, a word related to fenghuang, the Chinese phoenix) or Operation Phoenix was a military, intelligence, and internal security coordination program designed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Vietnam War. It was mainly functional between 1967 and 1972, but similar efforts existed both before and after this. The program was designed to identify and "neutralize"— via capture; assasination, and infiltration, meant to disrupt—the civilian infrastructure supporting Vietnam's Marxist insurgency, or Viet Cong (VCI). Fenghuang sculpture, Nanning city, Guangxi, China. ...
The phoenix from the Aberdeen Bestiary. ...
The Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) is an intelligence agency of the United States government. ...
Combatants Republic of Vietnam United States Republic of Korea Thailand Australia New Zealand The Philippines National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam Democratic Republic of Vietnam People’s Republic of China Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Strength US 1,000,000 South Korea 300,000 Australia 48,000...
Marxism is the political practice and social theory based on the works of Karl Marx, a 19th century philosopher, economist, journalist, and revolutionary, along with Friedrich Engels. ...
A Viet Cong soldier, heavily guarded, awaits interrogation following capture in the attacks on Saigon during the festive Tet holiday period of 1968. ...
Background In South Vietnam during the 1960s and early '70s there was a secret network, called by the US the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI). This provided the political direction and control of North Vietnam's war within the villages and hamlets. Year 1960 (MCMLX) was a leap year starting on Friday (link will display full calendar) of the Gregorian calendar. ...
By 1967 this network numbered somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 throughout South Vietnam. Almost every village had a cell made up of a Communist Party secretary; a finance and supply unit; and information and culture, social welfare, and proselytizing sections to gain recruits from among the civilian population. They answered up the chain of command, which, in turn, took orders from North Vietnam. A preferred tactic was to kill carefully selected government officials in order to drive the Saigon regime out of the region.[1]
VCI laid down caches of food and equipment for troops coming from border sanctuaries; it provided guides and intelligence for the North Vietnamese Army; it conscripted personnel to serve in local force (militia) and main force mobile combat units of the Viet Cong, levied taxes to facilitate the administration of a rudimentary civil government, and enforced its will.
In areas more or less loyal to the Saigon government, protection against the North Vietnamese forces—or even VC guerrillas—was often compromised, because elected village chiefs would be assassinated, bombs would explode in the market place, or Saigon supporters would be shot in the back. During 1969, for example, over 6,000 people were killed, over 1,200 in selective assassinations, and 15,000 wounded. Among the dead were some 90 village chiefs and officials, 240 hamlet chiefs and officials, 229 refugees, and 4,350 of the general populace.
History of the program In 1967 all pacification efforts had come under the authority of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. There were many different programs within CORDS. On example was creating a peasant milita which by 1971 had a strength of about 500,000.[2]
As early as 1964 the CIA used counterterror teams to seek out and destroy cadre hiding in villages. In 1967, as part of CORDS, the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was created which concentrated on gathering information on the VCi. It was renamed to Phoenix later the same year. The Vietnamese program was called Phung Hoang, after a mythical bird that appeared as a sign of prosperity and luck. The 1968 Tet offensive showed the importance of the Viet Cong infrastructure and the Communist military setback made it easier for Phoenix to be implemented. By 1970 there were 704 U.S. Phoenix advisers through-out south Vietnam.[3] Combatants Republic of Vietnam, United States of America, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia National Liberation Front, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Commanders William Westmoreland Võ Nguyên Giáp Strength 50,000+ (estimate) 85,000+ (estimate) Casualties 2,788 KIA, 8,299 WIA, 587 MIA 1,536 KIA, 7,764 WIA...
Officially, Phoenix operations continued until December 1972, although certain aspects continued until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.[4]
Operations One part of the The Phoenix Program was collecting information. Then VCI members should be neutralized (captured, converted, or killed). Emphasis was on local militia and police rather than the military as the main operational arm of the program.[5]
Neutraliztion was not arbitary but took place under special laws that allowed the arrest and prosecution of suspected communists, but only within the legal system. Moreover, to avoid abuses such as phony accusations for personal reasons, or to rein in overzealous officials who might not be diligent enough in pursuing evidence before making arrests, the laws required three separate sources of evidence to convict any individual targeted for neutralization. If a suspected VCi was found guilty, he or she could be held in prison for 2 years, with renewable 2-year sentences totaling up to 6 years.[6]
According to MACV Directive 381-41, the intent of Phoenix was to attack the VCI with a "rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders, command/control elements and activists in the VCI." Heavy-handed operations, such as random cordon and searches, large-scale and lengthy detentions of innocent civilians, and excessive use of firepower had a negative effect on the civilian population. It was also acknowledged that capturing VCI was more important than killing them.[7]
Measures of success and failure According to one view, Phoenix was a clear success. Between 1968 and 1972 Phoenix neutralized 81,740 VC, of whom 26,369 were killed. This was a large piece taken out of the VCI, and between 1969 and 1971 the program was quite successful in destroying the VCI in many important areas. By 1970, Communist plans repeatedly emphasized attacking the government’s pacification program and specifically targeted Phoenix officials. The VC also imposed quotas. In 1970, for example, Communist officials near Danang in northern South Vietnam instructed VC assassins to “kill 400 persons” deemed to be government “tyrant[s]” and to “annihilate” anyone involved with the pacification program. Several North Vietnamese officials have made statements about the effectiveness of Phoenix. In the end, it was a direct conventional North Vietnamese military invasion, not the insurgents, that defeated the South Vietnamese.[8]
Others view it less favorably, arguing that ultimately, the entire counterinsurgency in Vietnam was a failure for a variety of reasons; clearly, one critical factor was that the VC had established a large and effective support cadre throughout South Vietnam before a coordinated effort was undertaken to eradicate it. While indications are that Phoenix achieved considerable success in damaging that infrastructure, it was too little and too late to change the war’s overall course.[9]
The Phoenix Program is sometimes seen as an "assassination campaign," and has been criticized as an example of human rights atrocities alleged to have been committed by the CIA or other allied organizations, including U.S. Military Intelligence. There were eventually a series of Congressional hearings. Consequently, the military command in Vietnam issued a directive that reiterated that it had based the anti-VCI campaign on South Vietnamese law, that the program was in compliance with the laws of land warfare, and that U.S. personnel had the responsibility to report breaches of the law. Supporters argue that the primary intent was to capture, not to kill, in order to gain further information. However, decentralized operations in an uncertain, ambiguous environment did lead to abuses.[10] In many instances, rival Vietnamese would report their enemies as "VC" in order for US troops to kill them (Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing, New York: Signet, 1984, p. 625.). In many cases the Phung Hoang chief was an incompetent bureaucrat who used his position to enrich himself. Phoenix tried to address this problem by establishing monthly neutralization quotas, but these often led to fabrications or, worse, false arrests. In some cases, district officials accepted bribes from the VC to release certain suspects.[11]
Quotes - "The problem was, how do you find the people on the blacklist? It's not like you had their address and telephone number. The normal procedure would be to go into a village and just grab someone and say, 'Where's Nguyen so-and-so?' Half the time the people were so afraid they would say anything. Then a Phoenix team would take the informant, put a sandbag over his head, poke out two holes so he could see, put commo wire around his neck like a long leash, and walk him through the village and say, 'When we go by Nguyen's house scratch your head.' Then that night Phoenix would come back, knock on the door, and say, 'April Fool, motherfucker.' Whoever answered the door would get wasted. As far as they were concerned whoever answered was a Communist, including family members. Sometimes they'd come back to camp with ears to prove that they killed people."
- - Vincent Okamoto, combat officer (Lieutenant) in Vietnam in 1968, and recipient of Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest award conferred by the US Army. Wounded 3 times. He was the highest decorated Japanese American to serve in the Vietnam War. He has served as president of the Japanese American Vietnam Veterans Memorial Committee. He has served as a Los Angeles Superior Court judge. He was also an intelligence liaison officer for the Phoenix Program for 2 months in 1968. Quote is from page 361 of the hardback 2003 first edition of the Penguin book "Patriots: the Vietnam War remembered from all sides" by Christian G. Appy. [12] [13]
See also Colonel Nguyen Hop Doan Colonel Nguyen Hop Doan (1928-2002) was to be the last Mayor of Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam and Governor of Gia Dinh Province, before the fall of Saigon that led to the reunification of Vietnam under the Communist party in 1975. ...
Sidney Gottlieb Sidney Gottlieb (August 3, 1918 – March 7, 1999) was an American chemist probably best-known for his involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency mind control program (MKULTRA). ...
Counter-insurgency is the combating of insurgency, by the government (or allies) of the territory in which the insurgency takes place. ...
A death squad is an armed squad of men that kills civilians. ...
Con Son Island (Vietnamese Côn Sơn) is the largest island of the Con Dao archipelago, off the coast of southern Vietnam. ...
References
Further reading - Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program, 1990. [14]. Chapter 24 "Transgressions" online: [15]. Author permission further explained: [16]
- Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism., Newsweek, 19 June, 1972. [17]
- Don Luce, Hostages of War (Indochina Resource Center, 1973). [18]
- Seymour Hersh, Cover-Up, Random House, 1972. [19]
- Long Time Passing, by Myra MacPherson, Signet, 1984. [20]
- Then the Americans Came, by Martha Hess, Four Walls Eight Windows Press, 1996. [21]
- Deadly Deceits: My 25 years in the CIA, by Ralph McGehee, 1999. [22]
- Patriots: the Vietnam War remembered from all sides, by Christian G. Appy, Penguin, 2003. [23]
The Newsweek logo Newsweek is a weekly news magazine published in New York City and distributed throughout the United States and internationally. ...
Year 1972 (MCMLXXII) was a leap year starting on Saturday (link will display full calendar) of the Gregorian calendar. ...
Seymour Myron Sy Hersh (born April 8, 1937 Chicago) is an American Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist and author based in Washington, DC. He is a regular contributor to The New Yorker magazine on military and security matters. ...
Ralph McGehee is a self-described twenty-five year decorated veteran of the CIA and a critic. He is the creator of the CIABASE computer database. ...
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