Growth in the number of armed forces personnel from 1985 (index = 100) to 2000. 100 means no growth, 50 means it halved and 200 means it doubled.
SOURCE:
calculated on the basis of data on armed forces from IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2001. The Military Balance 2001-2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD): Ground Self-Defense Force (Rikujou Jietai, GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (Kaijou Jietai, MSDF), Air Self-Defense Force (Koku Jieitai, ASDF)
Armed Peoples on Duty (APOD, Army), Libyan Arab Navy, Libyan Arab Air Force (Al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Jamahiriya al-Arabia al-Libyya, LAAF)
DEFINITION:
The names of the ground, naval, air, marine, and other defense or security forces
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, unless otherwise indicated. Acronyms: Amnesty International (AI); European Council of Conscripts Organizations (ECCO); Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR); National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO); Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ); War Resisters International (WRI); World Council of Churches (WCC)
Conventional arms transfers (1990 prices) - Imports (US$ millions)
Refers to the voluntary transfer by the supplier (and thus excludes captured weapons and weapons obtained through defectors) of weapons with a military purpose destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. These include major conventional weapons or systems in six categories: ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100-millimetre calibre).
SOURCE:
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2005. SIPRI Arms Transfers. Database. February. Stockholm.
Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another.)
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.
Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population.
Japan does not have a ballistic missile development program, but its space program includes a number of technologies that could potentially be adapted to long-range missiles. The solid-fueled M-5 rocket system, first launched in 1995, includes technologies that could be adapted to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities roughly similar to those of the U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile. Japan's two-stage H-2 rocket is capable of placing a two-ton payload into orbit, but the H-2 is not optimal for ballistic missile applications due to its reliance on cryogenic liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuel. Japan lacks sophisticated command and control systems, as well as some guidance and warhead technology that would be necessary to develop operational missiles. Japan has partnered with the United States to research ballistic missile defenses (BMD), but has yet to make a final decision on future development and deployment. Many in Japan argue that a missile defense system would compliment the U.S. nuclear deterrent and defend against possible belligerents such as North Korea. Others argue that the system's costs outweigh the benefits, especially since the system's effectiveness is unproven. Missile defense also raises potential legal issues regarding Japanese legislation barring the military use of space. Japan is an active member of the MTCR and was involved in drafting the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC).
Libya first acquired Scud-B missiles in the early 1970s from the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, Libya accelerated its efforts to obtain a longer-range ballistic missile with the al-Fatah, reportedly with a range of 950km. Germany and China allegedly provided technical and material assistance to the al-Fatah program. The al-Fatah missile system has not been completed and remains untested. In November 2000, as part of a $600 million agreement, Libya allegedly acquired the first shipment of a total of 50 North Korean Nodong ballistic missiles, including launch capabilities. North Korea also allegedly provided more than 10 scientists to work on the Libyan missile program. This complemented other missile component shipments that reportedly began in 1999. Also, after the lifting of the 1999 sanctions, reports of increased technical and structural assistance from countries like Iran, North Korea, China, India, and Russia have raised concerns over Libya's growing ability to manufacture ballistic missiles. In 2003, US experts were given access to Libya's missile arsenal and to a number of missile research facilities. In December 2003, Libya pledged to eliminate ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than 300km with payloads of 500kg. Libya is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In April 2004, Libya told American officials that it plans to convert hundreds of its Scud-B missiles into short-range defensive weapons and discontinue all military trade with North Korea. In October, the US State Department announced that it had verified the complete dismantling of Libya's WMD programs, including MTCR-class missiles.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of missile weapons of mass destruction
Japan's "Atomic Energy Basic Law" allows only peaceful nuclear activities, and its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" pledge that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. Despite Japan's long-standing stance against nuclear weapons, there was an internal debate in the early 1970s about whether Japan should sign the NPT, in part due to concerns about assuring access to nuclear technology to meet national energy needs, and the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Some conservatives were also concerned that closing off the nuclear option might negatively impact future national security needs. Japan has played an active role in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and has proposed a process for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan ratified the CTBT in 1997 and has been a strong supporter of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). However, Japan's security relationship with the United States has tempered Tokyo's emphasis on disarmament. For example, Japan remains quiet about the possible presence of nuclear warheads on U.S. ships and military bases in Japan. Japan increasingly relies on nuclear power for its electricity needs, and has a highly developed civilian nuclear sector. Japan has a controversial program for recycling spent nuclear fuel that has produced large quantities of plutonium in the form of metal-oxide nuclear fuel. At the end of 2001, Japan had more than 30 metric tons of spent fuel stored at reprocessing plants in Britain and France, along with a domestic stockpile of 5 to 6 tons. These nuclear fuel stockpiles will ultimately return to Japan for use in domestic nuclear facilities. The original plan called for consumption of the stored fuel by 2010, but due to technical and safety issues, this timetable has been delayed and return of the stored fuel to Japan is proceeding slowly. Some argue this material could provide Japan with a latent nuclear weapons capability. In addition, the new facility under constructing in Rokkasho (Aomori Prefecture) will increase Japanese domestic reprocessing capacity and potentially produce an additional 5 tons of metal-oxide nuclear fuel per year. Although anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public has far outweighed support for keeping a nuclear option open, several neighboring countries have expressed concerns about possible Japanese nuclear ambitions. Partly in response to these fears, the Japanese government completed an internal study in 1995 that reaffirmed previous conclusions that developing nuclear weapons would damage both Japan’s national security and regional security. However recent tension developing in the region, particularly in the Korean peninsula, has led to increased discussions in Japan about the once taboo subject of nuclear weapons development. Despite recent speculation that Japan may reconsider its nuclear options, the deep aversion to nuclear weapons among the Japanese public will likely make any move in this direction difficult.
In its 19 December 2003 announcement that it was eliminating all materials, equipment and programs proscribed by the international community, Libya took the unusual step of first publicly revealing its nuclear weapons program, then renouncing it. Libya then invited the IAEA to verify the elimination of nuclear weapon related activities in-country. According to International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who led a December 2003 inspection team to Libya, Libya's nuclear weapons program is in the very initial stages, about three to seven years away from producing a nuclear weapon. Libya admitted having secretly imported raw uranium and the necessary equipment to convert it for enrichment into weapons-grade material but added that the enrichment plan had been dismantled and that no highly enriched uranium had been produced over the past decade. IAEA inspectors did not find either, though they did find imported equipment and technology at a number of previously secret nuclear facilities in and around Tripoli. It has been revealed that Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan is responsible for providing Libya with its nuclear warhead plans, raw uranium and enrichment centrifuges through his black market network. In his 19 December 2003 announcement, Qadhafi pledged to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Libya ratified in 1975, and to sign the Additional Protocol, which it did on 10 March 2004. IAEA chief El Baradei indicated that signing the Protocol would ensure IAEA oversight over Libya’s nuclear transition from weapons creation to peaceful purposes. Previously, Libya signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in November 2001 and ratified it in January 2004. In 1996, it had signed the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Besides previously secret nuclear sites disclosed in late 2003, Libya possesses a Soviet-supplied 10MW research reactor in Tajura. With the lifting of UN sanctions in 1998, Russia renewed its nuclear cooperation with Libya, providing funding for renovations to the Tajura nuclear complex. As of October 2004, the IAEA continues to investigate the clandestine network through which Libya supplied its nuclear weapons program. North Korea and several South African, German, and Swiss nationals have been implicated in providing restricted training and technologies to Libya.
DEFINITION:
A description of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons
Japan's 1947 constitution, which renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes, sets important limits on Japanese security policy. Japan does not have any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, although it has the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. The Japanese government is highly active in the international nonproliferation and disarmament arena, and party to all relevant multilateral treaties and regimes. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack, Japan has been especially active in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997. Before 1945, Japan developed and employed both chemical and biological weapons. Japan is now a state party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Japan is also a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Zangger Committee. Japan has an active nuclear energy program, one of the world's leading chemical industries, a growing biotechnology sector, and an active commercial space program.
Libya has shown interest in and taken steps to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. Indeed, it is one of the few states to have employed chemical weapons in a conflict (Chad, 1987). Libya's motivation to acquire WMD, and ballistic missiles in particular, appears in part to be a response to Israel's clandestine nuclear program and a desire to become a more active player in Middle Eastern and African politics. On 19 December 2003, Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi publicly confirmed his commitment to disclose and dismantle WMD programs in his country following a nine-month period of negotiations with U.S. and U.K. authorities.
DEFINITION:
An overview of the nation's situation with regards to the possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction
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