Army, Navy (includes naval air arm), Air Force (Bharatiya Vayu Sena), Coast Guard
Ground Forces (SV), Navy (VMF), Air Forces (Voyenno-Vozdushniye Sily, VVS); Airborne Troops (VDV), Strategic Rocket Troops (Raketnyye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya, RVSN), and Space Troops (KV) are independent "combat arms," not subordinate to any of the three branches; Russian Ground Forces include the following combat arms: motorized-rifle troops, tank troops, missile and artillery troops, air defense of ground troops
The names of the ground, naval, air, marine, and other defense or security forces
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC)
Conventional arms transfers (1990 prices) - Exports (US$ millions)
Refers to the voluntary transfer by the supplier (and thus excludes captured weapons and weapons obtained through defectors) of weapons with a military purpose destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. These include major conventional weapons or systems in six categories: ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100-millimetre calibre).
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2005. SIPRI Arms Transfers. Database. February. Stockholm.
Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another.)
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.
16 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; women officers allowed in noncombat roles only
18-27 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service; males are registered for the draft at 17 years of age; service obligation - 1 year; reserve obligation to age 50; as of July 2008, a draft military strategy called for the draft to continue up to the year 2030
This entry gives the required ages for voluntary or conscript military service and the length of sevice obligation.
For almost two decades, India has sought to develop and deploy ballistic and other missiles. User trials of the Prithvi-1 (150 km-range) and Prithvi-2 (250 km-range) ballistic missiles have been completed; both variants have been "inducted" into the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. India's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announced in September 2002 that the naval variant of the Prithvi (Dhanush) has completed sea trials and is ready for "induction." Five tests of different versions of the intermediate-range Agni ballistic missile were conducted between May 1989 and January 2001. Limited series production of the Agni-TD-I (1,500 km-range) and Agni-II (2,000-2,500 km-range) has commenced, and the Indian Army is raising a missile group to take possession of the missiles. In January 2003, DRDO conducted a second test of the single-stage, solid-fuel, 700-800 km-range version of the Agni. This new missile has been dubbed the Agni-1; it will be the likely successor to the Prithvi-series, which will henceforth be used in a battlefield support role. India reportedly will test a 3,500-4,000 km-range variant of the Agni (Agni-III) by the end of 2003. 'Development flight-trials' of the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos/PJ-10, which India is co-developing with Russian assistance, are likely to continue through 2003, with serial production expected to begin in 2004. However, India's sea-launched ballistic missile, Sagarika, is not expected to become operational before 2010. India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); in November 2002, it rejected a draft of the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) on ballistic missile proliferation on grounds that it is discriminatory and interferes with the peaceful uses of space technology.
Russia inherited most of the Soviet missile complex, although significant portions are located in Ukraine. Russia has the capability to produce highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-fueled missiles of all ranges. The RS-12M2 Topol-M (NATO designation SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has been developed for silo basing and mobile basing model is under development. Although the possibility of deploying a MIRVed variant of the SS-27 has also been discussed in the past, no steps in that direction appear to have been taken yet. In the meantime, Russia continues to extend service lives of existing types of MIRVed ICBMs. While no sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is currently in production, Russia is developing a new SLBM called the Bulava, which is to be deployed in the existing Typhoon class submarines and in the future in a new class of ballistic missile submarines currently under construction. It is planned that in the future a modification of Bulava will also be deployed in silos as a MIRVed ICBM. There are also plans to start production of an upgraded SS-N-23 variant, designated Sineva, and the Air Force reportedly began to receive a new type of strategic cruise missile. Reports of exports and leakage of Russian missile technology to countries such as Iran, India, China, Libya, and North Korea have led to concerns that Russia is contravening its obligations as a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction
India embarked on a nuclear power program in 1958 and a nuclear explosives program in 1968. Following a test of a nuclear device in May 1974, and five additional nuclear weapon-related tests in May 1998, India formally declared itself a nuclear weapon state. New Delhi's stock of weapons-grade plutonium is estimated to be between 240-395kg, which depending on the sophistication of the warhead design, could be used to manufacture 40-90 simple fission weapons. According to Indian government sources, India is capable of building a range of nuclear weapon systems ranging from "…low yields to 200 kilotons, involving fission, boosted-fission, and two-stage thermonuclear designs." India is not a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The Soviet nuclear weapon program began during World War II and culminated in a successful atomic bomb test in 1949. Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, is a nuclear weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to estimates by the Natural Resources Defense Council, by 1991, the Soviet Union had approximately 35,000 weapons in its stockpile, down from a peak in 1986 of approximately 45,000. Russia is estimated to now have around 20,000 nuclear weapons, although total stockpile size is uncertain because there is no accurate count of tactical nuclear weapons. However, in 2002 Russia declared it will eliminate its tactical nuclear weapons by the end of 2004. Under the START I Treaty, the Russian nuclear arsenal has been reduced to approximately 7,000 strategic warheads. The START II Treaty, which was declared non-binding in June 2002, would have reduced this number to between 3,000 and 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Treaty of Moscow) requires Russia to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. Russia inherited a massive nuclear weapons production complex and large stocks of weapons grade fissile material. It is estimated that Russia has between 735 and 1,365 metric tons (t) of weapons grade-equivalent highly enriched uranium (HEU) and between 106 and 156 t of military-use plutonium.
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons
India regards its nuclear and long-range power projection programs as instruments for maintaining strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region. These capabilities support New Delhi's claims to great power status, while also demonstrating that India's technical prowess is equal to that of developed countries'. Meanwhile, India continues to reject the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime on the grounds that it perpetuates an unjust distinction between a small group of states that are allowed nuclear weapons, and the rest of the world's states that are denied this right. India has also been highly critical of the nuclear weapon states' failure to meet their nuclear disarmament commitments.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 left the Russian Federation with the bulk of the massive Soviet weapons of mass destruction complex. This legacy has allowed Russia to retain its great power status even as its economy has collapsed, but the burden of supporting this oversized complex has strained the Russian political and economic system. Russia's nuclear and missile capabilities presupposes its crucial role in arms control and nonproliferation, while the remnants of chemical and biological weapons programs pose major environmental and proliferation threats.
An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction