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FACTS & STATISTICS
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Air force personnel
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12 |
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[12th of 49]
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Armed forces growth
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77 |
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[77th of 132]
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Armed forces personnel
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20 |
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[20th of 166]
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Army personnel
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15 |
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[15th of 49]
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Conscription
No conscription (AI). |
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Conventional arms imports
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$27.00 |
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[27th of 85]
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Employment in arms production
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9 |
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[9th of 56]
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Expenditures > Dollar figure
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$4.00 |
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[4th of 170]
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Expenditures > Percent of GDP
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149 %
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[149th of 171]
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Iraq coalition forces > Troop strength
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8 |
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[8th of 10]
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Iraq pledges of reconstruction aid
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$2.00 |
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[2nd of 40]
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Manpower > Availability > Males age 15-49
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10 |
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[10th of 175]
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Manpower > Military age
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40 |
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[40th of 129]
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Navy personnel
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11 |
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[11th of 49]
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US deployment
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3% |
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Weapon holdings
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27 |
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[27th of 137]
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WMD > Biological
Japan had an active biological weapons (BW) program prior to 1945. The focal point was the now infamous Unit 731 based at a laboratory complex in northeastern China during the Japanese occupation. Unit 731 experimented on Chinese civilians and Allied prisoners of war with various biological agents, including plague, cholera, and hemorrhagic fever. After World War II, the Japanese government abandoned its BW program. Japan signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it in 1982. Japan has actively supported negotiation of a protocol to strengthen current BWC provisions. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack and failed attempt to disperse anthrax, Japan has increased its focus on bio-terrorism defenses. Although Japan has a growing biotechnology industry, it is still small in comparison to its chemical industry. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan's biotech industry is subject to a comprehensive set of export controls. |
WMD > Missile
Japan does not have a ballistic missile development program, but its space program includes a number of technologies that could potentially be adapted to long-range missiles. The solid-fueled M-5 rocket system, first launched in 1995, includes technologies that could be adapted to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities roughly similar to those of the U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile. Japan's two-stage H-2 rocket is capable of placing a two-ton payload into orbit, but the H-2 is not optimal for ballistic missile applications due to its reliance on cryogenic liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuel. Japan lacks sophisticated command and control systems, as well as some guidance and warhead technology that would be necessary to develop operational missiles. Japan has partnered with the United States to research ballistic missile defenses (BMD), but has yet to make a final decision on future development and deployment. Many in Japan argue that a missile defense system would compliment the U.S. nuclear deterrent and defend against possible belligerents such as North Korea. Others argue that the system's costs outweigh the benefits, especially since the system's effectiveness is unproven. Missile defense also raises potential legal issues regarding Japanese legislation barring the military use of space. Japan is an active member of the MTCR and was involved in drafting the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). |
WMD > Nuclear
Japan's "Atomic Energy Basic Law" allows only peaceful nuclear activities, and its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" pledge that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. Despite Japan's long-standing stance against nuclear weapons, there was an internal debate in the early 1970s about whether Japan should sign the NPT, in part due to concerns about assuring access to nuclear technology to meet national energy needs, and the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Some conservatives were also concerned that closing off the nuclear option might negatively impact future national security needs. Japan has played an active role in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and has proposed a process for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan ratified the CTBT in 1997 and has been a strong supporter of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). However, Japan's security relationship with the United States has tempered Tokyo's emphasis on disarmament. For example, Japan remains quiet about the possible presence of nuclear warheads on U.S. ships and military bases in Japan. Japan increasingly relies on nuclear power for its electricity needs, and has a highly developed civilian nuclear sector. Japan has a controversial program for recycling spent nuclear fuel that has produced large quantities of plutonium in the form of metal-oxide nuclear fuel. At the end of 2001, Japan had more than 30 metric tons of spent fuel stored at reprocessing plants in Britain and France, along with a domestic stockpile of 5 to 6 tons. These nuclear fuel stockpiles will ultimately return to Japan for use in domestic nuclear facilities. The original plan called for consumption of the stored fuel by 2010, but due to technical and safety issues, this timetable has been delayed and return of the stored fuel to Japan is proceeding slowly. Some argue this material could provide Japan with a latent nuclear weapons capability. In addition, the new facility under constructing in Rokkasho (Aomori Prefecture) will increase Japanese domestic reprocessing capacity and potentially produce an additional 5 tons of metal-oxide nuclear fuel per year. Although anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public has far outweighed support for keeping a nuclear option open, several neighboring countries have expressed concerns about possible Japanese nuclear ambitions. Partly in response to these fears, the Japanese government completed an internal study in 1995 that reaffirmed previous conclusions that developing nuclear weapons would damage both Japan’s national security and regional security. However recent tension developing in the region, particularly in the Korean peninsula, has led to increased discussions in Japan about the once taboo subject of nuclear weapons development. Despite recent speculation that Japan may reconsider its nuclear options, the deep aversion to nuclear weapons among the Japanese public will likely make any move in this direction difficult. |
WMD > Overview
Japan's 1947 constitution, which renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes, sets important limits on Japanese security policy. Japan does not have any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, although it has the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. The Japanese government is highly active in the international nonproliferation and disarmament arena, and party to all relevant multilateral treaties and regimes. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack, Japan has been especially active in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997. Before 1945, Japan developed and employed both chemical and biological weapons. Japan is now a state party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Japan is also a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Zangger Committee. Japan has an active nuclear energy program, one of the world's leading chemical industries, a growing biotechnology sector, and an active commercial space program. |
... View all Military stats
SOURCES: Number of full-time military personnel in the air force.; Growth in the number of armed forces personnel from 1985 (index = 100) to 2000. 100 means no growth, 50 means it halved and 200 means it doubled.; Total armed forces (2000); ; A description of the status of conscription in the nation in 1997.; Conventional arms transfers (1990 prices) - Imports (US$ millions)
Refers to the voluntary transfer by the supplier (and thus excludes captured weapons and weapons obtained through defectors) of weapons with a military purpose destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. These include major conventional weapons or systems in six categories: ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100-millimetre calibre).; Current military expenditures in US dollars; the figure is calculated by multiplying the estimated defense spending in percentage terms by the gross domestic product (GDP) calculated on an exchange rate basis not purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Dollar figures for military expenditures should be treated with caution because of different price patterns and accounting methods among nations, as well as wide variations in the strength of their currencies; Current military expenditures as an estimated percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
; Number of coalition forces in Iraq. Earliest confirmed date of troop strength is Georgia, as of September 10, 2005. Latest confirmed date of troop strength is Denmark, as of March 23, 2006. NOTE: There are no reliable estimates on number of other coalition forces in Iraq, by country. An additional 1,850 troops are from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Ukraine.
Fiji is participating as part of the UN mission in Iraq.
U.S. troop strength includes active and reserve and are as of March 2006.; Amount pledged by donor countries for reconstruction in Iraq, as of December 31, 2005. NOTES ON PLEDGES OF RECONSTRUCTION AID TABLE: The European Commission has pledged $518,119,988, which includes an additional January 2005 pledge of 200 million Euros (approximately $260 million), not yet formally committed to UNDG or World Bank Iraqi Trust Fund.
Not incuded in this graph is $65,000,000 in additional pledges from Kuwait.
"The World Bank, United Nations and CPA estimated Iraq will need $56 billion for reconstruction and stabilization efforts from 2004 to 2007, but that estimate is probably too low." -Brookings Institute.
UPDATE ON 2003 MADRID CONFERENCE PLEDGES: Of the $13.5 billion pledged by donors other than the United States, $3.2 billion has been disbursed as of December 2005.
The figure for the United States is derived from the IRRF 1 and 2. Status of the IRRF 2 as of January 6, 2006: $16.9 billion as been committed, and just over $10.1 billion has been expended.; The total numbers of males aged 15-49. This statistic assumes that every individual is fit to serve.; The minimum age at which an individual may volunteer for military service or be subject to conscription.; The approximate share of US troops deployed to particular locations during peacetime. US figure includes 2% in Hawaii and 1% in Alaska.; A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of biological weapons of mass destruction; A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction; A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons; An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction
ALTERNATIVE NAMES:
Japan
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