Iraqi Armed Forces: Iraqi Army (includes Iraqi Special Operations Force, Iraqi Intervention Force), Iraqi Navy (former Iraqi Coastal Defense Force), Iraqi Air Force (former Iraqi Army Air Corps)
Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD): Ground Self-Defense Force (Rikujou Jietai, GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (Kaijou Jietai, MSDF), Air Self-Defense Force (Koku Jieitai, ASDF)
DEFINITION:
The names of the ground, naval, air, marine, and other defense or security forces
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC)
The number of draft-age males and females entering the military manpower pool in any given year and is a measure of the availability of draft-age young adults.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population.
Iraq began an offensive biological weapon (BW) program in 1985. By 1990, this program had produced 25 missile warheads and 166 400-pound aerial bombs that were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin, or aflatoxin. Further, Iraq acknowledged production of approximately 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin solution, 8,425 liters of anthrax solution, and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin. Baghdad also admitted to having researched the weapons potential of the camelpox virus, human rotavirus, enterovirus 17, and the toxin ricin. Since December 1998, when UN inspectors left the country, there has been no verifiable information about the status of Iraq's BW program. In May 2000, the United Kingdom estimated that Iraq could rebuild its BW program within months. As a condition of the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire agreement, Iraq ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq in part due to intelligence suspicions that Iraq had a clandestine biological weapons program among other WMD development programs. Investigations following the invasion, however, have yet to uncover evidence of biological weapons production in Iraq.
Japan had an active biological weapons (BW) program prior to 1945. The focal point was the now infamous Unit 731 based at a laboratory complex in northeastern China during the Japanese occupation. Unit 731 experimented on Chinese civilians and Allied prisoners of war with various biological agents, including plague, cholera, and hemorrhagic fever. After World War II, the Japanese government abandoned its BW program. Japan signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it in 1982. Japan has actively supported negotiation of a protocol to strengthen current BWC provisions. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack and failed attempt to disperse anthrax, Japan has increased its focus on bio-terrorism defenses. Although Japan has a growing biotechnology industry, it is still small in comparison to its chemical industry. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan's biotech industry is subject to a comprehensive set of export controls.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of biological weapons of mass destruction
Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons (CW) during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988. In 1988, Iraq mounted a massive chemical attack against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing approximately 5,000 civilians. Before Desert Storm, Iraq succeeded in producing the blister agent mustard, as well as the nerve agents tabun, sarin, cyclosarin and VX. After its 1991 defeat Iraq declared to UN inspectors that between 1982 and 1990 it produced 3,859 tons of CW agents and more than 125,000 filled and unfilled "special munitions." These munitions were mostly stored at the Muthana State Establishment, Iraq's major CW production, filling, and testing facility. Iraq's CW infrastructure suffered extensive damage during the 1991 Gulf War. After the war the United Nations was authorized to verify the destruction of all of Iraq's WMD and long-range delivery systems. By mid-1995, inspectors had largely completed verification and destruction of Baghdad's chemical stocks, munitions, and relevant production facilities and equipment. Following the suspension of UNSCOM inspections in 1998, the United States continued to believe that Iraq was secretly storing a significant quantity of chemical weapons, particularly nerve agent, and that Iraq had rebuilt much of its CW production infrastructure. According to the US State Department, Iraq had failed to account for 1.5 tons of VX, 1,000 tons of mustard gas, and 550 munitions containing mustard gas during the UNMOVIC inspections, violating UNSCR 1441. In November 2002, following a period of escalating pressure on Iraq, UNMOVIC inspection teams were allowed access to Iraq. Inspections continued until 18 March 2003 at which point all United Nations staff were withdrawn after the United States issued an ultimatum to Iraq. The UNMOVIC teams did not find any evidence that Iraq had resumed its WMD programs. On 19 March 2003 the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime. One of the justifications for this invasion was a belief that Iraq had clandestinely amassed large stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX, sarin and mustard gas, among other WMD that it had successfully concealed from the United Nations. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 the United States established the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). This group was tasked with locating the chemical weapons and other WMD reportedly hidden in Iraq. The United States at no point allowed UNMOVIC officials or inspectors to reenter Iraq to resume their duties and has not cooperated with UNMOVICS efforts to monitor Iraqi sites placed under UNMOVIC seal. On 30 September 2004 the ISG released its final report on Iraq's WMD programs. The ISG revealed that despite spending over one billion dollars it had not been able to find any WMD stockpiles or evidence that Iraq had restarted its CW program at any point subsequent to 1991. The ISG did find indications that Saddam intended to resume his WMD activities once UN sanctions were lifted but also noted that many Iraqi scientists and technicians were engaged in active deception of the Iraqi leadership regarding their ability to restart WMD programs. Iraq has not yet acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is anticipated that once Iraq regains full control over its domestic and foreign affairs it will acede to the CWC.
Japanese scientists began developing chemical weapons (CW) as early as 1917. The Japanese Army used CW after invading China in 1937, conducting an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 attacks. Japan reportedly produced five to seven million munitions containing agents such as phosgene, mustard, lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and diphenyl cyanarsine. Although Japanese forces used many of these munitions between 1937 and 1945, a considerable amount was abandoned when Japanese forces retreated. After World War II, Japan pledged to not produce CW and participated in the negotiations for the CWC, which Japan signed in 1993 and ratified in 1995. Japan's CWC obligations include the responsibility for the disposal of abandoned CW (ACW) in China. The deadline for completion of the clean-up is 2007, but the scale of the program has led many to estimate that Japan will need an extension. Japan's chemical industry is the world's second largest, with about 16 percent of global chemical production. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan has developed comprehensive and well-enforced export controls on chemical weapons precursors and dual-use items. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack, Japanese spending on CW defense has increased.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of chemical weapons of mass destruction
Iraq purchased considerable numbers of short-range Scud missiles and launchers from the Soviet Union beginning in the early 1970s. Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad extended the range of the Scud to 650km; many of these modified missiles (known as the al-Husayn) were used during that war and, later, in Desert Storm. With extensive assistance from foreign companies, Iraq pursued a variety of other missile projects; these efforts were largely halted by UN weapon inspections that began in 1991. From 1991 to 1998, working under the proscriptions contained in the UN ceasefire resolution, Iraq developed various types of ballistic missiles with ranges of less than 150km, including the al-Ababil and the al-Samoud. During their time in Iraq, UNMOVIC inspectors destroyed 72 al-Samoud-2 missiles that violated the 150km-range limit, as well as certain equipment for the production of solid rocket motors. Following the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, David Kay’s Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) learned that a version of the al-Ababil exceeding the permitted range had been in the midst of development. In addition, the ISG ascertained the existence of two cruise missile programs to convert the HY-2 Seersucker into a land-attack system. The first program extended the range from 100km to 150-180km; two of 10 of these completed prototypes were delivered to the Iraqi military just before the invasion and are known to have been fired against coalition targets. The second program, designed to increase the range to 1000km over land, began in late November 2001 but was halted approximately one year later, just prior to the arrival of UNMOVIC inspectors. Under the subsequent leadership of Mr. Charles Duelfer, the ISG released its three-volume Comprehensive Report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction on 30 September 2004.[1] According to the report, between 1997 and 2003, Iraq maintained undeclared programs to convert SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) with proscribed range capabilities. By 2000 or 2001, Iraq also began to focus its efforts on developing a long-range, solid-propellant ballistic missile that would have exceeded the 150km range limit imposed by the UN Security Council. In addition, the report confirms prewar intelligence that Iraq had engaged in secret negotiations with North Korea to acquire dangerous missile technology. A number of other governments, sub-state entities, and individuals also provided Iraq assistance in its secret efforts to develop illicit missile systems since 1997. Moreover, inspectors discovered that the UN-run Oil-for-Food program was rife with corruption and holes through which Saddam's regime could gain the financial and logistical means to continue these secretive efforts in past years. Overall, the report concludes that prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq's efforts relating to illicit missile programs remained at a developmental, not production, stage. The inspectors argue, however, that Iraq fully intended to restart its missile program pursuits once international sanctions were lifted and inspections terminated.
Japan does not have a ballistic missile development program, but its space program includes a number of technologies that could potentially be adapted to long-range missiles. The solid-fueled M-5 rocket system, first launched in 1995, includes technologies that could be adapted to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities roughly similar to those of the U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile. Japan's two-stage H-2 rocket is capable of placing a two-ton payload into orbit, but the H-2 is not optimal for ballistic missile applications due to its reliance on cryogenic liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuel. Japan lacks sophisticated command and control systems, as well as some guidance and warhead technology that would be necessary to develop operational missiles. Japan has partnered with the United States to research ballistic missile defenses (BMD), but has yet to make a final decision on future development and deployment. Many in Japan argue that a missile defense system would compliment the U.S. nuclear deterrent and defend against possible belligerents such as North Korea. Others argue that the system's costs outweigh the benefits, especially since the system's effectiveness is unproven. Missile defense also raises potential legal issues regarding Japanese legislation barring the military use of space. Japan is an active member of the MTCR and was involved in drafting the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC).
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction
Iraq began limited efforts in the civilian nuclear field in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s, then Vice-President Saddam Hussein issued direct orders for the creation of a nuclear weapons program. The Iraqi plans called for the initial development of a civilian fuel cycle and related expertise. A parallel weapons program was then to be built off the civilian efforts. Accordingly, Iraq acquired a French nuclear reactor in 1975. Israel later destroyed the reactor in a June 1981 air strike, leading Iraq to explore a number of clandestine uranium enrichment methods. By the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Iraq had created a robust, covert nuclear weapons program that included a complete, although untested, nuclear weapon design. Subsequent estimates suggest that Iraq was perhaps only one to three years away from building a nuclear weapon at that time. Following Iraq’s defeat in the first Operation Desert Storm, inspectors from the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) worked to uncover the full extent of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. They destroyed facilities and relevant equipment in the process, with this work continuing until inspectors left Iraq in 1998. IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002 after a four-year lapse. They stayed until their March 2003 evacuation, which preceded the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The subsequent invasion by US-led coalition forces was rooted in the belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime had been deceiving the IAEA and hiding its WMD arsenals and capabilities. Soon after the start of the war, former UN inspector David Kay was named head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which was tasked with searching Iraq for WMD and related programs. The ISG did not find evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program or stockpiles of WMD. Instead, in its comprehensive report released on 30 September 2004, the ISG confirmed that Saddam Hussein effectively ended Iraq’s nuclear program following the first Gulf War in 1991 and did not direct a coordinated effort to restart the program thereafter. The ISG report does describe Saddam Hussein’s intention to rebuild his WMD capabilities after international sanctions were removed, however. To that end, the ISG uncovered evidence that the regime sought to conceal documents from its nuclear program following the 1991 war as well as maintain an intellectual capacity among scientists who might be involved in future activities aimed at restarting a nuclear weapons program. In addition, the report concludes that Saddam Hussein purposefully sought to spread ambiguity about his WMD capabilities in order to avoid appearing weak and to deter aggression. Meanwhile, shortly after the ISG’s findings were published, troubling new reports emerged about missing nuclear-related equipment and materials in Iraq which, according to the IAEA, has been disappearing from previously monitored sites since the start of the war in 2003.
Japan's "Atomic Energy Basic Law" allows only peaceful nuclear activities, and its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" pledge that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. Despite Japan's long-standing stance against nuclear weapons, there was an internal debate in the early 1970s about whether Japan should sign the NPT, in part due to concerns about assuring access to nuclear technology to meet national energy needs, and the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Some conservatives were also concerned that closing off the nuclear option might negatively impact future national security needs. Japan has played an active role in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and has proposed a process for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan ratified the CTBT in 1997 and has been a strong supporter of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). However, Japan's security relationship with the United States has tempered Tokyo's emphasis on disarmament. For example, Japan remains quiet about the possible presence of nuclear warheads on U.S. ships and military bases in Japan. Japan increasingly relies on nuclear power for its electricity needs, and has a highly developed civilian nuclear sector. Japan has a controversial program for recycling spent nuclear fuel that has produced large quantities of plutonium in the form of metal-oxide nuclear fuel. At the end of 2001, Japan had more than 30 metric tons of spent fuel stored at reprocessing plants in Britain and France, along with a domestic stockpile of 5 to 6 tons. These nuclear fuel stockpiles will ultimately return to Japan for use in domestic nuclear facilities. The original plan called for consumption of the stored fuel by 2010, but due to technical and safety issues, this timetable has been delayed and return of the stored fuel to Japan is proceeding slowly. Some argue this material could provide Japan with a latent nuclear weapons capability. In addition, the new facility under constructing in Rokkasho (Aomori Prefecture) will increase Japanese domestic reprocessing capacity and potentially produce an additional 5 tons of metal-oxide nuclear fuel per year. Although anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public has far outweighed support for keeping a nuclear option open, several neighboring countries have expressed concerns about possible Japanese nuclear ambitions. Partly in response to these fears, the Japanese government completed an internal study in 1995 that reaffirmed previous conclusions that developing nuclear weapons would damage both Japan’s national security and regional security. However recent tension developing in the region, particularly in the Korean peninsula, has led to increased discussions in Japan about the once taboo subject of nuclear weapons development. Despite recent speculation that Japan may reconsider its nuclear options, the deep aversion to nuclear weapons among the Japanese public will likely make any move in this direction difficult.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons
In the decade before the first Gulf War (Desert Storm), Iraq invested more resources into nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs than any other developing country. The regime of Saddam Hussein envisioned its non-conventional weapons as serving a range of military and political ends, from tactical warfighting to strategic deterrence. These weapons programs were integrally linked with Saddam Hussein's personal and strategic ambitions: to remain in power, and to dominate the Persian Gulf and the Arab world.
Japan's 1947 constitution, which renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes, sets important limits on Japanese security policy. Japan does not have any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, although it has the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. The Japanese government is highly active in the international nonproliferation and disarmament arena, and party to all relevant multilateral treaties and regimes. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack, Japan has been especially active in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997. Before 1945, Japan developed and employed both chemical and biological weapons. Japan is now a state party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Japan is also a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Zangger Committee. Japan has an active nuclear energy program, one of the world's leading chemical industries, a growing biotechnology sector, and an active commercial space program.
DEFINITION:
An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction
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