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Encyclopedia > Trembling hand perfect equilibrium

The trembling hand perfection is a notion that eliminates actions of players that are unsafe because they were chosen through a slip of the hand. Players could choose actions that are not the intended ones due (trembling) that lead to unintended outcomes. Off-the-equilibrium plays are due to trembling or mistakes in choosing the action among the action set of players.


Example

The game represented in the following normal form matrix has two Nash equilibria, namely <Top, Left> and <Bottom, Right> (<T,L> and ). However, only <T,L> is trembling-hand perfect. The term normal form is used in a variety of contexts. ... In game theory, the Nash equilibrium (named after John Nash who proposed it) is a kind of optimal collective strategy in a game involving two or more players, where no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy. ...

Left Right
Top 1, 1 2, 0
Bottom 0, 2 2, 2

Assume player 1 is playing a mixed strategy . Player 2's expected payoff from playing L is:



Player 2's expected payoff from playing the strategy R is:



For small values of ε, player 2 maximizes his expected payoff by placing a minimal weight on R. By symmetry, player 1 should place a minimal weight on B if player 2 is playing the mixed strategy . Hence <T,L> is trembling-hand perfect.


However, similar analysis fails for the strategy profile .


Assume player 1 is playing a mixed strategy . Player 2's expected payoff from playing L is:



Player 2's expected payoff from playing the strategy R is:



For all positive values of ε, player 2 maximizes his expected payoff by placing a minimal weight on R. Hence is not trembling-hand perfect because player 2 (and, by symmetry, player 1) maximizes his expected payoff by deviating with a small chance of error.

Topics in game theory
Definitions Normal form game - Extensive form game - Cooperative game - Information set - Strategy - Mixed strategy - Preference
Equilibrium concepts Relations between equilibrium concepts - Dominant strategy equilibrium - Nash equilibrium - Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium - Bayes-Nash equilibrium - Perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium - Sequential equilibrium - Equilibrium refinements - Evolutionarily stable strategy
Classes of games Symmetric game - Perfect information - Dynamic game - Repeated game - Signaling game - Cheap talk - Zero-sum game - Mechanism design
Types of equilibria Pooling equilibrium - Separating equilibrium - Winner's curse - Incentive compatible
Games Prisoner's dilemma - Chicken - Stag hunt - Ultimatum game - Matching pennies - Minority Game - Rock, Paper, Scissors - ...
Theorems Revelation principle - Minimax theorem - Purification theorems - Folk theorem of repeated games
Related topics Mathematics - Economics - Behavioral economics - Evolutionary biology - Evolutionary game theory - Population genetics - Behavioral ecology - List of game theorists
[ edit ]

  Results from FactBites:
 
Quasi-perfect equilibrium - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (513 words)
Quasi-perfect equilibrium is a further refinement of sequential equilibrium.
But in any extensive-form trembling hand perfect equilibrium, at least one of the players believes that he is at least as likely as the other player to perform the task incorrectly and hence votes for the other player.
Nash equilibrium · Subgame perfection · Bayes-Nash · Trembling hand · Correlated equilibrium · Sequential equilibrium ·
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (935 words)
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium due to Reinhard Selten.
A trembling hand perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium that takes the possibility of off-the-equilibrium play into account by assuming that the players, through a "slip of the hand" or tremble, may choose unintended strategies, albeit with negligible probability.
The notions of normal-form and extensive-form trembling hand perfect equilibria are incomparable, i.e., an equilibrium of an extensive-form game may be normal-form trembling hand perfect but not extensive-form trembling hand perfect and vice versa.
  More results at FactBites »


 

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