Growth in the number of armed forces personnel from 1985 (index = 100) to 2000. 100 means no growth, 50 means it halved and 200 means it doubled.
SOURCE:
calculated on the basis of data on armed forces from IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2001. The Military Balance 2001-2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC)
Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another.)
The number of draft-age males and females entering the military manpower pool in any given year and is a measure of the availability of draft-age young adults.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population.
Although some intelligence estimates suggest that India possesses biological weapons, there is very limited open-source information available about a possible Indian biological weapon program. India has defensive biological weapon capabilities and has conducted research on countering various diseases, including plague, brucellosis, and smallpox. India also has an extensive and advanced pharmaceutical industry and is therefore technically capable of developing biological weapons. India ratified the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1974.
There is very limited open-source information regarding Syria's biological warfare (BW) capability. German and Israeli sources have asserted that Syria possesses Bacillus anthracis (which causes anthrax), botulinum toxin, and ricin. Other independent assessments, however, maintain there is no evidence that the country has progressed past the research and development phase of a BW capability. Syria has a pharmaceutical infrastructure that could support a limited BW program, and it engages in extensive trade of dual-use equipment and goods with companies in Western Europe, Russia, and North Korea. Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968 and signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on April 14, 1972, but has yet to ratify it.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of biological weapons of mass destruction
After many years of denying the existence of a chemical weapon program, India disclosed in June 1997 that it possessed chemical weapons. Few details are publicly available concerning Indian chemical weapon stockpiles, although Chinese researchers suggest that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents, mostly mustard agent, located at five chemical weapon production and storage facilities. Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which India signed in 1993 and ratified in September 1996, India must destroy 45 percent of its stockpile by 2004 and the remaining stockpile by 2007.
Syria is suspected of having one of the most advanced chemical warfare (CW) capabilities in the Middle East and among developing countries worldwide. Syria allegedly received initial chemical warfare assistance and supplies, including weaponized chemical agents, from Egypt prior to the October War against Israel in 1973. Analysts claim that the country now has an indigenous capability to produce and weaponize nerve (e.g., sarin) and blister (e.g., mustard) agents. There are numerous highly inconsistent reports that Syria has successfully produced and weaponized VX nerve agent. There are some allegations that Syria received Russian assistance in developing this agent in the 1990s but these reports remain substantially unconfirmed in the open sources. Syria appears to remain dependent on the acquisition of imported dual-use technology, equipment and precursors. In the past Syria has acquired many of these items from various European countries and India. Despite the widespread belief that Syria has an active chemical weapons program it is still able to obtain access to many dual-use chemicals used by its oil and chemical industries. As export controls have tightened Syria has increasingly turned to imports from countries outside international export control regimes such as Egypt and North Korea for the provision of certain precursor chemicals. Syria is still able to meet many of its more general bulk chemical needs from its traditional European and Indian suppliers. Syria possesses Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles capable of being fitted with chemical warheads, and in 1999 it allegedly tested a Scud-B carrying a warhead designed to disperse VX. The quality of Syrian weaponization efforts is not clear from open-sources and it remains unclear how effective the use of Scud missiles would be against Israeli defenses. In addition to this long range capability Syria is believed to possess a significant tactical chemical weapons capability centered around artillery shells and rockets. Open sources assert that there are at least three Syrian facilities currently engaged in producing CW, located near Damascus, Hama, and Safira village (in the Aleppo area). Beginning in early 2003 officials in the united States and Israel began to suggest that Syria had received shipments of chemical weapons and other WMD from Iraq. These allegations increased in frequency as the absence of WMD in Iraq became more apparent. To date the available information suggests that these allegations are at best speculative and at worst malicious. Given the claims that Syria has the most advanced CW capability in the middle-east it is difficult to find a convincing rationale for Syria receiving illicit Iraqi WMD stocks. Since late 2002 Syria has been confronted by an aggressive United States using WMD possession as a justification for pre-emptive military action. Since April 2003 Syria has been effectively surrounded by the United States and its allies and has come under increasing political and military pressures. Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968, but so far has declined to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In 2004 Syrian officials met with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In the absence of information on the content of the discussions the significance of this development remains unclear.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of chemical weapons of mass destruction
For almost two decades, India has sought to develop and deploy ballistic and other missiles. User trials of the Prithvi-1 (150 km-range) and Prithvi-2 (250 km-range) ballistic missiles have been completed; both variants have been "inducted" into the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. India's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announced in September 2002 that the naval variant of the Prithvi (Dhanush) has completed sea trials and is ready for "induction." Five tests of different versions of the intermediate-range Agni ballistic missile were conducted between May 1989 and January 2001. Limited series production of the Agni-TD-I (1,500 km-range) and Agni-II (2,000-2,500 km-range) has commenced, and the Indian Army is raising a missile group to take possession of the missiles. In January 2003, DRDO conducted a second test of the single-stage, solid-fuel, 700-800 km-range version of the Agni. This new missile has been dubbed the Agni-1; it will be the likely successor to the Prithvi-series, which will henceforth be used in a battlefield support role. India reportedly will test a 3,500-4,000 km-range variant of the Agni (Agni-III) by the end of 2003. 'Development flight-trials' of the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos/PJ-10, which India is co-developing with Russian assistance, are likely to continue through 2003, with serial production expected to begin in 2004. However, India's sea-launched ballistic missile, Sagarika, is not expected to become operational before 2010. India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); in November 2002, it rejected a draft of the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) on ballistic missile proliferation on grounds that it is discriminatory and interferes with the peaceful uses of space technology.
Syria's missile program began in the early 1970s as a means to counter Israel’s superior conventional military capabilities; since that time, the missile program has grown in tandem with the development of chemical weapons (CW). Syria now has one of the largest arsenals of ballistic missiles in the region, made up of hundreds of Scud-derived missile systems. In the 1970s and 1980s, Syria relied on Soviet technology and support for its missile program and imported the Soviet FROG-7, Scud-Bs, and the solid-fueled Scarab SS-21 missiles. In the 1990s, Syria looked to other states to supply it with missile technology and found willing partners in Iran and North Korea. Iran provided Syria with technical assistance for solid-fueled rocket motor production, while North Korea supplied it with equipment and technical assistance for liquid-fueled missile production. Syria, however, has had difficulty creating an indigenous production capability and has had to rely on continued imports from countries such as North Korea and China. Syria reportedly purchased 150 Scud-C missiles from North Korea in 1991. In September 2000, Syria tested a North Korean, 700 km-range Scud-D, revealing its commitment to expanding its missile capability. Syria is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction
India embarked on a nuclear power program in 1958 and a nuclear explosives program in 1968. Following a test of a nuclear device in May 1974, and five additional nuclear weapon-related tests in May 1998, India formally declared itself a nuclear weapon state. New Delhi's stock of weapons-grade plutonium is estimated to be between 240-395kg, which depending on the sophistication of the warhead design, could be used to manufacture 40-90 simple fission weapons. According to Indian government sources, India is capable of building a range of nuclear weapon systems ranging from "…low yields to 200 kilotons, involving fission, boosted-fission, and two-stage thermonuclear designs." India is not a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Although the Israeli and U.S. governments have expressed concerns about Syrian nuclear weapons aspirations, there is little convincing evidence of such an objective. Syria signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 and ratified the document one year later; its 30 KW nuclear research reactor in Dayr al Jajar, provided by China, is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In 1998, the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission began discussions with Russia about expanding its nuclear infrastructure, as prior negotiations with Argentina and China had proved unsuccessful. In May 1999, Moscow and Damascus signed an agreement in which the former will provide at least one light water nuclear reactor, which will be subject to IAEA safeguards. At this time, Syria has neither the infrastructure nor the financial resources to pursue an indigenous nuclear weapons program. Following revelations regarding the nuclear technology proliferation network of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan in 2003, some have evinced concern that Syria may have been a client. In a September 2004 interview, IAEA Secretary General ElBaradei stated that there are "no indications" of such a relationship.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons
India regards its nuclear and long-range power projection programs as instruments for maintaining strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region. These capabilities support New Delhi's claims to great power status, while also demonstrating that India's technical prowess is equal to that of developed countries'. Meanwhile, India continues to reject the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime on the grounds that it perpetuates an unjust distinction between a small group of states that are allowed nuclear weapons, and the rest of the world's states that are denied this right. India has also been highly critical of the nuclear weapon states' failure to meet their nuclear disarmament commitments.
While constrained by limited resources, Syria has shown interest in and taken steps to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, especially chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Damascus has allegedly received direct assistance from Russia (and formerly the Soviet Union), Iran, and North Korea in developing its programs. Syria's motivation to acquire WMD, and ballistic missiles in particular, appears to be a response to Israel's superior conventional military capabilities. There are strong indications that Syria is pursuing nuclear weapons.
DEFINITION:
An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction
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