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Biological
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There is no evidence that Brazil has ever developed or produced biological weapons. It ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1973 and signed the Mendoza Declaration in 1991, which prohibits biological as well as chemical agents. Brazil's opposition to biological weapons is evident from reports that senior government officials oppose using biological agents even to control coca production in neighboring Colombia. Brazil does have the capacity to produce biological agents; for example, it has one of the world’s largest crops of the castor bean (which naturally produces the toxin ricin) and is proficient in advanced biological techniques such as gene sequencing. However, there is no indication that Brazil presents a biological weapons threat; it is, in fact, a staunch proponent of biological weapons nonproliferation.
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Japan had an active biological weapons (BW) program prior to 1945. The focal point was the now infamous Unit 731 based at a laboratory complex in northeastern China during the Japanese occupation. Unit 731 experimented on Chinese civilians and Allied prisoners of war with various biological agents, including plague, cholera, and hemorrhagic fever. After World War II, the Japanese government abandoned its BW program. Japan signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it in 1982. Japan has actively supported negotiation of a protocol to strengthen current BWC provisions. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack and failed attempt to disperse anthrax, Japan has increased its focus on bio-terrorism defenses. Although Japan has a growing biotechnology industry, it is still small in comparison to its chemical industry. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan's biotech industry is subject to a comprehensive set of export controls.
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Chemical
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There is no evidence that Brazil has ever embarked on a chemical warfare (CW) program; to the contrary, Brazil is an extremely active participant in CW nonproliferation efforts. Even before the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came into existence, Brazil engaged in regional nonproliferation efforts. For example, in September 1991, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile signed the Mendoza Declaration, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transfer—directly or indirectly—chemical or biological weapons. Brazil participated actively in the negotiations for the CWC and ratified it in March 1996, thereby becoming a charter member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). By the end of 2000, Brazil had hosted five OPCW inspections of its chemical industry sites, as well as the first simulation of a challenge inspection of private industry.
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Japanese scientists began developing chemical weapons (CW) as early as 1917. The Japanese Army used CW after invading China in 1937, conducting an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 attacks. Japan reportedly produced five to seven million munitions containing agents such as phosgene, mustard, lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and diphenyl cyanarsine. Although Japanese forces used many of these munitions between 1937 and 1945, a considerable amount was abandoned when Japanese forces retreated. After World War II, Japan pledged to not produce CW and participated in the negotiations for the CWC, which Japan signed in 1993 and ratified in 1995. Japan's CWC obligations include the responsibility for the disposal of abandoned CW (ACW) in China. The deadline for completion of the clean-up is 2007, but the scale of the program has led many to estimate that Japan will need an extension. Japan's chemical industry is the world's second largest, with about 16 percent of global chemical production. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan has developed comprehensive and well-enforced export controls on chemical weapons precursors and dual-use items. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack, Japanese spending on CW defense has increased.
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Missile
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Brazil curtailed the military potential of its space launch vehicle (SLV) program in the early 1990s and joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Previously, however, military control over the SLV program and an ambitious export program of short-range rockets had raised concerns that Brazil might develop ballistic missiles and supply other countries with them.
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Japan does not have a ballistic missile development program, but its space program includes a number of technologies that could potentially be adapted to long-range missiles. The solid-fueled M-5 rocket system, first launched in 1995, includes technologies that could be adapted to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities roughly similar to those of the U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile. Japan's two-stage H-2 rocket is capable of placing a two-ton payload into orbit, but the H-2 is not optimal for ballistic missile applications due to its reliance on cryogenic liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuel. Japan lacks sophisticated command and control systems, as well as some guidance and warhead technology that would be necessary to develop operational missiles. Japan has partnered with the United States to research ballistic missile defenses (BMD), but has yet to make a final decision on future development and deployment. Many in Japan argue that a missile defense system would compliment the U.S. nuclear deterrent and defend against possible belligerents such as North Korea. Others argue that the system's costs outweigh the benefits, especially since the system's effectiveness is unproven. Missile defense also raises potential legal issues regarding Japanese legislation barring the military use of space. Japan is an active member of the MTCR and was involved in drafting the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC).
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Nuclear
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From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Brazil pursued an ambitious program of nuclear energy and technological development, which included construction of an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility under Navy direction. However, Brazil has since disavowed nuclear weapons, become a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and, with Argentina, established a bilateral inspection agency to verify both countries' pledges to use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. Brazil mines uranium, which is shipped to foreign countries for conversion and enrichment, and returned to Brazil, where it is fabricated in Resende into fuel for its two nuclear power reactors. When completed, a uranium enrichment plant under construction at Resende will allow the country to make its own low-enriched uranium fuel for its nuclear power industry. As of mid-2005, the government of Brazil was considering the possibility of signing an Additional Protocol with the IAEA and was planning to release a comprehensive report on the future of the country's nuclear program.
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Japan's "Atomic Energy Basic Law" allows only peaceful nuclear activities, and its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" pledge that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. Despite Japan's long-standing stance against nuclear weapons, there was an internal debate in the early 1970s about whether Japan should sign the NPT, in part due to concerns about assuring access to nuclear technology to meet national energy needs, and the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Some conservatives were also concerned that closing off the nuclear option might negatively impact future national security needs. Japan has played an active role in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and has proposed a process for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan ratified the CTBT in 1997 and has been a strong supporter of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). However, Japan's security relationship with the United States has tempered Tokyo's emphasis on disarmament. For example, Japan remains quiet about the possible presence of nuclear warheads on U.S. ships and military bases in Japan. Japan increasingly relies on nuclear power for its electricity needs, and has a highly developed civilian nuclear sector. Japan has a controversial program for recycling spent nuclear fuel that has produced large quantities of plutonium in the form of metal-oxide nuclear fuel. At the end of 2001, Japan had more than 30 metric tons of spent fuel stored at reprocessing plants in Britain and France, along with a domestic stockpile of 5 to 6 tons. These nuclear fuel stockpiles will ultimately return to Japan for use in domestic nuclear facilities. The original plan called for consumption of the stored fuel by 2010, but due to technical and safety issues, this timetable has been delayed and return of the stored fuel to Japan is proceeding slowly. Some argue this material could provide Japan with a latent nuclear weapons capability. In addition, the new facility under constructing in Rokkasho (Aomori Prefecture) will increase Japanese domestic reprocessing capacity and potentially produce an additional 5 tons of metal-oxide nuclear fuel per year. Although anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public has far outweighed support for keeping a nuclear option open, several neighboring countries have expressed concerns about possible Japanese nuclear ambitions. Partly in response to these fears, the Japanese government completed an internal study in 1995 that reaffirmed previous conclusions that developing nuclear weapons would damage both Japan’s national security and regional security. However recent tension developing in the region, particularly in the Korean peninsula, has led to increased discussions in Japan about the once taboo subject of nuclear weapons development. Despite recent speculation that Japan may reconsider its nuclear options, the deep aversion to nuclear weapons among the Japanese public will likely make any move in this direction difficult.
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Overview
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Brazil has abjured nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and curtailed its ballistic missile program in the early 1990s. From the 1970s to the early 1990s, however, Brazil’s nuclear program aroused concern that the country was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. The international community—and Washington in particular—raised additional concerns that technology from Brazil’s space launch vehicle (SLV) program would be used for production of ballistic missiles. Brasilia is now a member of all key international nonproliferation regimes.
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Japan's 1947 constitution, which renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes, sets important limits on Japanese security policy. Japan does not have any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, although it has the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. The Japanese government is highly active in the international nonproliferation and disarmament arena, and party to all relevant multilateral treaties and regimes. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack, Japan has been especially active in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997. Before 1945, Japan developed and employed both chemical and biological weapons. Japan is now a state party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Japan is also a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Zangger Committee. Japan has an active nuclear energy program, one of the world's leading chemical industries, a growing biotechnology sector, and an active commercial space program.
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