Army, Navy (includes naval air arm), Air Force (Bharatiya Vayu Sena), Coast Guard
Iraqi Armed Forces: Iraqi Army (includes Iraqi Special Operations Force, Iraqi Intervention Force), Iraqi Navy (former Iraqi Coastal Defense Force), Iraqi Air Force (former Iraqi Army Air Corps)
DEFINITION:
The names of the ground, naval, air, marine, and other defense or security forces
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC)
The number of draft-age males and females entering the military manpower pool in any given year and is a measure of the availability of draft-age young adults.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population.
For almost two decades, India has sought to develop and deploy ballistic and other missiles. User trials of the Prithvi-1 (150 km-range) and Prithvi-2 (250 km-range) ballistic missiles have been completed; both variants have been "inducted" into the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. India's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announced in September 2002 that the naval variant of the Prithvi (Dhanush) has completed sea trials and is ready for "induction." Five tests of different versions of the intermediate-range Agni ballistic missile were conducted between May 1989 and January 2001. Limited series production of the Agni-TD-I (1,500 km-range) and Agni-II (2,000-2,500 km-range) has commenced, and the Indian Army is raising a missile group to take possession of the missiles. In January 2003, DRDO conducted a second test of the single-stage, solid-fuel, 700-800 km-range version of the Agni. This new missile has been dubbed the Agni-1; it will be the likely successor to the Prithvi-series, which will henceforth be used in a battlefield support role. India reportedly will test a 3,500-4,000 km-range variant of the Agni (Agni-III) by the end of 2003. 'Development flight-trials' of the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos/PJ-10, which India is co-developing with Russian assistance, are likely to continue through 2003, with serial production expected to begin in 2004. However, India's sea-launched ballistic missile, Sagarika, is not expected to become operational before 2010. India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); in November 2002, it rejected a draft of the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) on ballistic missile proliferation on grounds that it is discriminatory and interferes with the peaceful uses of space technology.
Iraq purchased considerable numbers of short-range Scud missiles and launchers from the Soviet Union beginning in the early 1970s. Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad extended the range of the Scud to 650km; many of these modified missiles (known as the al-Husayn) were used during that war and, later, in Desert Storm. With extensive assistance from foreign companies, Iraq pursued a variety of other missile projects; these efforts were largely halted by UN weapon inspections that began in 1991. From 1991 to 1998, working under the proscriptions contained in the UN ceasefire resolution, Iraq developed various types of ballistic missiles with ranges of less than 150km, including the al-Ababil and the al-Samoud. During their time in Iraq, UNMOVIC inspectors destroyed 72 al-Samoud-2 missiles that violated the 150km-range limit, as well as certain equipment for the production of solid rocket motors. Following the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, David Kay’s Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) learned that a version of the al-Ababil exceeding the permitted range had been in the midst of development. In addition, the ISG ascertained the existence of two cruise missile programs to convert the HY-2 Seersucker into a land-attack system. The first program extended the range from 100km to 150-180km; two of 10 of these completed prototypes were delivered to the Iraqi military just before the invasion and are known to have been fired against coalition targets. The second program, designed to increase the range to 1000km over land, began in late November 2001 but was halted approximately one year later, just prior to the arrival of UNMOVIC inspectors. Under the subsequent leadership of Mr. Charles Duelfer, the ISG released its three-volume Comprehensive Report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction on 30 September 2004.[1] According to the report, between 1997 and 2003, Iraq maintained undeclared programs to convert SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) with proscribed range capabilities. By 2000 or 2001, Iraq also began to focus its efforts on developing a long-range, solid-propellant ballistic missile that would have exceeded the 150km range limit imposed by the UN Security Council. In addition, the report confirms prewar intelligence that Iraq had engaged in secret negotiations with North Korea to acquire dangerous missile technology. A number of other governments, sub-state entities, and individuals also provided Iraq assistance in its secret efforts to develop illicit missile systems since 1997. Moreover, inspectors discovered that the UN-run Oil-for-Food program was rife with corruption and holes through which Saddam's regime could gain the financial and logistical means to continue these secretive efforts in past years. Overall, the report concludes that prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq's efforts relating to illicit missile programs remained at a developmental, not production, stage. The inspectors argue, however, that Iraq fully intended to restart its missile program pursuits once international sanctions were lifted and inspections terminated.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction
India embarked on a nuclear power program in 1958 and a nuclear explosives program in 1968. Following a test of a nuclear device in May 1974, and five additional nuclear weapon-related tests in May 1998, India formally declared itself a nuclear weapon state. New Delhi's stock of weapons-grade plutonium is estimated to be between 240-395kg, which depending on the sophistication of the warhead design, could be used to manufacture 40-90 simple fission weapons. According to Indian government sources, India is capable of building a range of nuclear weapon systems ranging from "…low yields to 200 kilotons, involving fission, boosted-fission, and two-stage thermonuclear designs." India is not a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Iraq began limited efforts in the civilian nuclear field in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s, then Vice-President Saddam Hussein issued direct orders for the creation of a nuclear weapons program. The Iraqi plans called for the initial development of a civilian fuel cycle and related expertise. A parallel weapons program was then to be built off the civilian efforts. Accordingly, Iraq acquired a French nuclear reactor in 1975. Israel later destroyed the reactor in a June 1981 air strike, leading Iraq to explore a number of clandestine uranium enrichment methods. By the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Iraq had created a robust, covert nuclear weapons program that included a complete, although untested, nuclear weapon design. Subsequent estimates suggest that Iraq was perhaps only one to three years away from building a nuclear weapon at that time. Following Iraq’s defeat in the first Operation Desert Storm, inspectors from the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) worked to uncover the full extent of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. They destroyed facilities and relevant equipment in the process, with this work continuing until inspectors left Iraq in 1998. IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002 after a four-year lapse. They stayed until their March 2003 evacuation, which preceded the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The subsequent invasion by US-led coalition forces was rooted in the belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime had been deceiving the IAEA and hiding its WMD arsenals and capabilities. Soon after the start of the war, former UN inspector David Kay was named head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which was tasked with searching Iraq for WMD and related programs. The ISG did not find evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program or stockpiles of WMD. Instead, in its comprehensive report released on 30 September 2004, the ISG confirmed that Saddam Hussein effectively ended Iraq’s nuclear program following the first Gulf War in 1991 and did not direct a coordinated effort to restart the program thereafter. The ISG report does describe Saddam Hussein’s intention to rebuild his WMD capabilities after international sanctions were removed, however. To that end, the ISG uncovered evidence that the regime sought to conceal documents from its nuclear program following the 1991 war as well as maintain an intellectual capacity among scientists who might be involved in future activities aimed at restarting a nuclear weapons program. In addition, the report concludes that Saddam Hussein purposefully sought to spread ambiguity about his WMD capabilities in order to avoid appearing weak and to deter aggression. Meanwhile, shortly after the ISG’s findings were published, troubling new reports emerged about missing nuclear-related equipment and materials in Iraq which, according to the IAEA, has been disappearing from previously monitored sites since the start of the war in 2003.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons
India regards its nuclear and long-range power projection programs as instruments for maintaining strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region. These capabilities support New Delhi's claims to great power status, while also demonstrating that India's technical prowess is equal to that of developed countries'. Meanwhile, India continues to reject the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime on the grounds that it perpetuates an unjust distinction between a small group of states that are allowed nuclear weapons, and the rest of the world's states that are denied this right. India has also been highly critical of the nuclear weapon states' failure to meet their nuclear disarmament commitments.
In the decade before the first Gulf War (Desert Storm), Iraq invested more resources into nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs than any other developing country. The regime of Saddam Hussein envisioned its non-conventional weapons as serving a range of military and political ends, from tactical warfighting to strategic deterrence. These weapons programs were integrally linked with Saddam Hussein's personal and strategic ambitions: to remain in power, and to dominate the Persian Gulf and the Arab world.
DEFINITION:
An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction
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