Iraqi Armed Forces: Iraqi Army (includes Iraqi Special Operations Force, Iraqi Intervention Force), Iraqi Navy (former Iraqi Coastal Defense Force), Iraqi Air Force (former Iraqi Army Air Corps)
US Army, US Navy (includes Marine Corps), US Air Force, US Coast Guard; note - Coast Guard administered in peacetime by the Department of Homeland Security, but in wartime reports to the Department of the Navy
DEFINITION:
The names of the ground, naval, air, marine, and other defense or security forces
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC)
The number of draft-age males and females entering the military manpower pool in any given year and is a measure of the availability of draft-age young adults.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population.
18 years of age (17 years of age with parental consent) for male and female voluntary service; maximum enlistment age 42 (Army), 27 (Air Force), 34 (Navy), 28 (Marines); service obligation 8 years, including 2-5 years active duty (Army), 2 years active (Navy), 4 years active (Air Force, Marines)
DEFINITION:
This entry gives the required ages for voluntary or conscript military service and the length of sevice obligation.
Iraq began an offensive biological weapon (BW) program in 1985. By 1990, this program had produced 25 missile warheads and 166 400-pound aerial bombs that were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin, or aflatoxin. Further, Iraq acknowledged production of approximately 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin solution, 8,425 liters of anthrax solution, and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin. Baghdad also admitted to having researched the weapons potential of the camelpox virus, human rotavirus, enterovirus 17, and the toxin ricin. Since December 1998, when UN inspectors left the country, there has been no verifiable information about the status of Iraq's BW program. In May 2000, the United Kingdom estimated that Iraq could rebuild its BW program within months. As a condition of the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire agreement, Iraq ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq in part due to intelligence suspicions that Iraq had a clandestine biological weapons program among other WMD development programs. Investigations following the invasion, however, have yet to uncover evidence of biological weapons production in Iraq.
The U.S. offensive biological warfare (BW) program was launched in 1943 and terminated in 1969, by executive order. During this period, the U.S. weaponized a variety of pathogens and toxins for use against humans and plants. The anti-human agents it developed for weapons purposes were Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), the Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B. The anti-plant agents were the fungi that cause wheat rust and rice blast. In addition, U.S. military scientists conducted research on pathogens that cause smallpox, glanders, and plague, as well as several toxins, such as botulinum toxin, saxitoxin, and ricin. The entire U.S. BW stockpile was destroyed in 1969 and 1970; since that time, it has not had an offensive BW program. The U.S. ratified the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) in March 1975 and had an important role in the process of developing confidence-building measures (CBMs) during several BWC review conferences. However, in 2001, the Bush administration rejected an effort by other signatories to conclude a protocol that would provide verification measures. Since then, the remaining parties to the BWC have conducted semiannual meetings to discuss, among other things, national measures for the implementation of biosecurity regulations and penal legislation, leading up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006.[2] In addition, the United States has conducted an active biodefense program for many years in accordance with BWC provisions that permit the use of agents of types and in quantities appropriate for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. These activities are reported each year to Congress and in an annual information exchange on biodefense activities under the BWC. A 4 September 2001 New York Times article identified previously undisclosed U.S. government biodefense projects involving a model of a germ bomb, a factory to make biological agents, and the development of more potent anthrax. The United States denied allegations that this research was anything other than defensive in nature and asserted that it did not violate any BWC provisions or CBMs. On 28 April 2004, President Bush outlined the administration's perspective on biological weapons by issuing National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-33) called "Biodefense for the 21st Century", an initiative to strengthen the country's biodefense capabilities through programs in threat awareness, prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and response and recovery. The Bush administration also faces criticism that financial resources have been redirected from non-biodefense research in order to fund additional biodefense research.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of biological weapons of mass destruction
Iraq purchased considerable numbers of short-range Scud missiles and launchers from the Soviet Union beginning in the early 1970s. Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad extended the range of the Scud to 650km; many of these modified missiles (known as the al-Husayn) were used during that war and, later, in Desert Storm. With extensive assistance from foreign companies, Iraq pursued a variety of other missile projects; these efforts were largely halted by UN weapon inspections that began in 1991. From 1991 to 1998, working under the proscriptions contained in the UN ceasefire resolution, Iraq developed various types of ballistic missiles with ranges of less than 150km, including the al-Ababil and the al-Samoud. During their time in Iraq, UNMOVIC inspectors destroyed 72 al-Samoud-2 missiles that violated the 150km-range limit, as well as certain equipment for the production of solid rocket motors. Following the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, David Kay’s Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) learned that a version of the al-Ababil exceeding the permitted range had been in the midst of development. In addition, the ISG ascertained the existence of two cruise missile programs to convert the HY-2 Seersucker into a land-attack system. The first program extended the range from 100km to 150-180km; two of 10 of these completed prototypes were delivered to the Iraqi military just before the invasion and are known to have been fired against coalition targets. The second program, designed to increase the range to 1000km over land, began in late November 2001 but was halted approximately one year later, just prior to the arrival of UNMOVIC inspectors. Under the subsequent leadership of Mr. Charles Duelfer, the ISG released its three-volume Comprehensive Report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction on 30 September 2004.[1] According to the report, between 1997 and 2003, Iraq maintained undeclared programs to convert SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) with proscribed range capabilities. By 2000 or 2001, Iraq also began to focus its efforts on developing a long-range, solid-propellant ballistic missile that would have exceeded the 150km range limit imposed by the UN Security Council. In addition, the report confirms prewar intelligence that Iraq had engaged in secret negotiations with North Korea to acquire dangerous missile technology. A number of other governments, sub-state entities, and individuals also provided Iraq assistance in its secret efforts to develop illicit missile systems since 1997. Moreover, inspectors discovered that the UN-run Oil-for-Food program was rife with corruption and holes through which Saddam's regime could gain the financial and logistical means to continue these secretive efforts in past years. Overall, the report concludes that prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq's efforts relating to illicit missile programs remained at a developmental, not production, stage. The inspectors argue, however, that Iraq fully intended to restart its missile program pursuits once international sanctions were lifted and inspections terminated.
The United States has the capability to produce highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-fueled missiles of all ranges. It currently deploys 500 Minuteman and 10 MX/Peacekeeper nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at three bases in Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming. The number of warheads on Minuteman missiles was scheduled to be reduced from three to one by 2007 under the defunct START II agreement, but this plan may be revised to assign between 700 to 800 warheads to the 500 Minutemen missiles. Deactivation of the MX/Peacekeeper force began in October 2002 and will conclude in 2005, at the cost of $600 million. In 2004, the Defense Department retired 17 additional MX/Peacekeeper missiles as part of this plan, and the final 10 MX missiles will be withdrawn from alert status by October 1, 2005. These remaining missiles will not be destroyed as prescribed under START II, but will be retained as stipulated in the 2001 NPR for potential use as space launch vehicles, target vehicles, or for redeployment. The Minuteman missile force is also undergoing a $6.0 billion modernization program to improve the weapon's accuracy, reliability, and to extend its service life beyond 2020. A new, longer-range ICBM, to be ready in 2018, is being considered by the Pentagon. As of early 2005, the U.S. Navy had 14 operational Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), having reduced its level by one in 2004 to meet NPR specifications. The four oldest subs in the original class of 18 have been converted to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. The 14 operational SSBNs carry a total of 336 Trident-1 and Trident-II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), each carrying between six and eight warheads, for an estimated total of 2,016. All SSBNs will be modified to carry the Trident II missiles, and the navy has extended the service life of the Trident-II from 30 to 49 years. The Pentagon is planning to introduce a new SSBN in 2029 when the oldest of the current subs will be retired. Previous predictions indicated that the U.S. Navy would station the 14 SSBNs evenly among the Atlantic and Pacific fleets; however, recent planning shifts have called for an SSBN fleet of 9 to be stationed in the Pacific with only 5 submarines in the Atlantic. Also, in 2004, the Navy initiated the Enhanced Effectiveness (E2) Reentry Body Program that would allow missiles to be targeted within 10-meter accuracy, expanding the list of potential targets to be attacked by W76 warheads. Finally, the Navy plans to resume SLBM flight tests in 2005 and plans to develop a submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (SLIRBM) that would carry nuclear and conventional payloads. The U.S. bomber force consists of 94 B-52 bombers stationed at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana and Minot AFB in North Dakota, and 21 B-2 bombers stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. The B-52 can deliver air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), advanced cruise missiles (ACM), or gravity bombs. The B-2 carries only gravity bombs. It is estimated that 450 ALCMs are deployed as well as around 400 operational ACMs, which have a longer range, greater accuracy, and more difficult to intercept than an ALCM. The B-2s are scheduled to undergo upgrades allowing them to make mission and target changes in route. The U.S. Air Force intends to expedite the process of finding a replacement for its current bomber force, considering long- and mid-range options, unmanned aircraft, and new bombers. The United States is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whose goal is to control the transfer of nuclear-capable missiles and unmanned delivery systems capable of carrying all types of WMD.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction
Iraq began limited efforts in the civilian nuclear field in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s, then Vice-President Saddam Hussein issued direct orders for the creation of a nuclear weapons program. The Iraqi plans called for the initial development of a civilian fuel cycle and related expertise. A parallel weapons program was then to be built off the civilian efforts. Accordingly, Iraq acquired a French nuclear reactor in 1975. Israel later destroyed the reactor in a June 1981 air strike, leading Iraq to explore a number of clandestine uranium enrichment methods. By the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Iraq had created a robust, covert nuclear weapons program that included a complete, although untested, nuclear weapon design. Subsequent estimates suggest that Iraq was perhaps only one to three years away from building a nuclear weapon at that time. Following Iraq’s defeat in the first Operation Desert Storm, inspectors from the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) worked to uncover the full extent of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. They destroyed facilities and relevant equipment in the process, with this work continuing until inspectors left Iraq in 1998. IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002 after a four-year lapse. They stayed until their March 2003 evacuation, which preceded the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The subsequent invasion by US-led coalition forces was rooted in the belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime had been deceiving the IAEA and hiding its WMD arsenals and capabilities. Soon after the start of the war, former UN inspector David Kay was named head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which was tasked with searching Iraq for WMD and related programs. The ISG did not find evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program or stockpiles of WMD. Instead, in its comprehensive report released on 30 September 2004, the ISG confirmed that Saddam Hussein effectively ended Iraq’s nuclear program following the first Gulf War in 1991 and did not direct a coordinated effort to restart the program thereafter. The ISG report does describe Saddam Hussein’s intention to rebuild his WMD capabilities after international sanctions were removed, however. To that end, the ISG uncovered evidence that the regime sought to conceal documents from its nuclear program following the 1991 war as well as maintain an intellectual capacity among scientists who might be involved in future activities aimed at restarting a nuclear weapons program. In addition, the report concludes that Saddam Hussein purposefully sought to spread ambiguity about his WMD capabilities in order to avoid appearing weak and to deter aggression. Meanwhile, shortly after the ISG’s findings were published, troubling new reports emerged about missing nuclear-related equipment and materials in Iraq which, according to the IAEA, has been disappearing from previously monitored sites since the start of the war in 2003.
As one of the five recognized nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States maintains a sizeable arsenal of nuclear weapons, including approximately 10,350 intact warheads, 5300 of which are considered active or operational. Approximately 4,530 strategic warheads are operational, 1,150 of which are deployed on land-based missile systems (Minuteman and Peacekeeper ICBMs), 1,050 on bombers (B-52 and B-2), and 2,016 on submarines (Ohio-class subs). 780 are tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), and consist of an estimated 200 Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles (TLAM/N), and 580 B61 bombs. The remaining warheads are stockpiled. The only remaining U.S. weapons in forward deployment, aside from those on SSBNs, are approximately 480 of the 580 operational B61 bombs, located at eight bases in six European NATO countries. According to the May 2002 Treaty of Moscow (the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT) between the United States and the Russian Federation, both countries are required to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012. In June 2004, the US Department of Energy announced that "almost half" of these warheads would be retired for dismantlement by 2012. This statement suggests that the total stockpile of 10,350 warheards would be reduced to about 6,000 by this date. Over 5,000 warheads have been removed from deployment by the United States and placed in a "responsive reserve force" (active but not deployed or in overhaul). These "spares," or warheads on inactive status, have not been dismantled, in keeping with past practice under previous U.S. arms control agreements. The Bush administration has rejected U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but calls for a continued moratorium on nuclear testing. The NPR calls for a reduction in the amount of time needed (now 18 months as mandated by Congress, but this could be reduced to as little as 12 months) to test a nuclear weapon, suggesting that the United States might decide to resume nuclear testing, although Bush administration officials deny that this is currently planned and explain the shortening of test-site readiness time as a logical extension of the U.S. decision to maintain a testing option. The NPR also calls for discussion on possible development of new, low-yield, bunker-busting TNW. A law barring research and development that could lead to the production by the United States of a new low-yield "bunker buster" nuclear weapon (warheads with a yield of 5 kilotons or less) was passed by Congress in 1994. In its FY2004 budget request, however, the Department of Defense requested a repeal of the 1994 law, suggesting that the U.S. government intends to proceed with development of new nuclear weapons. The repeal was approved by the Senate on 20 May 2003. The Bush administration has requested an additional $8.5 million in its 2006 budget in order to continue research of nuclear "bunker busters" under the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) Project. Congress rejected RNEP funding and resources for the Advanced Concepts Initiative, one that would develop mini-nukes or exotic designs, completely for FY2005. Weapons laboratories under the Department of Energy began research on the RNEP Project in 2003, and the study is expected to be complete in 2006. The United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, making it the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons during a conflict. It ratified the NPT in March 1970.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons
In the decade before the first Gulf War (Desert Storm), Iraq invested more resources into nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs than any other developing country. The regime of Saddam Hussein envisioned its non-conventional weapons as serving a range of military and political ends, from tactical warfighting to strategic deterrence. These weapons programs were integrally linked with Saddam Hussein's personal and strategic ambitions: to remain in power, and to dominate the Persian Gulf and the Arab world.
The United States possesses a substantial nuclear weapons arsenal and associated delivery systems. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review suggests that the United States may seek to develop, and possibly test, new types of nuclear weapons in the future. The United States destroyed its biological weapons by 1970 and is in the process of destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons. Some critics allege that elements of U.S. government biodefense research are in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
DEFINITION:
An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction
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