Reliabilism, a category of theories in the philosophical discipline of epistemology, has been advanced both as a theory of knowledge and of justified belief (as well as other varieties of so-called positive epistemic status). As a theory of knowledge, reliabilism on one formulation can be roughly stated as follows: Jump to: navigation, search Philosophy is a discipline or field of study involving the investigation, analysis, and development of ideas at a general, abstract, or fundamental level. ... Jump to: navigation, search Epistemology, from the Greek words episteme (knowledge) and logos (word/speech) is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge. ... Jump to: navigation, search Knowledge is the state of understanding something and being capable to utilize the fact for doing something. ... This article or section should include material from Episteme Epistemology (from the Greek words episteme=science and logos=word/speech) is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge. ...

One knows that p (p stands for any proposition--e.g., the sky is blue) if, and only if, one believes that p, is true, and one has arrived at the belief that p through some reliable process.

As a theory of justified belief, reliabilism can be formulated roughly as follows: Proposition is a term used in logic to describe the content of assertions, content which may be taken as being true or false, and which are a non-linguistic abstraction from the linguistic sentence that constitutes an assertion. ...

One has a justified belief that p if, and only if, the belief is the result of a reliable process.

Moreover, a similar account can be given (and an elaborate version of this has been given by Alvin Plantinga) for such notions as 'warranted belief' or 'epistemically rational belief'.

Leading proponents of reliablist theories of knowledge and justification have included Alvin Goldman, Marshall Swain, and more recently, Alvin Plantinga. Goldman's article "A Causal Theory of Knowing" (Journal of Philosophy, v. 64 (1967), pp. 335-372) is generally credited as being the first full treatment of the theory, though D. M. Armstrong is also regarded as an important source, and (according to Hugh Mellor) Frank Ramsey was the very first to state the theory, albeit in passing. Alvin Ira Goldman (born 1938) is a professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. ... Jump to: navigation, search Alvin Plantinga (born 15 November 1932 in Ann Arbor, Michigan, of Frisian ancestry) is a contemporary American philosopher known for his work in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. ... Jump to: navigation, search 1967 was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ... David Malet Armstrong, often D. M. Armstrong, (1926 - ) is an Australian philosopher of mind, and scientific metaphysician. ... Jump to: navigation, search Hugh Mellor (D. H. Mellor) is an Australian-born British philosopher. ... Frank Plumpton Ramsey (February 22, 1903 - January 19, 1930) was a British mathematician and logician. ...

On the classical or traditional analysis of 'knowledge', one must be justified in believing that p in order for that belief to constitute knowledge; the traditional analysis has it that knowledge is no more than justified true belief. Reliabilist theories of knowledge are sometimes presented as an alternative to that theory: rather than justification, all that is required is that the belief be the product of a reliable process. But reliabilism need not be regarded as an alternative, but instead as a further explication of the traditional analysis. On this view, those who offer reliabilist theories of justification further analyze the 'justification' part of the traditional analysis of 'knowledge' in terms of reliable processes. Not all reliabilists agree with such accounts of justification, but some do. Analysis, in philosophy, is principally an account of either the meaning or content of a word, phrase, or concept, and it may be applied to the analysis of an argument that makes use of such an analysis. ... This article or section should include material from Episteme Epistemology (from the Greek words episteme=science and logos=word/speech) is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge. ...

Objections to the Theory

Some find reliabilism objectionable because they believe it entails externalism, which is the view that one can have knowledge, or have a justified belief, despite not knowing (having "access" to) the evidence, or other circumstances, that make the belief justified. Most reliabilists maintain that a belief can be justified, or can constitute knowledge, even if the believer does not know about or understand the process that makes the belief reliable. In defending this view, reliabilists (and externalists generally) are apt to point to examples from simple acts of perception: if one sees a bird in the tree outside their window and thereby gains the belief that there is a bird in that tree, they might not at all understand the cognitive processes that account for their successful act of perception; nevertheless, it is the fact that the processes worked reliably that accounts for why their belief is justified. In short, they find they hold a belief about the bird, and that belief is justified if any is, but they are not acquainted at all with the processes that led to the belief and made them justified in having it. Of course, internalists do not let the debate rest there; see externalism (epistemology). Recently internalism and externalism have become part of the standard jargon of philosophical discourse, and have become central to certain important debates. ... Recently internalism and externalism have become part of the standard jargon of philosophical discourse, and have become central to certain important debates. ...

Another of the most common objections to reliabilism, made first to Goldman's knowledge reliable process theory of knowledge and later to other reliabilist theories, is the so-called generality problem, as follows. For any given justified belief (or instance of knowledge), one can easily identify many different (concurrently operating) "processes" from which the belief results. My belief that there is a bird in the tree outside my window might be accorded a result of the process of forming beliefs on the basis of sense-perception, of visual sense-perception, of visual sense-perception through opaque surfaces in daylight, and so forth, down to a variety of different very specifically-described processes. Some of these processes might be statistically reliable, while others might not. It would no doubt be better to say, in any case, that we are choosing not which process to say resulted in the belief, but instead how to describe the process, out of the many different levels of generality on which it can be accurately described. In philosophy, reliabilism is conducive to a logical process which is flawed because it cannot specify restrictions on qualitative modifiers, such as relevancy. ...

Another objection to reliabilism is called the "New Evil Demon Problem" The evil demon problem originally motivated skepticism, but can be resuited to object to reliabilist accounts as follows: If our experiences are controlled by an evil demon, it may be the case that we believe ourselves to be doing things that we are not doing. However, these beliefs are clearly justified, even though the processes that arive at these beliefs are consistently unreliable. Occams razor non sunt multiplicanda entia praeter necessitatem or plurality should not be posited without necessity is a central tenet of skeptical thought. ...

Robert Brandom has called for a clarification of the role of belief in reliabilist theories. Brandom is concerned that unless the role of belief is stressed, reliabilism may attribute knowledge to things that would otherwise be considered incapable of possessing it. Brandon give the example of a parrot that has been trained to consistently respond to red visual stimuli by saying 'that's red'. The proposition is true, the mechanism that produced it is reliable, but Brandom is reluctant to say that the parrot knows it is seeing red because he thinks it cannot believe that it is. For Brandom, beliefs pertain to concepts: without the latter there can be no former. Concepts are products of the 'game of giving and asking for reasons'. Hence, only those entities capable of reasoning, through language in a social context, can for Brandom believe and thus have knowledge. Brandom may be regarded as hybridising externalist and internalist, allowing knowledge to be accounted for by reliable external process so long as a knower possess some internal understanding of why the belief is reliable. Robert Brandom is a contemporary American philosopher at the University of Pittsburgh. ... Look up belief in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... Recently internalism and externalism have become part of the standard jargon of philosophical discourse, and have become central to certain important debates. ... Recently internalism and externalism have become part of the standard jargon of philosophical discourse, and have become central to certain important debates. ...