Speculative reason is theoretical (or logical, deductive) thought (sometimes called theoretical reason), as opposed to practical (active, willing) thought. The distinction between the two goes at least as far back as the ancient Greeks philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, who distinguished between theory (theoria, or a wide, bird's eye view of a topic, or clear vision of its structure) and practice (praxis), as well as productive knowledge (techne). Speculative reason is contemplative, detached, and certain, whereas practical reason is engaged, involved, active, and dependent upon the specifics of the situation. Speculative reason provides the universal, necessary principles of logic, such as the principle of contradiction, which must apply everywhere, regardless of the specifics of the situation. Practical reason, on the other hand, is that power of the mind engaged in ethical matters, and is therefore also referred to as moral reason, because it involves action, decision, and particulars. Though many other thinkers have erected systems based on the distinction, two important later thinkers who have done so are Aquinas (who follows Aristotle in many respects) and Kant.
It has always, moreover, connoted special aptitude or acuteness in reasoning, "dialectical skill"; and it was because of this characteristic of Zeno's polemic against the reality of motion or change that this philosopher is said to have been styled by Aristotle the master or founder of dialectic.
The perennial problem of the relation of reason to faith, already ably discussed by St. Augustine in the fifth century, was thus raised again by St. Anselm in the eleventh.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, rational speculation was applied to theology not merely for the purpose of proving the praeambula fidei, but also for the purpose of analysing, illustrating and showing forth the beauty and the suitability of the mysteries of the Christian Faith.