|
Air force personnel
|
45,600 |
|
[12th of 49]
|
|
Armed forces growth
|
-3 |
|
[77th of 132]
|
|
DEFINITION: Growth in the number of armed forces personnel from 1985 (index = 100) to 2000. 100 means no growth, 50 means it halved and 200 means it doubled. |
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SOURCE: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy |
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Armed forces personnel
|
237,000 |
|
[20th of 166]
|
|
DEFINITION: Total armed forces (2000) |
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SOURCE: calculated on the basis of data on armed forces from IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2001. The Military Balance 2001-2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press |
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Army personnel
|
151,800 |
|
[15th of 49]
|
|
SOURCE: IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2001. The Military Balance 2001-2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Branches Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD): Ground Self-Defense Force (Rikujou Jietai, GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (Kaijou Jietai, MSDF), Air Self-Defense Force (Koku Jieitai, ASDF) |
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DEFINITION: The names of the ground, naval, air, marine, and other defense or security forces |
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SOURCE: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy |
Conscription No conscription (AI). |
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DEFINITION: A description of the status of conscription in the nation in 1997. |
|
SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008 |
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Conventional arms imports
|
$195,000,000.00 |
|
[27th of 85]
|
|
DEFINITION: Conventional arms transfers (1990 prices) - Imports (US$ millions)
Refers to the voluntary transfer by the supplier (and thus excludes captured weapons and weapons obtained through defectors) of weapons with a military purpose destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. These include major conventional weapons or systems in six categories: ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100-millimetre calibre). |
|
SOURCE: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC) |
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expenditure > % of GDP
|
0.97 %
|
|
[91st of 145]
|
|
DEFINITION: Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another.) |
View time series
|
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SOURCE: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2005. SIPRI Arms Transfers. Database. February. Stockholm. |
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Expenditures > Dollar figure
|
$45,841,000,000.00 |
|
[2nd of 111]
|
|
DEFINITION: Current military expenditures in US dollars; the figure is calculated by multiplying the estimated defense spending in percentage terms by the gross domestic product (GDP) calculated on an exchange rate basis not purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Dollar figures for military expenditures should be treated with caution because of different price patterns and accounting methods among nations, as well as wide variations in the strength of their currencies |
View time series
|
|
SOURCE: World Development Indicators database |
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Iraq coalition forces > Troop strength
|
600 |
|
[8th of 10]
|
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DEFINITION: Number of coalition forces in Iraq. Earliest confirmed date of troop strength is Georgia, as of September 10, 2005. Latest confirmed date of troop strength is Denmark, as of March 23, 2006. NOTE: There are no reliable estimates on number of other coalition forces in Iraq, by country. An additional 1,850 troops are from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Ukraine.
Fiji is participating as part of the UN mission in Iraq.
U.S. troop strength includes active and reserve and are as of March 2006. |
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SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008 |
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Manpower > Availability > Males age 15-49
|
29,392,600 |
|
[10th of 175]
|
|
DEFINITION: The total numbers of males aged 15-49. This statistic assumes that every individual is fit to serve. |
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SOURCE: US Department of Defense. The Brookings Institution Iraq Index, April 24, 2006. |
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Navy personnel
|
43,800 |
|
[11th of 49]
|
|
SOURCE: CIA World Factbook, 28 July 2005 |
|
personnel
|
272,000
|
|
[23rd of 170]
|
|
DEFINITION: Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. |
View time series
|
|
SOURCE: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy |
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personnel > % of total labor force
|
0.41 %
|
|
[129th of 168]
|
|
DEFINITION: Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population. |
View time series
|
|
SOURCE: World Development Indicators database |
Service age and obligation 18 years of age for voluntary military service |
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DEFINITION: This entry gives the required ages for voluntary or conscript military service and the length of sevice obligation. |
View time series
|
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SOURCE: World Development Indicators database |
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US deployment
|
3% |
|
|
|
DEFINITION: The approximate share of US troops deployed to particular locations during peacetime. US figure includes 2% in Hawaii and 1% in Alaska. |
|
SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008 |
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Weapon holdings
|
3,307,000 |
|
[27th of 137]
|
|
SOURCE: Dr T.R. O'Connor, (05/15/04) |
WMD > Missile Japan does not have a ballistic missile development program, but its space program includes a number of technologies that could potentially be adapted to long-range missiles. The solid-fueled M-5 rocket system, first launched in 1995, includes technologies that could be adapted to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities roughly similar to those of the U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile. Japan's two-stage H-2 rocket is capable of placing a two-ton payload into orbit, but the H-2 is not optimal for ballistic missile applications due to its reliance on cryogenic liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuel. Japan lacks sophisticated command and control systems, as well as some guidance and warhead technology that would be necessary to develop operational missiles. Japan has partnered with the United States to research ballistic missile defenses (BMD), but has yet to make a final decision on future development and deployment. Many in Japan argue that a missile defense system would compliment the U.S. nuclear deterrent and defend against possible belligerents such as North Korea. Others argue that the system's costs outweigh the benefits, especially since the system's effectiveness is unproven. Missile defense also raises potential legal issues regarding Japanese legislation barring the military use of space. Japan is an active member of the MTCR and was involved in drafting the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). |
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DEFINITION: A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction |
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SOURCE: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) |
WMD > Nuclear Japan's "Atomic Energy Basic Law" allows only peaceful nuclear activities, and its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" pledge that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. Despite Japan's long-standing stance against nuclear weapons, there was an internal debate in the early 1970s about whether Japan should sign the NPT, in part due to concerns about assuring access to nuclear technology to meet national energy needs, and the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Some conservatives were also concerned that closing off the nuclear option might negatively impact future national security needs. Japan has played an active role in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and has proposed a process for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan ratified the CTBT in 1997 and has been a strong supporter of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). However, Japan's security relationship with the United States has tempered Tokyo's emphasis on disarmament. For example, Japan remains quiet about the possible presence of nuclear warheads on U.S. ships and military bases in Japan. Japan increasingly relies on nuclear power for its electricity needs, and has a highly developed civilian nuclear sector. Japan has a controversial program for recycling spent nuclear fuel that has produced large quantities of plutonium in the form of metal-oxide nuclear fuel. At the end of 2001, Japan had more than 30 metric tons of spent fuel stored at reprocessing plants in Britain and France, along with a domestic stockpile of 5 to 6 tons. These nuclear fuel stockpiles will ultimately return to Japan for use in domestic nuclear facilities. The original plan called for consumption of the stored fuel by 2010, but due to technical and safety issues, this timetable has been delayed and return of the stored fuel to Japan is proceeding slowly. Some argue this material could provide Japan with a latent nuclear weapons capability. In addition, the new facility under constructing in Rokkasho (Aomori Prefecture) will increase Japanese domestic reprocessing capacity and potentially produce an additional 5 tons of metal-oxide nuclear fuel per year. Although anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public has far outweighed support for keeping a nuclear option open, several neighboring countries have expressed concerns about possible Japanese nuclear ambitions. Partly in response to these fears, the Japanese government completed an internal study in 1995 that reaffirmed previous conclusions that developing nuclear weapons would damage both Japan’s national security and regional security. However recent tension developing in the region, particularly in the Korean peninsula, has led to increased discussions in Japan about the once taboo subject of nuclear weapons development. Despite recent speculation that Japan may reconsider its nuclear options, the deep aversion to nuclear weapons among the Japanese public will likely make any move in this direction difficult. |
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DEFINITION: A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons |
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SOURCE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative |
WMD > Overview Japan's 1947 constitution, which renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes, sets important limits on Japanese security policy. Japan does not have any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, although it has the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. The Japanese government is highly active in the international nonproliferation and disarmament arena, and party to all relevant multilateral treaties and regimes. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack, Japan has been especially active in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997. Before 1945, Japan developed and employed both chemical and biological weapons. Japan is now a state party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Japan is also a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Zangger Committee. Japan has an active nuclear energy program, one of the world's leading chemical industries, a growing biotechnology sector, and an active commercial space program. |
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DEFINITION: An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction |
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SOURCE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative |